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

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THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND INTERCOMMUNION

By J. P. HICKINBOTHAM

I. Introduction.

Like most Churches, the Church of England has recently recovered interest in its own past. Recent publications, like the Bishop of Chichester's *Christian Unity, the Anglican Position* and Professor Sykes's *The Church of England and the Non-Episcopal Churches in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,* have reminded us that this interest is not irrelevant to problems of Church unity. The Church of England, as many of us believe, had a broadly consistent and agreed policy towards other Churches from the sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. The past cannot dictate to the present. But neither can the present ignore the past; and there is a growing conviction that while this policy could not, and should not, be applied unchanged to-day, it deserves more careful attention than it has latterly received, and that some of its principles have much to teach us. This article attempts to interpret the principles of this historic Anglican tradition and to suggest how far they may be applicable to our present problems.

II. The Pre-Reformation Tradition.

Intercommunion is a modern problem, arising from the Reformation. The primitive and medieval Church had (broadly speaking) a simple and more or less agreed principle governing admission to Communion. The Sacraments were acts of Christ in his Body the Catholic Church; therefore any member qualified to receive Communion in one part of that Church was qualified to receive it in all parts. The Eucharist

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was the act of the whole Church, and admission to it depended upon a man's standing *vis à vis* the whole Catholic Church; the locality in which he worshipped was theologically irrelevant. Similarly, the Ministry was the Ministry of Christ in his Body the Catholic Church; a minister was ordained in and for the whole Church, and if his ordination qualified him to serve in one part of that Church it qualified him to serve in all.

The principle was easy to apply in practice because of three assumptions somewhat glibly but none the less generally made:

(a) It was assumed that the Church Catholic is visibly one, with one local Church representing it in each place. When rival bodies appeared it followed that they were spurious imitations or at best schisms *from* the Church. They were not parts of the Church. Even if they had technically valid Sacraments the grace of the Sacraments could not be conveyed in any saving way outside the Church; it remained in suspense until the recipients were reconciled to the Church. There could be no question of fellowship with such bodies, and there was little difficulty in deciding which was the true Church—it was your own. If you were a Westerner the East was in schism from the Church; if you were an Easterner the West was in similar unhappy plight.

(b) It was assumed that there was one only method of admission to communicant status—Baptism followed normally by Confirmation, though in the West Confirmation was not an entirely indispensable preliminary to Communion. Thus it was easy to decide who was qualified to receive Communion.

(c) It was assumed that there was only one method of admitting to the Ministry—episcopal ordination. Thus it was easy to decide who was qualified to celebrate the Eucharist.

III. Problems Created by the Reformation.

This over-simplified but (it is hoped) substantially true account of the pre-Reformation attitude became impossible in the sixteenth century. The claim made by the Church of

England, in common with other Protestant Churches, that national Churches are free to reform themselves under the Word of God and that they may differ from each other in non-essentials did not invalidate the principle, and ideally it need not have complicated the application of it. Had the claim been allowed, and had there remained one form of admission to communicant status and one form of admission to the Ministry, all might have been well. National Churches might have differed much in liturgy, administration, and doctrinal expression but they would have all recognized each other as the due local representatives of the Church Catholic and would have received each other's communicants and clergy accordingly. This would have been a return to something like the unity in variety of the primitive Church. But in actual fact this did not happen. None of the three assumptions which had made the principle easy to apply could any longer be easily made.

(a) The Church could no longer be easily assumed to be visibly one with a single local Church representing it in each place. For this there were two reasons.

(i) Some Churches which claimed to be true national Churches refused to recognize each other as such, because each believed the other to be so corrupt in doctrine as to be apostate or at least to be of doubtful Churchly status. This was so not only as between Rome and Protestants, but as between certain of the Protestant Churches themselves.

(ii) In consequence of this, rival Churches were set up in the same area, and again not only Roman as against Protestant, but Protestant competed with Protestant. This was particularly confusing when both Churches were, according to Anglican standards, doctrinally orthodox in all essentials.

(b) It could no longer easily be assumed that there was one agreed mode of admission to communicant status. Practically all agreed on the indispensability of Baptism (though Baptist insistence on believers' baptism soon added to the

complications), but some retained Confirmation while others rejected it.

(c) It could no longer be easily assumed that there was one agreed mode of admission to the Ministry. Some retained episcopacy, others substituted for it presbyterianism or an independent polity.

IV. The Church of England's Attitude.

Faced by these complications the Church of England had either to abandon the basic principle of the pre-Reformation Church or to retain it and to work out, as best it could, a new application of it which would take account of the problems raised. The Church's practice and the writings of its divines can, the writer thinks, only be understood as a reasonable and consistent whole on the assumption that the latter course was taken, not always perhaps fully consciously but none the less definitely. How, then, were the problems tackled?

(a) What bodies could be recognized as true parts of the Catholic Church? The answer to this had two parts corresponding to the two aspects of the problem noted above.

(i) The first test was that laid down in the 19th Article of Religion: the preaching of the pure Word of God and the due ministration of the Sacraments "according to Christ's ordinance in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same". The Word and Sacraments are the basic means whereby the Gospel of the grace of God is made available to men; desertion of these renders a Church apostate. In practice this was held to involve acceptance of at least the fundamentals of the Protestant position as against Rome—e.g. the supremacy of the Bible, justification by faith alone, the denial of Papal authority and of Roman sacramental teaching. The Church of England justified her own separation from Rome on the ground of Rome's extreme corruption, and if Anglicans usually were unwilling to regard her as entirely apostate they were committed to the view that she could not be recognized with sufficient assurance to warrant her claim to be the true representative of the Church Catholic in this country. Fur-

ther, what they claimed for themselves Anglicans allowed to others. The main Protestant Churches of Europe and Scotland were universally recognized as true parts of the Church Catholic, and even the seventeenth century High Church divines habitually spoke of them as the "Church of France" or "of Germany" etc., thus recognizing that they and not Rome were the true national Churches of those countries. This applied both to Lutheran and Calvinistic Churches; both alike were held to be substantially orthodox in essentials and at liberty to differ from us and from each other in non-essentials.

(ii) The second test was whether or not the Church concerned had seceded from, or been set up in rivalry to, an existing national Church which was sufficiently orthodox to be recognized as the local representative of the Church Catholic. Secession could be justified if, but only if, the existing Church had become hopelessly corrupt, as Rome was assumed to be. In all other circumstances dissenting bodies were regarded as wilful schismatics, sinfully separating from the Church Catholic as focused in the Church locally representing it; and such bodies could not be recognized as true parts of the Church. They were openly setting at nought the principle that the one Church must have its one local embodiment in each place. For this reason the English Nonconformists were accorded no ecclesiastical recognition, even though they might be tolerated by the law of the land. Towards the end of the period this principle began to be obscured, first in our dealings with Scotland where the existence of an Episcopalian remnant after the Scottish Kirk had reverted to Presbyterianism caused difficulties, and secondly in the new lands where no one form of Christianity could claim substantial priority over another; but in the earlier period the principle was rigorously adhered to.

(b) What was the test of admission to communicant status? For its own members the Church of England insisted upon Confirmation as well as Baptism, though the significant exception in favour of those "desirous to be confirmed" proved that it did not regard this as theologically indispens-

able. But it interpreted the Prayer-Book rubric as applying to the members of the Church of England only, as indeed was to be expected since the Prayer-Book is a manual for Church of England worshippers. Scottish and foreign Protestants were always, and English dissenters usually, admitted to Communion. This accorded with the distinction made between the Sacraments of the Gospel which were "generally necessary to salvation" as having been instituted by Christ, and other rites such as Confirmation which were consonant with Scripture, ordained by the Church, and had great edificatory value, but could not be regarded as essential because they were not clearly enjoined in Scripture. Confirmation was regarded as belonging to the *bene esse* of the Church and therefore as something which our Church must retain, but it was not of the *esse;* and since Baptism clearly sufficed to make a person a member of the Church those parts of the Church which regarded it as sufficient also to give communicant status were free to do so, and their members were not to be repelled when they desired to communicate with us. This form of admission to communicant status might be unwise and unedifying, but it was legitimate. Persons so admitted were communicants of the Catholic Church and must be treated as such.

(c) What was the test of admission to the Ministry? The answer was on similar lines to that given to the question about communicant status. Episcopacy was required of members of the Church of England desiring to be admitted to the Ministry. In the sixteenth and again in the eighteenth century this was often grounded simply upon the fact that episcopacy was the established order of the Church in this country; it was thought of (along Lutheran lines) as a matter theologically indifferent which each Church might decide as it saw fit. In the seventeenth century, and of course in many cases before and after, it was often thought of as the only proper form of ordination, as having been instituted under the guidance of the Spirit in the early Church, or by the Apostles, or even by Christ himself. But even those who thus thought of it as ex-

isting *jure divino* distinguished sharply between the Word and Sacraments which were the vehicles of the grace of God and therefore constitutive of the Church, and ordinances concerning Church order which pertained to the peace, well-being, and edification of the Church but were not constitutive of its essence. As Bishop Andrewes wrote : " Nor if one form is of divine right does it follow that without it there is not salvation or that a Church cannot stand. Let a man be blind if he sees not Churches standing without it ". Archbishop Bramhall summed up the view of the Caroline divines when he said, in reference to the non-episcopal Churches overseas, that a distinction must be drawn " between the true nature and essence of a Church which we do readily grant them and the integrity and perfection of a Church which we cannot grant ". Churches lacking episcopacy lacked what was of the *bene esse* of the Church, not the *esse* of the Church.

The Church of England, therefore, while standing firm for episcopacy could recognize non-episcopal Churches and their Sacraments, even though they might be thought defective in Church order. This involved a real, though limited, recognition of their ministries : their ministers were true ministers of the Catholic Church though defective in the form of their Orders. It did not follow, however, that such ministers could, save in very exceptional cases, be admitted to minister in the Church of England. Had they been freely admitted this would have undermined the Church of England's own rule of episcopacy. The case differs from that of admitting unconfirmed members of other Churches to Communion, because, whereas such persons came as private individuals receiving spiritual hospitality in a branch of the Church Catholic other than their own, a minister celebrating the Eucharist in an Anglican Church is necessarily acting as one officially sanctioned and accredited by the Church of England itself and carrying the full weight of its authority. Exceptions could therefore only be made to the rule if they were made sufficiently rarely and for sufficiently good cause to show clearly that there was no intention of disturbing the Church's order. Such occasional

exceptions were made in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in England ; while later in our period Lutherans in considerable numbers regularly ministered over long periods to Anglican congregations, according to the Anglican rite and under the authority of the Anglican bishops, in the mission field, and they were not required to accept episcopal ordination. Such exceptions are sufficient to show that the mind of the Church of England was prepared to accept the Orders of the main non-episcopal Protestant Churches as a real admission to the ministry of the Catholic Church. They were also sufficiently rare to show that the mind of the Church of England nevertheless regarded such Orders as defective in proper form and as something not normally allowed in our own Church.

V. The Church of England's Practice.

This has partly emerged from the foregoing discussion, but it may be convenient to summarize it here.

(a) On grounds of doctrinal corruption no sure recognition could be given to the Roman Church. Contacts with the Eastern Churches were few but generally friendly. The only serious negotiations for inter-communion, however, were undertaken by the Non-jurors' sect which represented the most "High Church" wing of Anglicanism, and as these broke down on doctrinal grounds it seems unlikely that any very sure mutual recognition between the Church of England and the Orthodox Churches would have been possible. On grounds of schism no recognition could be given to the English Nonconformists. This left the Protestant Churches of Scotland and Europe, which were regarded as substantially orthodox and as the true national representatives of the Church Catholic.

(b) Therefore members of the Protestant Churches were regularly admitted to Communion and Anglicans were free to communicate with them and frequently did so. Some individuals scrupled to make use of this latter liberty on the ground not of their lack of Churchly status or the invalidity of their Sacraments but of the risk that by doing so they might

seem to cast doubt on their own loyalty to episcopacy. But the liberty was there ; it was used by leading Churchmen and bishops ; and it received the official sanction of Archbishop Wake of Canterbury.

(c) This practice depended upon the view that while episcopacy and confirmation both belonged to the *bene esse* of the Church they could not be regarded as of the *esse* of the Church. Baptism could suffice for communicant status, and Sacraments could be ministered by non-episcopal ministers, though in both cases this was regarded as a defect.

(d) Interchange of ministers was restricted to very rare occasions because anything else would have endangered the Church of England's adherence to episcopacy.

(e) English Nonconformists who desired, as a sign that their separation from the Church of England was not complete, to communicate in the Church occasionally, were usually allowed and often actively encouraged to do so. This, however, implied no recognition of the Free Churches as Churches. It was a liberty allowed on the ground on which it was asked for: that the individuals concerned were members of the Church of England who had not wholly severed their connexion with it and hoped ultimately to be able to return to full fellowship with it.

VI. The Church of England's Tradition and Our Modern Problems.

It falls outside the scope of this article to describe the present Anglican practice. Suffice it to say that some Anglicans, because of a new doctrinal stress on episcopacy, have felt bound to restrict the range of intercommunion with non-episcopal Churches ; while others, because of a new recognition of the Churchly status of the Free Churches and a conviction that the charge of schism cannot be maintained in the old way, have felt equally bound to extend it in their direction. Authority has done little decisively. The moral weight of the Lambeth Conference lies behind positive recommendations which in some respects go further and in others less far than

the traditional practice. One school of thought tends to regard these recommendations as the maximum limit ; the other tends to regard them as giving a semi-official sanction both to certain new steps and also to certain parts of traditional practice ; but as the resolutions arise from an explicitly professed concern to extend unity, they cannot regard them as implicitly forbidding those existing parts of customary practice to which they do not explicitly refer.

We therefore pass to an individual attempt to estimate the lessons which may profitably be learnt from the historic Anglican tradition.

(1) The basic principle that Ministry and Sacraments belong to the Church Catholic and not the local Church is sound. Both are functions of the Body of Christ ; they carry the authority of the whole Body, and in them the whole Body is concerned. It follows that communicants and ministers ought to be accepted as such throughout the Body. Our divisions may make this impossible of full realization at present ; but our aim must be to approximate as closely as possible to this standard.

(2) The principle that the Church Catholic should have one regional Church in each place, and that such regional Churches should be free to differ in non-essentials is sound. Only so can the unity of the Body and the variety of function among its members be properly expressed. Separated congregations are a denial of unity ; uniformity is a denial of that proper variety which is needed if the Church as a whole is to express "the very varied wisdom of God".

(3) The first practical step is therefore to discover what bodies can and what cannot be recognized as parts of the Catholic Church. The tests proposed by the Anglican tradition have validity, but their application requires re-thinking in two ways.

(a) The test of the Word and Sacraments is basic, since they are the divinely appointed channels of the grace of God. But the Lambeth Appeal was surely right in holding that the

acknowledgement of Scripture as "The rule and ultimate standard of faith" and of the Creeds as "the sufficient statement of the Christian faith" is an adequate guarantee of the preaching of the pure Word of God. We do not value any less our Protestant doctrinal heritage, nor could we abandon (e.g.) the doctrine of justification by faith alone which we believe is a truth of the Gospel which, with our fellow-Protestants, we hold in trust for the whole Church. But we cannot refuse to recognize as Churches, or to enter into fellowship with, bodies which differ from us on this but nevertheless accept the same final standard of faith in the Scriptures and acknowledge those Creeds which the whole early Church found a sufficient safeguard against apostasy from the Scriptural revelation. We could not ourselves belong to a Church which did not adhere to such doctrines as justification by faith ; but we may have fellowship with them none the less.

(b) The test of wilful schism from a godly national Church has a real validity. We could not acknowledge the Churchly status of groups which for no good reason today seceded from such a Church. In so seceding they would sin against charity and do despite to the principle of the Church's unity. But this cannot be applied today to the principal denominations in England or elsewhere for two reasons. First, the schisms were not the fault only of one side ; Anglican intolerance and spiritual deadness were to blame for the English schisms quite as much as were the Dissenting bodies ; secondly, the divisions are centuries old and the present-day Churches are not to blame for them. A Methodist has not seceded from the Church to form a conventicle ; he has had to choose between one existing Church and another. The argument is still more cogent in countries which have never had an established Church, but to which various denominations have come more or less contemporaneously. We must therefore think of the united regional Church as an ideal for the future, not a present reality. At present the Church Catholic is represented by several local Churches all of which may be recognized as parts

of the Catholic Church, but all of which are involved in a sinful state of schism. Schism in this case is *within* the Church not *from* it.

(4) Between different regional Churches the goal is complete interchangeability of communicants and clergy. This is the proper unity between autonomous parts of the Church Catholic. Between Churches in the same area the goal is corporate reunion so that all are merged in one constitutionally united body. This is the proper unity of the one local representative of the Church Catholic. But intercommunion is a proper step toward reunion ; it is a lesser scandal that there should be two Churches in one place which are in fellowship with each other than that there should be two Churches which are out of fellowship. Nevertheless, it is a right principle that Christians should normally communicate or minister in one local Church which is their spiritual home and the place where they make real their fellowship in Christ. This applies even as between regional Churches in communion with each other ; their members can partake of hospitality from each other as circumstances demand, but if they wish to worship regularly in the Church of another place then they should join it as members. This is still more important in the case of Churches in the same area ; the right of mutual hospitality expresses their unity in Christ ; the rule that they should normally communicate or minister in their own Church is a reminder that the Churches are separate and ought to be united. We therefore conclude that the aim must be to establish full interchangeability of communicants and ministers between all parts of the Catholic Church, with the provisos (a) that such interchange should not obscure the rule that normally people should worship in their own local Church and (b) that between Churches in the same area this intercommunion is only a step towards corporate fusion.

(5) The attainment of full interchangeability of communicants and ministers in the sense described above depends upon agreement as to the form of admission to communicant status

and to the Ministry in the Catholic Church. The writer can here only record his belief that the classical Anglican tradition was here on the right lines : that Confirmation and episcopal Ordination cannot be regarded as essential in the strictest sense, but that they nevertheless belong to the well-being of the Church and are part of the Lord's will for the Church. To say that it is always wrong for unconfirmed persons to come to Communion and that no other form of ministry is a ministry of Christ in his Body the Catholic Church seems to go beyond the clear warrant of Scripture, to be inadequately supported in Church tradition, and to cast doubt upon the manifest fruit of the Spirit in the communicants and clergy of the non-episcopal Churches. To say that because they are not strictly essential they are matters indifferent seems to ignore the fact that to reject anything which God wills for the Church, even if the Church can refuse it without ceasing to be the Church, is to refuse a gift of God. This is always a defect, and if done as a conscious refusal of what is recognized as his gift it is rebellion against him. To say that Confirmation and episcopacy do not belong to the *bene esse* of the Church seems to ignore their consonance with Scripture, to fail to do justice to Church history, and to set at nought the spiritual experience of the Churches which have retained them.

If this be so it follows that with the non-episcopal Churches at home and overseas the Church of England must restrict its fellowship to that enjoyed traditionally with the Continental Protestants : *viz,* there should be freedom on each side to communicate with each other as visitors, but that there can be only very exceptional interchanges of ministry at least in the celebration of the Eucharist. We have already shown how this kind of practice witnesses to the value we ourselves attach to Confirmation and to Episcopacy as belonging to the *bene esse* of the Church Catholic and as being the proper mode of admission to communicant status and the Ministry respectively, and yet also witnesses to our recognition that in the divided Church Baptism alone and solemn ordination by the Church in

non-episcopal forms are true and sufficient though formally imperfect methods of admission to communicant status and to the Ministry respectively in the Catholic Church.

VII. Conclusion.

The writer, as he concludes, is aware that his purview has been somewhat narrowly Anglican and that his interpretation of the relevance of the historic Anglican tradition to present problems would not commend itself even to all his fellow-Anglican inheritors of that tradition. But perhaps the article will not be entirely useless if it in any way clarifies a tradition which is often puzzling, not least to Anglicans themselves ; and if it suggests a few lines of thought which may at least provoke fruitful discussion.

BOEHME AND THE UNGRUND

By M. CHANING-PEARCE

THE publication of an English and annotated edition of Bishop Martensen's Boehme studies[1] is timely and important not only for students of that great seer but also for all who are concerned with that most seminal influence in modern thought and theology, the "existential thinking" of Soren Kierkegaard. For, although Boehme's mysticism is existential in grain and Kierkegaard loved and revered the good bishop, for him nevertheless both mysticism and Martensen were suspect. That paradox is posed in this book.

But it also raises issues yet more radical and relevant for modern man. For, in Boehme's basic and central concept of the *Ungrund*—the ground of all being—and Martensen's criticism of that doctrine, we confront the essential conflict which divides our world between such "fell, incenséd opposites" as those of Nature and Spirit, reason and faith-knowledge, the life-attitudes of, in Mr. Koestler's terms, the "Yogi" and the "Commissar". And in this region of speculation we meet also that sense of dread before the *ungrund* of existence in a disintegrating world and that eschatalogical or end-view which obsesses the thought and feeling of our end-age. With this concept of the *Ungrund* we touch rock-bottom in Boehme's thought, in this book and in the contemporary crisis of spirit.

Martensen's confusion of thought and Mr. Hobhouse's hesitation at this crucial point, like Kierkegaard's suspicions of both Boehme and Martensen, are symptomatic of this acute

[1] *Jacob Boehme: Studies in his Life and Teaching*, by Hans. L. Martensen. Translated by T. Rhys Evans. Edited by Stephen Hobhouse, M.A. Foreword by Canon Peter Green, D.D. (Rockliff Press, 1949. 21s.)

conflict of consciousness where these last things are concerned. This essay reveals the fact (ironically enough !) that although Boehme is plainly a precursor in Kierkegaard's mode of thought, Martensen, whose professorial status and style were an abomination to Kierkegaard, is nevertheless constrained to condemn Boehme for precisely that existentiality which Kierkegaard, had he ever come to grips with Boehme's thought, must have approved. But Kierkegaard shied at what he conceived to be mysticism as Martensen shies at Boehme's existential thinking when carried beyond a certain point and applied to the *Ungrund* or ground of being and for what is, at root, the same reason—that this is an " illegitimate " " short cut " to the ultimate Reality.

But Christian existential thinking does not necessarily or always come to a halt at this point. For one of the most representative of modern religious thinkers, Nicholas Berdyaev, that which, from their respective slants, both Kierkegaard and Martensen reject, Boehme's bold pursuit of his existential thinking beyond the divine-human frontier in his doctrine of the *Ungrund,* becomes the headstone of his existential Christian metaphysic. Here, for Berdyaev, is " one of the greatest discoveries which have been made in the history of philosophy ".

The conflict, confusion and intensity of thought and feeling generated at this point are indicative of its cruciality. We are, in fact, confronted here with the problem—a peculiarly modern one—of the nature, validity and scope of the existential life-attitude. It is not one which can be burked. However grotesque or monstrous some of the manifestations of that mood may appear there can now be no doubt that it is a revolutionary force with which all realistic religious thinking must reckon.

That crucial issue dominates this book because Boehme pursues this existential attitude to the end and, unlike his critics, sets no limits to its scope. For, like Kierkegaard's theology, Boehme's " theosophy " is based upon an initial acceptance of natural existence and those intimations of reality

which are, in Keats's phrase, " proved upon the pulses ". There is his ultimate authority for faith ; he never abandons it for any external authority or " reserved " dogma even where the *Ungrund,* the " ground and granite " of Being, is concerned.

For him, in the current existentialist slogan, " existence precedes essence ". In other words his movement of mind and faith is always and to the end from within outwards, from Nature to Spirit, from human to divine life and not, as for an authoritarian theology and where God is concerned, in the reverse direction.

He sets no limits to his pursuit of this existential way as regards either its end or its means. He follows it to the *Ungrund* of God and also to the uttermost depths, the *ungrund* of his own spirit, accepting, not only the intimations of mind and psyche, but also the divinations of spirit, the total reborn person, as not delusive but veridical " news of reality ". Indeed, it is at this ground-level of divination, the " fundamental affirmations " (in Amiel's phrase) of the human spirit, that he finds his faith and truth. He thus extends the scope of the life-attitude misleadingly termed " existential thinking " beyond the bounds of conscious thought and intuition, beyond, indeed, the bounds of consciousness itself. There, and not in any external authority, he finds the ground and guarantee of his faith. It is, he says, " not I, the I that I am, (that) knows these things, but God knows them in me ".

At that ground-level, and at that level alone, he believes that he surpasses subjectivity. As Martensen shows, his much-abused term " theosophy " implies much more for Boehme than mere subjective mysticism. It is a " sacred philosophy " which " embraces nature and history " and " seeks to present a philosophy of nature in the light of the Divine idea, just as it also strives to give a philosophy of history ". This is thus a " mysticism of the mind " (or rather of the spirit) which makes no ultimate distinction between Nature and Spirit, human and divine being and, unlike many mystiques, is concerned with that mystery not only in the microcosm of the individual soul

but also and concurrently in the macrocosm of the world and Man. It is a feature of his thought which makes it the more relevant for a modern mood allergic to matter-spirit dualism and suspicious of all subjectivity.

It is after the same fashion of movement from existence to essence, "through experience beyond experience," that he passes in life from an initial conflict, chaos and complexity to an eventual harmony, cosmos ("Kingdom of God") and simplicity. It is essentially the same pattern which we find in the life of Kierkegaard. The pilgrim's progress of both these men began with storm and stress and closed in a rare and radiant serenity of spirit. For the records of Kierkegaard's beatific death (a dying singularly similar to that recorded of Boehme) do not, in fact, support Mr. Hobhouse's view that "poor Kierkegaard died broken-hearted." Both men, in Boehme's phrase, passed from "combat into the still rest" and found their way at the last from the conflict of existence into the "still centre" of essence or real Being.

In life as in thought Boehme thus followed this course from existence to essence to the end (which is also the beginning) of all things—the *Ungrund*. And it is here, at this crucial and terminal point, that Martensen condemns him for an "illicit anthropomorphism" and Mr. Hobhouse hesitates, remaining, as he remarks, "in some doubt on the matter." But —it is the real challenge of the book—is it ultimately possible for any full critique of Boehme's thought, or for the modern mind faced with the same last things, to remain in doubt on this matter? To do so is to remain in doubt as to the validity of Boehme's whole word and as to the real meaning of life itself. It is therefore of crucial importance to examine carefully both Boehme's doctrine and Martensen's criticism.

For Boehme the *Ungrund* is the "naked ground," "the abyss of God's liberty," "the abyssal world where there is neither end nor limit," "beyond nature and creature" and beyond good and evil. This is the "*mysterium magnum* . . . the chaos wherefrom originate good and evil, light and darkness, life and death . . ." Here he finds the ground of God's own

" eternal unbeginning generation " where " the eternal Spirit of God works from eternity to eternity in the great mystery of divine generation . . . and all is a continual love-combat or wrestling delight . . ." Here, therefore, is " the place of spirit."

Such, in brief, is Boehme's concept of the *Ungrund*. It is evidently significantly similar to that of modern psychology of the " unconscious " or " subliminal." Boehme is, in fact, applying his knowledge of the human *ungrund* to that of all Being. He is neither original nor alone in that daring doctrine. It has both ancient and modern affinities. This is the " En-soph " (not any thing) of the Jewish Kabbala. It is also the foundation-stone of Berdyaev's Christian metaphysic. The latter thus predicates " the obscure abyss which precedes both the consciousness of being and the distinction between good and evil " where " freedom dwells " and " God engenders himself, realizes himself, proceeding from the Divine Nothingness." Here, for Berdyaev, is the *fons et origo* of freedom and Spirit and the only adequate explanation of the facts of evil and the Fall.

Martensen accepts Boehme's findings up to this point. Boehme, he says, " seeks the living God . . . Whom he knows in his own evangelical consciousness." In other words he moves from his own inner experience of existence to divination of the divine life, and up to this point Martensen follows his lead. He accepts, for example, his existential findings concerning the nature of regeneration or the life of the spirit and even tolerates them in ideas so controversial or heretical as those of the androgynity of God and Christ or of the " Maiden Sophia " (a conception with which Boehme anticipated Solovyev.)

But here, at the *Ungrund,* he halts as thought in pious panic and roundly condemns Boehme. " We must blame Boehme," he concludes categorically, " for viewing man as the direct instead of the inverted image of God." That is, an " inverted " approach from existence to essence, Nature to Spirit, is legitimate up to this point but illegitimate thereafter. Appeal is thus made to a " Law " or dogma beyond the reach of reason and existential thinking alike. At this " Holy of holies " an

authoritative Church and blind belief take charge. Martensen not only executes a complete *volte face* himself but suggests that this change from "inverted" to "direct" apprehension is a law of life and thought.

The position which Martensen thus assumes is substantially that of Aquinas and orthodox Catholic theology of a range of revealed truth "reserved" from human reason. It is, in fact, that doctrine of a "double truth" which is the source of the conflict between reason and religion, materialism and mysticism which splits the modern consciousness and has passed from the realm of ideas into that of the common life.

But there is a significant difference between the statement of this "double truth" by Aquinas and by Martensen. For the latter's use of the terms "inverted" and "direct" suggests an advance from the reason-faith antinomy of orthodox theology which, however, Martensen does not himself develop. For, when thought through, this category of thought implies, not an absolute distinction or division between rational or existential and "reserved" or revealed truth but rather, as it were, an obverse-reverse relation between these contraries. As a dutiful Churchman Martensen assumes that this other "direct" knowing is the prerogative of the Church and ventures no further. But Boehme does, and a full criticism of his doctrine and a fulfilled existential thinking must also make that venture.

This use of the term "inverted" takes us, in fact, to the threshold of the mystery of conversion. For it implies a point —this crucial point of the *Ungrund*—where the one approach is or should be converted into its contrary. And this is a mystery which, had Martensen followed his intuition further, he would have found to be comprehended, not only by the Church but also by Boehme's own "theosophy" and, too, by a fulfilled existential thinking followed to the end.

This mystery of crisis and conversion—the turning-point—is a constant and main motif in the thought of Boehme as of Kierkegaard. Like the latter he envisages the "instant" of crisis and decision in terms, not of smooth development or emergence, but of catastrophe, a "dying into life." Both

thinkers suggest an extreme, even a despairing effort of spirit at this "instant" of crisis and conversion. "Throw thyself," Boehme enjoins the disciple in his *Dialogue of the Supersensual Life,* "into THAT where no creature dwelleth." "If thou canst, my son," he continues, "for a while but cease from all thy thinking and willing, then thou shalt hear the unspeakable words of God." That is, so and so only, then and then only, can this "direct" knowledge be known.

Kierkegaard's "leap in the dark" sounds the same note. It is an imagery, with its suggestion of a crucial and catastrophic *volte face* of consciousness, which is in accord rather than discord with the implications of Martensen's "inverted"-"direct" category of thought. It is, moreover, a conception which accords with the modern mood. For here, it seems, is a divination of the nature of the crisis, the conversion-point, which "Palinurus" in his book *The Unquiet Grave,* that sign of our times and schizophrenia, echoes with his notion of an "extra effort" which modern man knows that he needs to break through the closed circle of his conditions but knows also that of himself he cannot make.

Boehme, like Kierkegaard, was thus much more aware of this mystery of crisis and conversion from an "inverted" to a "direct" apprehension than Martensen realized and, indeed, knew much more about it than Martensen himself knew. And, where Boehme and Kierkegaard find both that knowledge and their authority for accepting it as veridical in their own existential experience Martensen turns to the external authority of the Church. For him, at this crucial point, an abyss opens which, so he obediently believes, only the Church can bridge. But Boehme and Kierkegaard, though far more aware of that abyss, find it spanned in their own inner experience. Where, at this perilous point, he looks without for his succour and authority, they look within. And there the same miracle of conversion or regeneration is enacted. But for Boehme the nature of this miracle is no longer wholly "reserved" or wholly obscure. For him the "inverted" and the "direct" modes of

consciousness are not irreconcilable opponents but as obverse and reverse, and this point of crisis and conversion is seen as a *coincidentia oppositorum,* a meeting and marriage of those contraries without which, as Blake similarly divined, "there is no Progression."

Thus the clue to this mystery of conversion of consciousness for which Martensen looks to the Church is, in fact, to be found in Boehme's own "theosophy." Nor, in reality, is that experience and knowledge foreign to the existential life-experience of everyman. This is no more a mystery "reserved" with a mystical than with an ecclesiastical élite. Every artist and thinker is similarly conscious of a critical point or "instant" when one kind of consciousness and knowledge is, in "the twinkling of an eye," converted into its contrary, an "inverted" into a "direct" apprehension. To the storm and stress of the struggle to grasp an idea, theorem, a pattern of line, mass, colour or thought there suddenly ensues a state of consciousness, a total comprehension, a sense of wholeness (or "holiness") and a lucidity and simplicity which seem the precise opposite of the former state and yet derive directly from it. Then the consciousness is, in Rilke's phrase, "reborn into the whole".

And at that point of conversion and regeneration beyond the exhaustion-point, an abandonment or surrender of the striving self, a cessation of the "upward anguish" occurs for which the metaphors of "throwing" the self into an "abyss" or the "leap in the dark" ring very real. From that moment—it is, in effect, an "instant" of crisis and decision—the movement changes from ascent to descent, from an "inverted" to a "direct" or converted apprehension of the reality which has been sought. The seeking is converted into a finding, the "upward anguish" into a down-falling illumination, fulfilment and rest. That, for those who will "search the heart", is common knowledge.

Nor it is a knowledge confined to art or thought. For those with eyes to see it is to be known in life and most of all

in the universal experience of love. Those who have ever really taken the "leap in the dark" which all real love is, know quite well how *eros,* the ascending love of desire and possession, is, at its crisis or conversion-point, converted into what seems its opposite, a descending love of *agape* of self-surrender and donation. Theology may draw an absolute distinction between those two states, impose some barrier which only a priesthood can pass. Life does not. And, if we trust our own existential intimations we know that the *eros* is, as it were, the obverse of the *agape* love and state, its reconcilable opposite not its irreconcilable opponent, that, in fact, the one merges into the other in real marriage; at the "instant" of the "leap", the crisis, the decision, the one is transformed into the other. Again we behold an ascending and a descending movement which, for life if not for logic, are, not contradictory but complementary.

But there is more here to our point—this matter of the *Ungrund*—for, in all such life-experience, we are also aware of a fact which, for logic, is absurd—that this state of illumination or love, this "new world" or other kind of (to use the Johannine term) "aeonian" life is nevertheless not new but strangely familiar. It is as though we moved into a world, a life which, in fact, we have always known, which, in reality, has always existed. We may reach that fullness, be reborn into that Whole by our "upward anguish" but we know then that it was there, and in its fullness or perfection, all the time. It was not evolved; it was only reached by the arduous ascent. It is as though, in our own inner chaos, our *ungrund,* this heavenly cosmos had always—"from the foundation of the world"—existed in its fullness. We have realized it now; that is all.

Now this is the very point upon which Martensen finds fault with Boehme's conception of the *Ungrund*—in that, so he supposes, it infers a God who is emergent only, who is not "perfect" from the beginning and, in some sense, beyond the battle of strife and suffering. Yet this intimation of divine life, perfect, impassible, complete, found by the ascending soul,

within the chaos or *ungrund* of consciousness which is that of all more profound life-experience is also that which Boehme, in reality, always affirms. For him the "still rest" is always there at the heart of the "combat". It is not fashioned but found in that combat. Indeed the combat is the obverse of the peace, the motion of the rest, the darkness of the light. Like day and night, life and death, for such an existential divination, the "pairs of opposites", the contraries of our existence, are not and cannot be divided.

Moreover, if that existential approach be pursued—as Boehme dares to pursue it—into the realm of ideas, idea-opposites such as those of transcendence and immanence, Eros and Agape, Nature and Spirit, human and divine being become similarly indivisible. These contraries are divided in our logic but not in our life There they are seen, by seers such as Boehme as, in the end, a single ascending and descending movement, the eternal systole and diastole of ultimately undivided and indivisible Being proceeding from the *Ungrund,* the ground of all Being.

Such is Boehme's full vision. It is that also of all existential thinking which explores not only the conscious mind but also the *ungrund* of the human soul. It is a life-wisdom which, as both Boehme and Kierkegaard found, tallies not only with our life-experience but also with the Christian creed and, in particular, with the doctrine of the Incarnation of the God-Man with its intrinsic pattern of the eternal "unbeginning" ascent and descent of Being. Moreover, in reality it also confirms, from such inner experience, that mystery of crisis and conversion which the Church proclaims *ex cathedra.* What Martensen declares dogmatically concerning "inverted" and "direct" or converted knowing upon the authority of the Church this mode of existential thought or divination discovers in the human heart itself. But, in the end, the revelation is essentially the same.

But—and for an authoritarian theology, here is the offence —for that way of existential thinking the seat of authority, the ground of faith and the real Church are within. It is a con-

sequence which Boehme also grasped. The true Church, he wrote, is that place within " wherein the children of God are begotten according to the spirit ". And, for such an existential thinking, the mystery of being which has been a closed becomes an open secret which he who runs may read, if he will, in his own heart. It would seem, indeed, that it is rather for " Churchianity " (idolatry of a human and historic Church) than for Christianity that a theology of this type is " illicit " or subversive. For a rigid ecclesiastical dogmatism it is certainly so.

But if it is illicit for such a " Churchianity " it is also illicit for an existentialism such as that popularized by Monsieur Jean Paul Sartre. For just as a totalitarian orthodoxy pronounces a *ne plus ultra* where the nature of God is concerned, so this atheistic existentialism also pronounces its own *ne plus ultra* where the very idea of God or the life of the spirit are concerned, declaring dogmatically that " God is dead ." And for the modern mind, the news that God is " reserved " and that " God is dead " amount to much the same thing. The effect is singularly similar. Sartrian existentialism, for which the life of spirit is tabu, points to an *Ungrund,* a chaos incapable, by that tabu, of becoming a cosmos. A " Churchianity " which removes or " reserves " God and the divine life in a heaven " wholly other " than our earth leaves man and his immediate world no less lost. Strange bedfellows ! Yet it seems much the same bed—a bed of Procrustes unnaturally curtailing or extending the human spirit—which both alike inflict.

Such is the challenge with which this book, when pondered, confronts our thought, theology and life. These are issues of life and death, not merely of theoretic theology, which have to-day come down into the arena of actual existence. They crystallize in Boehme's concept of the *Ungrund* with a poignant relevance for our condition. For to-day the *Ungrund* —a cosmos returning to its original chaos—yawns before the appalled gaze of modern man. It seems all too often an *Ungrund* from which no real cosmos or " Kingdom " of the spirit can ever again come. T. E. Hulme prophesied a generation

ago that the prime need of modern man was the fortitude to "gaze into a chasm without shuddering". Boehme gazed into the chasm of the *Ungrund*. And there he found God. Was that venture of spirit, of an existential thinking followed to the depths and to the end, "illicit"? It is the residual question which this book leaves in the mind.

THE FREEDOM FOR WHICH CHRIST MAKES US FREE[1]

By MAISIE SPENS

MYRIADS—even among practising Christians—confronted with the Mystery of the Transfiguration are as fish out of water. The Mount of Transfiguration is no resort of theirs. It leaves them uncomprehending—at best, indifferent ; at worst, incredulous. Fearful of its unfamiliarity, exasperated by its seeming irrelevance for the daily round and life in the raw, they gasp at the bare thought of the rarefied atmosphere of the mountain-top. All their stress is upon the necessity for *descent*. They turn and cling—as for dear life—to the foot of the Mount as *terra firma*.

Not content with this, they conjure any who would fain dwell upon this Mystery of the Mount of Transfiguration to " come down to earth " and " be practical ". And they are right so to do—*provided they know and speak truth*. This proviso should give us all—no matter what or where our present stand in relation to the Mount of Transfiguration—most solemnly to pause, for sooner or later each single one of us will have to reckon with the truth of this Mystery in the entirety of its ceaseless operation for and upon us individually and corporately.

It is an undeniable truth that any who are taken—however infinitesimal a part of the way—up the Mount of Transfiguration must needs " come down to earth " again. But—as

[1] This article will appear in due course as part of a book bearing the title *Receive the Joyfulness of Your Glory*, to be published by Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton.

has been said with rare perspicacity—" the curse of every truth is that a counterfeit always waits upon it, and is its greatest enemy ". There is directed against the Mount of Transfiguration a counterfeit " come down to earth " which is indeed that Mystery's greatest and most unrelenting enemy—amounting to implicit if not explicit censure of any prolonged dwelling upon the Mystery of the Mount of Transfiguration as spiritual self-indulgence, or escapism from reality or both.. Truth or counterfeit, however, depends upon the nature both of the descent and of reality. Descent as such has no value apart from what conditions it ; and reality centres not in ourselves but God.

Descent from the Mount of Transfiguration may itself be —and perhaps often is—escapism : escapism of the worst kind —the conscious or subconscious fighting shy of Glory. Such descent is as misguided as it is cowardly and barren.

True and fruitful descent of the Mount of Transfiguration is a Mystery no less supernatural than that of its Ascent. If we cannot truly ascend the Mount of Transfiguration except we be *taken* up it by our Lord within his own ascent of it, still less can we make the true descent of the Mount except in so far as we be *taken* down it by our Lord himself within his own descent of it.

The top and the bottom of the Mount of Transfiguration are commonly held to be in violent contrast—and so they are, in a way. But not in the way, nor for the reason, most frequently assumed : namely, that the top of the Mount is something unearthly, altogether outside the normal run of human experience and in consequence " unreal " ; whereas the bottom is " real " comprising, as it does, the human sorrow, suffering, conflict, need and perplexity which we have grown accustomed to regard as synonymous with " reality ".

Our minds *apart from the mind of Christ* tend falsely to identify things which are not identical, and to divorce those which are fundamentally inseparable. Left to ourselves, we departmentalize. We pigeon-hole and relegate Glory to the top of the Mount as something ethereal and ineffectual. Out

of our depth in regard to Glory—and more afraid than desirous of it if the truth be admitted—we consider it realistic and our duty to " face facts ", as we think, by plunging into the human wreckage all around us to effect such rescue as may be. Actually —though for the most part we remain oblivious of it—nothing can radically salvage human wreckage except Glory. There must be the descent of Glory into the wreckage and its transfigurational raising up by Glory.

In proportion as to all intents and purposes we mentally divorce the top from the bottom of the Mount of Transfiguration we falsify the significance of both. Neither Mystery can be truly discerned—let alone penetrated—in isolation. Suffering, travail, conflict—however tragic, formidable, or universal —do not exhaust, let alone comprise, the whole nor even the greater part of reality. Facts most assuredly, but " Oh facts—what *are* facts ? Just the way a thing happens to look at a given moment " as has been pointed out in Edith Wharton's *Ghosts*. Transient actualities on a temporal plane, they co-exist—as does sin itself—within the transfigurational range of the one all-embracing, absolute, immutable and eternal reality of the Essential Glory of God outside of which nothing can exist, and by which nothing is unaffected for a single second irrespective of whether we realize it or not.

The bottom of the Mount of Transfiguration only seems more real than the top in so far as we accustom ourselves to live on the surface rather than to live in depth, and allow ourselves to live by shadows rather than by substance. But *seeming* does not do away with facts. Even although we may have become so inured to the *fallen* appearance of man and creation as to take it for granted and to equate it with reality, nevertheless the truth is quite other. Seldom, if ever, has this been more prophetically proclaimed than when, during the Mass broadcast from Paris on February 22, 1948, le Chanoine Rodhain, preaching on the Gospel for the Second Sunday in Lent (St. Matthew xvii), declared with quiet but thrilling conviction: *" C'est cette transfiguration qui est la realité même . . La*

Transfiguration c'est le rendez-vous final". Words of such absolute and inexhaustible truth as these can never sufficiently be pondered.

Reality is all-inclusive. The Mount of Transfiguration is one and indivisible. Moreover the Mysteries of the top and bottom of this Mount are inseparable, being—in a very profound sense—simultaneities existing each for the other *that the Glory of God may be all in all.* All that is wrought and comes to pass upon the top of this Mount arises out of and for the sake of all that is innate in—and symbolized by—the epileptic boy at its foot. Our Lord's descent from the Glory of the Transfiguration to the boy in the plain is a veritable repetition and reaffirmation of the primary descent from the heavenly Glory in the Incarnation.

Nothing in the Gospels is accidental : neither events themselves, nor variations in recording them, nor silences. Every incident in its occurrence contains an innumerable combination of facets—and one facet impresses itself as a high-light for one evangelist, another for another. Thus what at first sight appear to be discrepancies may later prove a source of illumination, investing a Mystery with a wholly fresh significance as it is realized that they are not contradictions but complementary high-lights. This is the case in the Marcan and Lucan accounts of our Lord's descent from the Mount of Transfiguration.

Both evangelists record the *awed amazement* of the people —but with a profound difference. St. Mark relates that " Straightway all the multitude when they saw him, were greatly amazed [the Greek connotes amazement not unmixed with terror] . . . " (Mk. ix, 15)—and this *before* the healing of the epileptic boy. St. Luke relates that " they were all astonished at the majesty of God " (R.V. Lk. ix., 43. A.V. "the mighty power of God ") *after* the healing of the epileptic boy. But this apparent discrepancy is no slip on the part of either evangelist, even if—at a superficial glance—the Lucan *after* should seem more plausible. Each in his account of our Lord's de-

scent from the Mount of Transfiguration is striving "to make known to the sons of men his mighty acts and the glorious majesty of his kingdom" (A.V. Ps. cxlv, 12).

St. Luke, the keen and compassionate physician, naturally singles out—because sharing it so deeply himself—the awe felt at the blaze of accidental glory manifest in the dominion of the King of Glory over a spirit of life-long infirmity so ingrained as to result in inveterate disruption of body, mind and personality entirely baffling all merely human attempts to bring about its cure.

Perhaps because it derives from St. Peter, whose preoccupation during the descent from the Mount must still have been with Glory manifest in the *Person* of Jesus as distinct from any of his acts, St. Mark's account stresses the awe of the multitude, not at sight of accidental glory as he is glorified in the transfigurational redemption of those he saves, but upon recognition in Jesus himself of something of his own intrinsic Glory doubtless disclosed in some lingering but transient afterglow of that on-shining and out-shining of *Essential Glory* seen by Peter, James and John when he was transfigured before them.

In St. Luke, "the kingdom of God come with power" is manifest in the King of Glory exercising his rule over the enemy as prophetically foretold and enjoined—"The Lord shall send the rod of thy power out of Sion : be thou ruler, even in the midst among thine enemies" (B.C.P. Ps. cx, 2). In St. Mark, it is the King *himself* who is manifest as the power and the Glory of his Kingdom.

It is not for nothing that the first act of the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord on his descent from the Mount of Transfiguration should be the healing of an epileptic boy, rather than the healing of any other kind of infirmity. Nor is it by chance that this particular healing should be among those of our Lord's healings which the Synoptists were divinely inspired to recount in greater detail. The more it is pondered, the clearer it becomes that every detail is of vital significance

both intrinsically and in strengthening the impact upon us of the Mystery of the Transfiguration in its entirety.

So violent is the contrast between the light on the top of the Mount of Transfiguration and the darkness at its foot as to make the Transfigured Lord and the epileptic boy appear such poles apart in every respect as almost to exclude any similarity at all. Nevertheless, incredible as it may seem, there is a certain sense in which it is strictly true to say that the Transfigured Lord and the epileptic boy have *a state in common.* Each is *a victim under a cloud*—but how dynamic the difference both in victim and in cloud.

One is a victim *for*—and the other a victim *of*—the sin of the world. One is victim *by his own will* : " He was offered, because it was his own will, and he opened not his mouth " (Douai Version Is. liii, 7). As Sacrificial Lamb of God—" the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world " (Rev. xiii, 8)—no murmur of rebellion or self-pity ever passed his lips because none was in his heart : his heart being alway filled with " the silence of content ". The other is, " from a child ", victim *regardless of*—and later *against*—his own will : hence his whole being becomes a progressive cry of fear. The instinctive fear-revolt of infant mind and body leads imperceptibly—and hardens—into conscious and recurrent childish, then adolescent, rebellion and self-pity until fear-revolt of mind and body become convulsive second nature and productive of many and varied sins.

One victim " by the things which he suffered " *liberates* others—" Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world ". The other suffers in such fashion as adds both to the sin and suffering of the world, so that wittingly or unwittingly he in his turn renders all others bound up with him in the bundle of life no less—and perhaps even more—*victims of his own sin* than he himself has been a victim, unintentional or otherwise, of the sin of others. One victim suffers for Love : Priest of Love Illimitable for God and Man. The other suffers from self-love : the sole begetter of all inordinate fear. One

victim is under the luminous Cloud of Glory : the other under the dark cloud of a mind not yet awake to Glory, much less informed by it.

" From a child "—that, both for the one victim and the other, is where it all starts. Acceptance of life in priestly self-immolation ; or fear-refusal of life in would-be self-preservation : that is the whole crux—and on it literally everything in the Universe depends, because each is affected by all and all by each. There is in the apse of the Cathedral of St. Vladimir in Kiev, a nineteenth-century icon of the Madonna and Child painted by Vasnetzov, which—even in reproduction —makes this vividly apparent.

This Vasnetzov Madonna, with Child in arms, stands queenly, selflessly, upon clouds which make earth far more real and present than if there had been any attempt to portray it. On either side, Cherubim and Seraphim adore. It is the whole Cosmos which is seen to be actively engaged—through the *aliveness* of the Child and the eagerness with which he is, from his Mother's arms, as it were, literally throwing himself into life. Such readiness to leave behind all human protection in order to go out to meet all that life will bring, and to gather it all up into his redeeming love, is but the extension of his pre-incarnate *leaping down* from heaven—the extension of Love's majestic Mystery as set forth in the Introit for the Sunday in the Octave of the Nativity : Wisd. xviii. While all things were in quiet silence, and night was in the midst of her swift course, thine almighty Word, O Lord, leaped down from heaven out of thy royal throne. Ps. xciii. The Lord is King, and hath put on glorious apparel : the Lord hath put on his apparel, and girded himself with strength.

Not only is this Child Life incarnate, but he is also exuberantly, exhilaratingly, in love with life. His outstretched arms delightedly embrace life as being itself—bring what it may—*the lovely Will of God.* " . . . Lo, I come . . . to do thy will, O God " (Heb. x, 9) : " In the volume of the book it is written of me, that I should fulfil thy will, O my God : I am content to do it ; yea, thy law is within my heart " (B.C.P.

Ps. xl, 10. A.V. Ps. xl, 8 "I delight to do thy will, O God . . .").

This Child is one with life—and at one in himself—because he is all-embracing love. Nothing could be in sharper contrast to the epileptic boy at the foot of the Mountain : "from a child" upwards fearing life and shrinking from it, exhausted and overwhelmed by it, hating it because fearing it, volcanically divided between frustration's desire to be revenged upon it and cowardice's suicidal desire to end it.

Until the coming of the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord, the cloud at the foot of the Mount of Transfiguration is one of almost unrelieved darkness. Such intense human love and compassion as are mercifully to be found there serve as much to intensify as to lighten that darkness by their utter impotence to dispel it, or to effect for the epileptic boy any radical liberation from his mental and physical bondage.

The Gospel accounts of the life-long sufferings of this *only child* are purely objective factual descriptions which must of necessity fall far short of the incalculably more intense subjective sufferings underlying outward facts and symptoms. Yet, even so, they are almost unbearably vivid.

Led thereto by the Holy Spirit, the Synoptists have in this epileptic boy epitomized at one and the same time both the *isolation* and the *solidarity* of all suffering. The boy's whole chequered existence of maladjustment to everyday life is laid bare as an abyss of loneliness : an enigma which no human being can fathom—himself least of all. But this heart-rending element of isolation in his suffering is by no means confined to himself. It extends also in varying degree to each and all who in loving compassion identify themselves with him. Their inability to free him from his bondage isolates them in no less baffling an abyss of loneliness. Theirs is the loneliness of seemingly unavailing love which—try as it may—cannot *reach* the sufferer's innermost self, let alone bring to it any sufficiency of succour.

Indeed the boy's own sufferings pale before those of the father suffering not only *with* and for his son, but suffering *from* him year in year out and forced—by reason of his son's inability to bear his own burden—always to bear in heart, mind, body, and materially as well, the twofold burden of his son's cross imposed upon his own.

Even more pronounced than all the isolation—for himself and others—in the boy's suffering, is its *solidarity*: involving as it ultimately must and does family, passers-by, and Church.

The boy is a victim—one of myriads—of the sin of the world. He is one whom the cumulative sins of a "faithless and perverse generation", an "evil and adulterous generation", have broken in mind and body. His father is in turn a victim of the boy's brokenness; and the disciples—in their anguished impotence to help either the one or the other when with agonized challenge and appeal to "do something about it" their double burden is cast upon them—are themselves victims of both. There is darkness in the boy and around him. His loss of self-control and dignity obscures the image of God in himself, and casts a shadow upon it in all humanity.

It is significant that no "Why?" as to the boy's suffering came either from the boy's father or from our Lord. Our Lord had no need to ask its cause. He knew. He knew that not the boy's sin alone, nor the parents', but that of the entire race, had all contributed to the revolt and breakdown of the boy's mind and body.

Not "Why?", but "*How long* is it since this hath come unto him?" asked our Lord of the boy's father. Again, he can have had no need to ask as far as he himself was concerned. It was all one to him to heal disease at the first onset or in its final stages. Surely he must have asked "for their sakes"—above all for the father's sake. It was as though he needs must evoke that answering "From a child" (A.V. Mk. ix, 21. "From his infancy" D.V. Mk. ix, 20), so that the father's plea for help should not be confined to the immediate need of the passing hour, but should be an all-embracing plea for total

succour reaching to the very roots of all that had been wrong from start to finish. It was absolutely necessary that the lifetime which had *never known wholeness* should be present in its entirety in the foreground of the father's consciousness when he sent up to our Lord his *de profundis* : " . . . but if thou canst do anything, have compassion on us and help us ". Since always it is " According to your faith be it unto you ", our Lord could spare the father's faith nothing if he was to be enabled to receive all.

The father of the epileptic might never have obtained his son's healing had he approached Jesus, newly descended from Glory, with a " *Why* did God allow this fate to befall my beloved son in the innocence of babyhood ? " He left the "Why ? " on one side, in order to give himself undividedly in action calculated to win not *explanation* but redemption for his son. He trampled down all queries by which the devil loves to bemuse men and unnerve them. Unswervingly he went clean past the complete failure of Jesus' disciples to effect help of any kind, still hoping for it—albeit tentatively—from their Master direct : " . . . if thou canst do anything, have compassion on us, and help us ".

" If thou canst! " " All things are possible to him that believeth " (R.V. Mk. ix, 23). " Lord, I believe ; help thou mine unbelief ". The Lord of Glory had fired in him the will to believe, but imagination boggled. He could not, try as he might, imagine things wholly other than they had always been, but implored our Lord himself to fill up that which was lacking in his imagination and utterly beyond his own power to quicken. This sufficed for our Lord. The father having done all in his own power, the whole power of Jesus could be—and was instantly—released on behalf of his son and of himself : and that at one of the peaks of the boy's extremity.

The boy's first sight of Jesus had brought on another of his fits—hardly surprising in one given to them, and unable to cope with life even at its most ordinary, let alone in that unparalleled afterglow of Transfiguration Glory still manifest

in Jesus and which had already smitten with fearsome awe even the multitude accustomed to react more robustly and less intensely to things just as they came.

It is to St. Mark that we owe the record of *how* Jesus healed the boy. We cannot be sufficiently thankful for his courageous fidelity to fact which lets the healing be plainly seen for what it was : a gradual process rather than an instantaneous cure. Far from lessening its wonder, it serves rather to heighten it by exposing in depth the inexhaustible significance of this particular " sign " or " miracle " wrought by Jesus.

We are told that while the boy " wallowed foaming " on the ground at Jesus' feet, " He rebuked the unclean spirit, saying unto him, Thou dumb and deaf spirit, I command thee, come out of him, and enter no more into him ". Read superficially, this may strike harshly upon moderns who see the boy's condition as being due, not to possession by an evil spirit other than himself, but to a false " track in the mind " which—however in later years he may by his own fault have deepened it—at least originated in infancy before ever there was any possibility of his consciously knowing anything of it, let alone understanding the imperative need for it to be counteracted and eradicated. In this wise, our Lord's rebuke might seem rather the rebuke of the boy himself and—by any purely human standards either of fairness or uncleanness—to smack somewhat of injustice.

Yet the Incarnate Lord not only adjudged all things truly, but understood the human mind as none other ever has or can. He knew that there was in the boy a spirit of inordinate fear, and that such being at bottom self-regarding and self-obsessed is unclean, and unclean, moreover, in that it is a spirit of inward division, a disintegrating and corrupting principle in the personality making for rage and greed, anxiety and jealousy, self-pity and lovelessness, paralysis and death, chaos and self-destruction. Assuredly, our Lord knew not less clearly than the moderns that the boy was suffering from a false " track

in the mind", and that his physical ills could never be cured short of a radically transforming renewal of mind and spirit. But over and above knowing the need for this renewal he was able to *effect* it—as he alone can ever effect it for any in similar need.

Our Lord's diagnosis of "the unclean spirit" in the boy as a "dumb and deaf spirit" penetrated to the very root of all his ills of spirit, mind, and body. By dint of habitually crying out—both interiorly and exteriorly—in fear, rebellion, and self-pity, he had become dumb in the praise of God and deaf to his Silence—and hence to his Word spoken in Silence. The complete breakdown in wholeness in relation to himself, and others, was but the inevitable and secondary consequence of his dumbness and deafness towards God: the outward and visible symptom of an inward inability to say "Yes" to the Living God, and in him to life in its entirety.

That which is "not written" in the Gospels is not less significant than that which has been set down verbally by the Evangelists. Their silences and their words alike derive from the Holy Spirit; and silences no less than words are meant to be prayerfully pondered in and by that Spirit who with divine purposefulness inspired them. Such intentional silences occur in the account of the epileptic boy at the foot of the Mount of Transfiguration as in all accounts of recorded events in the life of Jesus, and are scarcely—if at all—less pregnant than the total silence which enshrines all that is verbally unrecorded amid "all that Jesus began both to do and teach" on earth. Such silences rigorously demand that there shall be no propounding of human fancy for fact human or divine. But whilst these silences by their very nature preclude discovery of any genuine additions to factual detail, they no less rigorously demand deep consideration and reverent search for such underlying *principles* as may be implicit in them.

There is in the account of the epileptic boy at the foot of the Mount of Transfiguration one outstanding silence of in-

calculable significance which is more thought-provoking than all the recorded facts about him put together. This is the complete silence in regard to his mother. What of her ? It is at least possible, even probable, that did we but know the answer to this question, we should likewise know why a "dumb and deaf spirit" had established life-long strangle-hold upon the boy from within.

In the event of only one parent actually taking the sick boy to Jesus or his disciples in pursuit of healing, it would *in normal circumstances* have been more natural that this should have been the mother rather than the father. Still more unnaturally she is not even found accompanying father and child in the father's anguished quest for their son's cure. It may be—who now can tell ?—that sickness or death rendered it impossible. Yet in the latter case, it is not improbable that the Holy Spirit who left on record not only that the dead man of Nain was "the only son of his mother", but also that "she was a widow", might likewise have left on record that the father of the epileptic boy was a widower ; or in the former, that the father would have besought Jesus to heal not only his sick son but his sick wife also. May it be that the clue to the whole situation lies concealed in those three short but immeasurable words: *in normal circumstances* ? Was it precisely normal circumstances which had been lacking, and desperately needed above all else ?

It is not improbable that the interior and exterior brokenness manifest in the epileptic boy was less an *individual* brokenness than the culmination in his person of *family* brokenness having terminated in a seemingly final and unnatural parting of the ways between mother and father and child. It may well be that the Gospel silence with regard to the boy's mother veils some antecedent tragedy—some rift between husband and wife as such, or between mother and father as such, perhaps, or on the mother's part perhaps some pre-natal unwantedness of the child, due to fear or other causes rooted possibly in childhood tragedy of her own, and

subsequent inability to love the sickly and humanly unlovable child born to her. Be this as it may, the silence of the Gospels —not by accident we may be sure—compels us to reckon with the absence of the mother at the foot of the Mount of Transfiguration in such a way as to leave indelibly imprinted upon us the fundamental necessity of combined mother-love, father-love and intactness of the home as a *sine qua non* for wholeness in the child.

The epileptic boy's inability "from a child" to say "Yes" to life clearly presupposes the fact that he—be the reason what it may—had not in childhood, that peculiarly sensitive, impressionable and formative phase of development, heard life's "Yes" to himself. Otherwise, he could not but have re-echoed it instinctively. Some insufficient or unstable human love—or else some over-possessive love so-called, some undisciplined and undisciplinary love—shown to him by another must automatically have come to him as life's "No" to himself, and frightened him in turn first into an instinctive "No" to life, then later into thinking both too much and too little of himself, and finally into progressive refusal and inability to take up his cross. It needed but a glance for our Lord to see that in this very refusal and inability to take up his cross, rather than in the cross itself, lay the boy's undoing.

It has often been held that in bidding an evil spirit come out of a man or woman, our Lord was speaking—maybe thinking—merely in terms of the belief in evil spirits, and spirit-possession, widely current in his day. This may be so —but surely there must have been more to it than that. Basically he spoke always and only in terms of love ; and, therefore, with all the consecrated *imaginativeness* born of—and indispensable for—the creative exercise of true love.

So absolute and limitless was our Lord's love-identification with the epileptic boy that it enabled him not merely to see to the very heart of the boy's need *objectively from without,* but also in a single intuitive flash so to plumb the boy's *subjective* state in its entirety as to understand it

exhaustively *as from within the boy himself*. Here was Light's knowledge of darkness as darkness *feels itself to be* : a dual personality—because not only *in* that darkness, but even *to* that darkness itself, there flickers still, however fitfully and intermittently, a humanly inextinguishable divine spark which is even more crucifying to the darkness than is the darkness either to it or to itself inexpressible though these be.

Our Lord knew, as profoundly as the boy himself, his fear of anything and everything, known or unknown, and of his own chaotic self above all. He knew his torturing fear lest his "real" and enduring self was coming to be—or perhaps already was—only and solely all that he hated and despised himself for being and doing in ever-recurrent, ever-intensifying thraldom to fear. He knew his even more terrifying spells of spurious freedom from fear, when he no longer feared anything in heaven or earth but frenziedly desired to run amok, and kill the spark in him which he had glimpsed and longed to be, but never really been able to imagine himself becoming for more than the few seconds' duration vouchsafed him at incredibly long intervals only to be followed by more agonizing depths than ever.

An insupportable riddle to himself, the boy in his chaotic and fatalistic bondage was wholly and compassionately understood by our Lord through and through. Our Lord's rebuke of the unclean spirit, and his command to the dumb and deaf spirit to come out of the boy was Love's *imaginative* —as well as authoritative—way of "speaking to his condition." Only by letting the boy feel himself treated *at one and the same time* as the dual personality he felt himself to be and the unified personality he craved to be, could he be enabled to feel, imagine, and believe himself to be liberated *from within* from the dark fear that had so dominated his whole life as to seem to him a more real "self" than the to him incredible light-self to which it scarcely allowed any freedom at all to grow, energize, and become stable. The absoluteness of our Lord's rebuke to the unclean spirit was the measure of

his understanding and compassionate love for the boy, and the measure of his repudiation on the boy's behalf of all to which he himself had never known how—or knowing how had failed—to say : " Get thee behind me Satan ". At that moment our Lord was doing for the boy all that he had hitherto been unable to do for himself—doing it *not instead of him,* but so as to bring him to the point of freedom to do of his own free will that which not even Love could do for him ; and doing it *patiently* as well as potently.

Our Lord, in his love and wisdom, allowed the boy *time* —as St. Mark makes plain. He did not force instantaneous healing upon him, but bore with him while in his own way he rallied to Love's ministry as best he might.

As was only to be expected humanly, the boy's chaos did not subside immediately. For a while, even after the authentic and inevitably fruitful word of Jesus had been spoken to the boy at the very roots of his being, his travail and conflict increased rather than decreased. The habit of noisy and resistant fear persisted in him mechanically, retarding his discernment—let alone appropriation—of what was being wrought out for him by Love. Hence even when the fear-mechanism in him had at length run itself to a standstill, the only immediate perceptible result was that " the child became as one dead ; insomuch that the more part said, He is dead ". In him silence, no less than noise, appeared uncannily divorced from life. It was, however, not the silence of death, but rather that of suspended animation, as it were, in the vacuum of deliverance from past bondage not yet become creative deliverance into newness of life.

Raphael's *La Trasfigurazione* is the only well-known picture of the Transfiguration to include the epileptic boy being brought by his father, accompanied by the crowd, to the disciples to heal. If there are any other Transfiguration paintings which do likewise, or which depict in isolation some phase of the Mystery at the foot of the mountain, they are not readily discoverable. But it is no more than the truth to

say that something of the very essence of the Mystery of the healing of the epileptic boy is given *by proxy* as it were, in one picture treating of another, but kindred Mystery—that of our Lord's healing of the disabled man at the pool of Bethesda. This picture is the *Christ Healing the Sick* of Pedro Orrente (c. 1570-1645), a reproduction of which may be found in E. Harris's *Spanish Painting* (John Gifford, 1938. Plate 43). The moment at Bethesda which Orrente chose to depict corresponds to that in which the epileptic boy was still "as one dead"—but more than that, it likewise visibly illumines the *how* and *for what* of that which was to follow.

The sick in Orrente's picture lie in gloom under the porticos by the pool. Each is so hemmed in by his own misery as to be oblivious to that of those around him. Infinitely weary, expectation withered, the disabled man lies, hopeless, on his back. He does not as yet see Jesus, accompanied by three disciples, approach him. Nonetheless, all-unsuspected by himself in his seemingly interminable death-in-life, Jesus is even now present beside him as Bridegroom-Saviour—Saviour *because* he is Bridegroom.

This Christ of Pedro Orrente's is not amongst the outstandingly well-known paintings of him. One wonders why not. He should be. So uniquely, instantly, unmistakably the *Bridegroom*-Saviour he is, for some at least, more immediately and enduringly arresting than the Christ of any other artist whatsoever.

Short of stature, humanly insignificant, this Christ of Bethesda simultaneously combines the prophetic "no form nor comeliness" of Isaiah liii with the moral power and majesty of God. He is vividly enhaloed, but with a miniature halo, as though Glory had forcibly *compressed* itself in order not to submerge him.

Withdrawn into himself, he stands by the foot of the sick man's bed, bending slightly towards him, manifestly rooted in his God and Father, hands breast-high and priest-wise, all-love and all-compassion, the incarnation of prayer. Prayer

Incarnate he is indeed. Between him and the disabled man there is—in some verbally indescribable, yet nevertheless pictorially, tangible way—a twofold current of action on the part of our Lord. It is clear that he is, at one and the same time, in process of drawing out of the man all that ails him interiorly and infusing into him immensely concentrated quickening virtue. He is pouring forth in and by Silence that which will by the power of the Holy Spirit progressively bring into being in the man a new creation, spiritually, mentally, and physically in proportion as he himself, through the same Spirit, awakens, and responds to that which is in mercy being wrought out for him.

" When Jesus saw him lie, and knew that he had been now a long time in that case ", to him the *duration* of the disabled man's sickness, so progressively paralysing to the man's own imagination and hope of wholeness, was but a reason the more *for*—and not *against*—his healing. As is his wont, it is precisely the point of humanly greatest obstacle which our Lord makes the point of his transfiguring intervention. Time from having been the man's jailor is made by our Lord a determining factor in and for his liberation. In the stillness and stilling of eternity, Jesus ignores the tyranny of time and turns time as foe to time as friend.

He likewise ignores and overrules the absence of that form of human help which had for so long seemed to the man himself the indispensable prerequisite and sole possibility of cure.

Our Lord cuts clean across the man's preconceived notions—not so much in order to effect his deliverance merely as such from past and present bondage, as in order to deliver him into unitive life with himself. It is to this he is manifestly *wooing* him with every fibre of his being, whilst no less manifestly praying into him the *enablement* for such love-response as he wills to evoke from him as "an offering of a free heart ".

So it was with the epileptic boy at the foot of the Mount of Transfiguration. He had had his interior fear—and all be-

gotten of it—drawn out of him by the Praying Christ. But infinitely merciful though that negative stilling was, it was not of itself sufficient to constitute life. Such a stilling was not an end in itself. That *from* which he had been freed was of far less vital import than that *for* which he was freed. To him also, as to the disabled man at the pool of Bethesda, it was precisely as *Bridegroom*-Saviour drawing him to unitive life with himself that Jesus came.

Not yet quickened to newness of life, the boy after writhing on the ground lay there to all appearance dead and less capable of response to life than ever. " But Jesus took him by the hand, and raised him up; and he arose " (R.V. Mk. ix, 27). Such was the first outcome of Jesus' descent from the Mount of Transfiguration : a deeply significant further stage in the continuance of miracles which " made known the Glory that was his ".

How glorious a Mystery is that " But Jesus took him by the hand, and raised him up ; and he arose ". In the original that " took " has a connotation of " get possession of "; whilst " hand " is not infrequently used to symbolize " spirit ". Thus our Lord's outward and visible act of external physical aid was intended to go deeper, and to signify—and convey to the boy the revivifying, peace-giving, assurance of—an inward and spiritual grace of change of ownership. It was for the boy the effectual pledge that he was no longer his own—mere prey to fear's legion torments—but the freedman of Christ, so that it was Jesus his Bridegroom-Saviour who would *for the asking* henceforth remain in bedrock possession of his free spirit. It was as Penitent—through complete renewal of mind following upon the dispositions of Christ prayer-infused into him in place of his own—that he thus became the first freedman of the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord, Priest and King.

Hitherto Jesus and the boy had been victims *with a difference.* It was as priest of Triune Glory—that Glory of Love wholly given, wholly received, wholly given again—that Jesus sacrificially, joyously, creatively and redemptively lived and

offered up his victim-life. The boy's non-accepted—yet nonetheless inescapable—victim-life had, on the contrary, been rendered wholly uncreative, and indeed positively destructive, by self-regarding fear. Such fear is, in the last resort, precisely self's refusal to exercise a sacrificial priesthood of Triune Glory like to that of our Lord in his own freely-embraced victim-life. The boy's freeing by our Lord from self-imprisoning fear was, therefore, nothing less than invitation and enablement to become progressively one with him in a life-long exercise of this sacrificial priesthood of Glory.

Henceforward Jesus and the boy were to be victims not merely *with a likeness,* but in unbroken unitive partnership to the Glory of God and for similar transfigurational emancipation for all creation. This it was for which the boy had been freed. This—and this alone—it is to be a freedman of the Transfiguration.

St. Luke alone records in so many words what is perhaps one of the most significant, thankworthy and inspiring aspects of the whole Mystery of the healing of the epileptic boy at the foot of the Mount of Transfiguration. We are told by him that " Jesus rebuked the unclean spirit, and healed the boy and gave him back to his father " (R.V. Lk. ix, 42. A.V. delivered him again to his father. D.V. restored him to his father). This was freeing indeed—not the altogether easier, less substantial, less triumphant freeing born of a change of external circumstances ; but a radical and transfigurational freeing *within* and *towards* the self-same exterior and interior circumstances which had always obtained hitherto.

What gracious and invigorating trust of the father, as well as of the boy, our Lord thus evinced in letting them go back *to the old setting* to prove as a continuing and expanding experience his " Behold I make all things new "—there where, above all places, its wonder would be greatest for themselves, as well as being unarguable testimony to those who had known them in their pre-Transfiguration life.

Freeing *in*—rather than freeing *out of*—the victim-state is the supreme love-gift of the Transfigured and Transfiguring

Lord to the souls he unites to himself to live in and by the Mystery of his Transfiguration. This is his turning of sorrow into joy : a joy far greater than could ever be any mere taking away of sorrow as an end in itself.

Dame Julian of Norwich speaking, in her *Revelations of Divine Love,* of the sinner that shall come saved to heaven, says : " Though the soul be healed, his wounds are seen afore God,—not as wounds, but as worships ". The Mysteries of the top and the bottom of the Mount of Transfiguration are those in which God permits and enables the soul also to see for itself its own wounds, and the wounds of all creation, if not as already *actual* worships, yet as at least *potential* worships—and to unite with the Blessed Trinity for the turning of these potential worships into consummated worships to his Glory is for it the life of heaven begun on earth. It was this very desire to make of his wounds worships which our Lord had prayed into the boy in place of his terrified shrinking from them and self-pitying resentment of them. Together with this desire, he had prayed into the boy desire and enablement for the acceptance of his own cross, since wounds can only be made worships by taking up the cross daily. The following Jesus in daily taking up of the cross is itself the progressive transfigurational making of wounds into worships.

So wonderful was this " new creation " wrought in and for the epileptic boy when " Jesus took him by the hand, and raised him up ; and he arose ", that attention commonly tends to focus exclusively upon his personal healing. But this is to remain oblivious of the fact that the primary significance of this inexhaustible Mystery is to be found not in the boy's healing as such, but in what may be termed its essentially *prophetic* character as prefiguring the Resurrection. For in his being raised up by the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord of Glory is prefigured Jesus being raised up by the Glory of his Father after his Passion ; and in his arising is prefigured the taking again by Jesus of the life voluntarily laid down that he might take it again in and to the Glory of the

Father and for the salvation of all creation. The boy's being raised up by Jesus and himself arising is a *συνέργεια*—a joint-work—of Jesus and the boy wrought out in the power of the Holy Spirit which prefigures the triune *συνέργεια* of Father, Son and Holy Spirit in Christ's Resurrection from the dead.

Our Lord conferred upon the boy a signal grace in permitting and enabling him to prefigure "the power of his Resurrection". But the grace was not confined merely to prefiguration, but also gradually extended to actual—even if infinitesimal—participation in what "the power of his Resurrection" was already meaning to Jesus himself. Neither for Jesus nor the boy was the cross to be taken up as an end in itself, nor endured simply for endurance's sake, but only as part of a glorious whole : that glorious whole which—as Mr. E. I. Watkin has pointed out—had just been under discussion between our Lord, Moses and Elijah in his Transfiguration when they "spake of his departure [R.V. margin] which he was about to accomplish at Jerusalem" (Lk. ix, 31).[2]

[2] Mr. Watkin has written most luminously: "When it is said in St. Luke's account of the Transfiguration 'they spake of his departure which he should accomplish at Jerusalem' am I not right in thinking that it refers not *only* to his death as is commonly understood and often translated, but to his entire departure from this mortal life (at death) to the order of the Resurrection body and its life (the Resurrection) to heaven (the Ascension)? This glorious departure from a hill top seems above all to be his departure. The orientation is not simply to the Passion, but on and through it to the final glorification. We know that the Resurrection was in the forefront of our Lord's mind : 'Tell no man . . . till the Son of Man be *risen*'. To translate ἔξοδον by death or decease is *interpretation* not translation. It should be translated literally 'departure' . . . Since our Lord departed at Jerusalem by his death and his Resurrection and finally his Ascension, I feel entitled to interpret the departure here mentioned as referring to the entire departure in its three acts. If not, why not use the word 'death'? Is it indeed *conceivable* that he conversed with Moses and Elijah *only* of his Passion—and was silent about the Resurrection and its fulfilment the Ascension, the triumph achieved by a seeming defeat, the glory prefigured by the passing glory of the moment? Surely not". Mr. Watkin's interpretation finds independent corroboration in Canon A. M. Ramsey's *The Glory of God, and the Transfiguration of Christ*, p. 123, where Canon Ramsey rightly takes it still further with his :

Jesus must have prayer-communicated to the boy something of that "joy that was set before him" for which, and by which, "he endured the Cross, despising the shame" (Heb. xii, 2); and prayed for him also a sharing—in so far as he could receive it—in his own "I lay down [Gk.=(also) offer up] my life, that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself" (Jn. x, 17-18).

The Mystery of the healing of the epileptic boy at the foot of the Mount of Transfiguration is in a very real sense not *his* Mystery only, but also a Mystery of Christ—in that it derives solely from Christ, witnesses to his incarnate power to heal, and prefigures "the power of his Resurrection". But in an equally real sense this Mystery is as much *ours* as it is his own and Christ's. Individually and corporately we all have part in this Mystery—whether we figure as the boy before, during or after his healing; the father; the crowd of onlookers; or the impotent disciples.

The epileptic boy before his healing is representative of the suicidal tendencies of our present world in its state of house divided against itself. Individuals, families, classes, nations, even divided Christendom, are all in varying degrees convulsed like him in body, mind, and spirit. Like him, we alternate fearfully between helpless acquiescence and rebellious frustration in our present day clash between chaos and Silence, speed and stillness, art and science, Church and State, pacifism and war, sanity and insanity. A farseeing American doctor has recently designated our age as one of "universal nervousness". This nervousness we have in common with the fear-ridden epileptic boy. We can no more rid ourselves of it than could he. Only the Christ can pray it out of us.

The father of the epileptic boy bears witness to the convulsive outcome of the reproduction from generation to generation of man's fallen nature, and the suicidal character of

Continued

"there is also, in Christ's departure, the new exodus of Israel from bondage into freedom. Of this Moses and Elijah were speaking from the midst of the glory"

man's urge to creativity of which he has lost control. He and the disciples alike bear witness to the impossibility of family or Church—let alone State—casting out the sin-begotten spirit of our "universal nervousness", which can "come out by nothing, save by prayer": prayer as sacrificial as that of the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord.

The "Because of your little faith" given by our Lord in reply to the disciples' query as to why they could not cast out the unclean spirit from the boy, removed from the boy *exclusive* responsibility for his failure to be healed at their hands. It made plain once for all the *corporate* implications and demands in each and every individual healing.

The profound importance attaching to the absence of the mother of the epileptic boy—be the reason for that absence what it may—bespeaks the God-designed indispensability of our Lady's rôle in conjunction with that of her Son for the wholeness of mankind. We need her as Mother not less than did our Lord. She will prepare, strengthen and uphold us in our sacrificial self-oblation, and co-operate with us in it, as she did for him in his. In the Christ of the Vasnetzov Madonna and Child who gives himself so royally and fearlessly to life from the arms of his queenly, selfless Mother, we are *shown* why those who are to be "made" by him "kings and priests unto God and his Father" must pray *"ut adveniat Regnum Tuum, adveniat regnum Mariae"*. She not only bids us "Whatsoever he saith unto you, do it", but she prays unceasingly for our progressive enablement to do so and by her perfect self-effacing love for him and us furthers and deepens our joyous sacrificial union with him.

As first freedman of the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord, the erstwhile epileptic boy is the firstfruits of the Mystery of the Transfiguration. He is the pledge prefiguring a host of men, women, and children all down the ages likewise to be freed in and by this Mystery for unconditional "Yes" with Christ to life as appointed or permitted by the Father: freed for the setting of the face toward Jerusalem

and the drinking of the Gethsemane chalice given by the Father, freed for good works on the way up to Jerusalem, until in the Via Dolorosa "works" as such fall off and give place to the one supreme work of completion of the "Exodus" from fallen life through death to the risen and ascended life hid with Christ in God.

One in the never-ending train of freedmen and freedwomen of the Transfiguration was Sister Elizabeth of the Trinity, "the Praise of Glory", the young French Carmelite nun who died at Dijon on November 9, 1906. During her last illness she wrote to her Mother: "The good God takes pleasure in immolating his little victim (hostie),[3] but the Mass he is saying with me, of which his love is the priest, may last some time longer. The victim (hostie) does not find it long in the hands of him who sacrifices her". The truth was that she did not find it long because she, too, made priestly self-oblation of herself in union with his oblation of himself, and so became as it were concelebrant with him in the transfigurational Mass which he was saying with her as "victim" (host) "for his Father's Glory and to succour the needs of his Church".

Be our crosses what they may, exteriorly or interiorly, to each and all of us, priests and laity alike, the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord holds forth the invitation and *possibility* to become freedmen and freedwomen of the Transfiguration. It is a possibility which is ours *for the taking*.

Each soul who hears and responds to this invitation of his will likewise become as it were concelebrant with him in the transfigurational Mass he desires to say with it as "victim" (host)—like himself—to the Glory of his Father and for the hastening of the day when "creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the

[3] *Translator's footnote*: Here . . . the word *hostie* is used, which in French signifies the Sacred Host in the Mass as well as an ordinary victim. The word "victim" or "sacrifice" does not render the meaning of this passage in the original.

glory of the children of God" (Rom. viii, 21). To this invitation of his he adds his "he that hath ears to hear, let him hear".

May his Silence still us so to hear—as his Silence alone can—that we, when Jesus as Bridegroom-Saviour speaks to us, takes us by the hand and raises us up, may, like the epileptic boy, arise to newness of life both for ourselves and for all the myriads of souls bound up with us in the bundle of life now and for ever.

CHARLES JOHN SHEBBEARE

By A. M. RAMSEY

By the death on October 15, 1945, of Charles John Shebbeare, sometime Rector of Stanhope in the County of Durham, Doctor of Divinity, Chaplain to the King and Master of the Wear Valley Beagles, the Church of England lost a personality remarkable in its modern history. His gifts were far from common in themselves, and perhaps unique in their combination in one who spent the whole of a long working life as a parochial clergyman.

Shebbeare was born on April 15, 1865, the eldest son of the Vicar of Wykeham in Yorkshire. He went to Westminster as a boy; and it is recorded that he made a mark amongst his school contemporaries by his vigour in debate upon matters of literature, art and religion. He had already a devotion to Shakespeare which remained throughout his life, and he introduced his friends to Berkeley's philosophy. Amongst his contemporaries at Westminster was C. C. J. Webb, later to be Oriel Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion in the University of Oxford, with whom he formed a life-long friendship. Webb later paid this tribute to Shebbeare's influence: "My second series of Gifford lectures was dedicated to a friend, without the mention of whose name I should have been silent concerning the personal influence whose effect upon my intellectual and religious life has been more continuous and powerful than that of any other. With Mr. C. J. Shebbeare—now the worthy successor of Bishop Butler in the rectory where the *Analogy* was written—I have from boyhood shared all my thoughts upon the problems of philosophy and theology" (Muirhead, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, second series, p. 340).

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE PACIFIC LIBRARY

Shebbeare passed from Westminster to Oxford, where he spent his first year as a non-collegiate student, and subsequently migrated to Christ Church. To the surprise of many of his friends he got only a Fourth Class in Greats; but he was a slow reader and writer and found it difficult to cover the ground, being content only with a very thorough study of any book that he read. The facility of more rapid reading came later, but meanwhile dons and undergraduates who knew him were aware that his class in the schools was absurdly below his merits.

His career is quickly told. Curacies at Enfield (1888-1891) and at Milford in Surrey (1891-1898); the rectory of Swerford near Oxford (1898-1921) and of Stanhope in County Durham (1921-1942). He married, in 1914, Miss Evelyne Joyce, and had three sons. The two rectories cover nearly all his active life; but the picture is incomplete without a mention of the Mastership of the Beagles which he assumed in 1930 and of his membership of the Archbishops' Commission on Doctrine which gave him, in his later years, a special outlet for his gifts of friendship, theology and debate. He retired from Stanhope in the summer of 1942, and spent his last three years in Oxford.

A hint of the unusual and versatile character of Shebbeare's mind was given by the title of the first book which he wrote, *The Greek Theory of the State and the Nonconformist Conscience* (1895). No more curious book can have been written by an Anglican curate. It begins with a discussion of the declining fortunes of the Liberal Party and an appeal to it to think out its political philosophy. It argues that the aspirations of Liberalism imply not a utilitarian theory but a theory akin to that of the Greeks wherein good things are cherished for their own sake. If, then, Liberals were true to their implicit philosophy they would value certain things which they commonly disparage—the hereditary peerage, the Established Church and field-sports, each of which is vigorously expounded and defended. It is unlikely that the book had a big circulation; but to read it now is to find it full of Shebbeare. He was greatly concerned with the fortunes of the Liberal Party. His political activities disturbed his first vicar, evoked the more

tolerant astonishment of his second, and claimed a share of his time during his years as Rector of Swerford, when—eschewing politics within his own parish—he was vigorous at election times in other Oxfordshire villages. But it would be totally misleading to describe him as a political parson, for this interest represented only one facet of his many-sided character. Field-sports (the ethics of which he expounded in a sermon written for the Chapel Royal and printed in *Theology*, January 1931), music (which provides a good many allusions in his books), and, above all, philosophy and theology were his abiding interests. He enjoyed everything which seemed to him to be good. He understood wine and food. He knew Hegel's works intimately. He read the ancient classics " for pleasure." He was familiar with Dante's *Divina Comedia.* Few men give such an impression of a vigour and vitality which touch life at so many points.

Shebbeare had been brought up in a " Tractarian " household, and while he had always a reverent understanding of that tradition he moved to a position which he himself described as Evangelical. But he held a version of Evangelicalism which was very much his own. He was wont to say that he had " come to the Evangelical position by way of the Kantian ethic ", and this rather cryptic remark is illuminated by much that he wrote. He always insisted that " the first step in the acceptance of the Christian Religion—the perception of its intensive claim upon our obedience—is a step which our moral facilities must take alone." Starting from the Categorical Imperative and the sense of guilt he went on to identify the Kantian " good will " with the justifying faith of St. Paul, and to find the distinctiveness of Christianity to lie in an experience of acceptance and pardon on the basis not of orthodoxy or of good works but of a right disposition of the will. This enabled him to make use of much of the Evangelical language about sin and salvation (and he could use it with fervour and passion), while he sat loose to the historic events of the gospel in a way which often puzzled his Evangelical friends. There was a certain naiveté in the transition which he made from Kant to the gospel: but

in his own heart and mind the two were close together. He studied the literature of popular evangelicalism and the Keswick movement, and affirmed that its position was in essence his own. On the other hand, he made the centenary of Kant the occasion of a special sermon in his honour at Swerford; and he used to teach the village school-children about the "categorical imperative" (*eo nomine*). A story is told of how one of his colleagues in the Doctrinal Commission demurred to the lengths to which he was using this conception and said: "You can't worship a categorical imperative"—only to receive a passionate answer: "On the contwawy: I bow down to it in wevewence."

Shebbeare's first theological book was *Religion in an Age of Doubt* (1914). In it he worked out a Christian apologetic and the beginnings of a presentation of Christian doctrine on the basis of his Kantian approach. After a characteristic treatment of Morality, Duty and Guilt—in which he shows the connexion between the good will and justifying faith—he passes on to the Person of Jesus Christ, in whom is the moral supremacy which embodies an imperative divine claim, and the assurance of pardon which sinners need. The chapters upon our Lord, interwoven as they are with the theme of the book, form a self-contained essay. Basing his portrait upon a critical investigation of the sayings in "Q" and the episodes in Mark, Shebbeare gives his own version of what would nowadays be called the "Jesus of liberalism". But having read many of the expositions of the gospel portrait of that period, I feel that Shebbeare's is outstanding and that it deserves to be read and pondered to-day, when in the reaction from liberalism we are in danger of losing something which ought not to be lost. The book then passes on to discuss the experience of salvation in two rather curious chapters entitled "Evangelicalism" and "The Keswick School." Next, having laid the basis on which Christian dogmatics must rest, the book passes on to the construction of a systematic theology. Shebbeare has applauded the Ritschlians for making the moral relation of men to Jesus Christ the central fact in theology, but now he censures

them for eschewing the task of a Christian metaphysics and proceeds to some essays in this task. In particular, the argument from conscience is shown to lead on to a restatement of the Argument from Design and to an "optimistic" view of the universe such as involves the hope of heaven and a bodily resurrection.

The coincidence of its publication with the outbreak of war prevented *Religion in an Age of Doubt* from winning the attention which it deserved. But it made its mark. Shebbeare's diocesan bishop was Charles Gore; and he was delighted when the bishop wrote to him implying that the position taken in the book was tenable within the Church of England, and making the interesting comment that he was inclined himself to be metaphysical where Shebbeare was Ritschlian, and Ritschlian where Shebbeare was metaphysical. Shebbeare was almost fierce in repudiating the idea that salvation is by orthodoxy, but was himself ready to accept the miraculous, and he had a deep sense of the importance of such traditional dogmas as the resurrection of the body. "If we regard the body as evil, we shall desire to banish it from heaven. If we esteem it as God's good gift, we shall desire it restored at the resurrection. The former view accords with the sentiment of Eastern barbarism: the latter with that of the Western civilization which has deemed the body worthy to be celebrated by the brush of Titian or the chisel of Pheidias" (*op. cit.* p. 166).

Shebbeare's next book *The Challenge of the Universe* (1918) developed the restatement of the Argument from Design which had been briefly suggested in the last book. This work has not the same variety of interest as its predecessor; but it is perhaps Shebbeare's biggest achievement in the form of a single closely-reasoned argument which deals fairly with as many possible objections as his vivid imagination could conceive, and gains in convincingness by not trying to prove too much. The book begins with an acute criticism of Bertrand Russell's *Free Man's Worship,* and it passes on to criticize and restate the Argument from Design. The central conception is that the

world is a rational whole, whose principles cannot be explained as no more than a mechanical uniformity: natural selection and utilitarian exigencies do not cover all the facts within its life. Shebbeare's treatment of *aesthetic* laws and ends is specially cogent, and, of course, very characteristic of his own interests. And his argument that "necessity and accident are far from being mutually exclusive" prefigures his treatment of the matter in his later book on Providence. Shebbeare writes as an Idealist in philosophy, making much (as he always did) of the argument that evil is necessary for the fullest perfection of the universe. Near the conclusion of the book he finds himself bound to allow the conceivability of a rational universe which embodies the idea of the good but does not necessarily imply a personal God: the further step to belief in a personal God is, however, required by the consideration of the nature of religious experience.

Soon after the migration from Swerford to Stanhope there came the invitation to Shebbeare to join the Commission on Doctrine which had as its chairman first Dr. Burge (Shebbeare's own bishop in Oxfordshire) and then Dr. Temple. Shebbeare had taken some part in the discussions at Cuddesdon which led to the setting up of the commission, and he joined with vigour in the meetings both of the full commission and of its northern group. The first book from Butler's rectory, *Problems of Providence* (1929) alludes to his colleagues of the commission in the preface. "You speak (so I can imagine some of them saying to me) of 'the good' or 'the moral law' when others would speak of 'God'. You appear to be satisfied, more than most people, with the impersonal substitute. Now, in fact, I am *not* satisfied with the impersonal object of worship, because I feel (here the only possible defence is autobiography)—and at times I feel passionately—the desire to speak to God. Job's 'oh, that I knew where I might find him: I would fill my mouth with arguments' expresses my frame of mind quite exactly." The book is a discussion of a number of practical questions concerning the relations of God and man; and the argument leads to a determinist position.

The book is a mirror both of the writer's mental powers and of the depth of his religion: but it lacks the convincing clarity of its predecessors.

One of Shebbeare's colleagues in the Doctrinal Commission spoke of the blending of cool reasoning and passionate emotion in his contributions. This unity of opposites appears in his contribution to the volume of essays edited by Dr. Grensted and entitled *The Atonement in History and Life* (1930). The purpose of the volume was to show that an evangelical doctrine can be presented on sound theological grounds as against the purely Abelardian standpoint of Rashdall and others. The subject entrusted to Shebbeare was the Atonement and Modern Thought, and his contribution consists of a sermon preached at Cambridge in 1926 together with an introductory essay. The sermon, on Zechariah xii, 1, "... a fountain opened for sin and for uncleanness", is remarkable. It is an argument for the necessity, rationality and morality of an act of reparation to offset the volume of sin in the universe. Particularly Shebbearean is the plea made for the need for an atonement *aesthetically* satisfying to offset the *ugliness* of sin. Referring to Isaiah iv, 4, the preacher says: "The Lord shall purify the blood of Jerusalem by the spirit—or the blast—of burning. Our own dislike of bodily filth and defilement is not merely prudential: it is partly aesthetic. Thus I imagine that most of us, if we had been oppressed by the presence in our neighbourhood of loathsome and insanitary dwellings, would experience a distinct emotional satisfaction if these had been destroyed by fire—distinct from what we would feel at the removal of the uncleanness by quieter methods." "When Lord Roberts issued to his soldiers a prayer that Christ might wash them in his blood, a Unitarian minister asked why the general wished the men to use this 'disgusting language'. This criticism could hardly have been made by one who had ever fallen under the magic of that verse of Aeschylus

μηλοισιν αἱμάσσοντας ἑστιὰς θεῶν,

'drenching with the blood of sheep the hearths of the gods'".

The argument is one to be studied. One who was present in the University Church as an undergraduate remembers how the philosophical exposition led on to the sure evangelical conclusion "that the pardoned penitent must ever look back to a sin-stained past; that he can never expect to view the world with a soul satisfied and at rest unless God has opened for us in some sense and by some means a fountain for sin and for uncleanness".

The essay prefixed to the sermon is no less interesting: for it contains what is probably the first discussion by an *Anglican* writer of Karl Barth's Commentary on Romans. The English translation by Sir Edwyn Hoskyns had not yet appeared and Shebbeare was probably alone amongst Anglican theologians in expounding the German work to English readers at that date. Of some of Barth's paradoxes he says: "many of these epigrams will present no difficulty when once we have been accustomed to their unfamiliar setting—they agree so remarkably well with the customary language of old-fashioned evangelicalism". Shebbeare distinguishes two factors in Barth's theology—an anti-Pelagianism, which he welcomes, and an anti-rationalism which he deplores. It is a remarkable fact of theological history that the first full examination of Karl Barth's teaching within the Church of England should have been made by a country parson, and that one who belonged so thoroughly to the liberal era of English divinity should have been the first to appreciate the theology of the Swiss Neo-Protestantism.

Mention must be made of an article on "The Evangelical Conception of the Sacraments" which Shebbeare contributed to *Theology*, April 1930. This paper is bound up with discussions in the Doctrinal Commission, and it is a learned statement as to why Evangelicals find the familiar "Catholic" conception of sacramental causality difficult to accept. It deserves to be widely known. It displays a learning and appreciation of scholastic writers and the interesting remark: "To an evangelical of sensitive spirit the Roman books are sometimes pleasanter reading than some Anglican theology. The Anglican reluctance to 'define' tends to cover up what ought to be

brought into clear daylight". Shebbeare had a consistent respect for Roman Catholic divinity, particularly in a field in which his own reading was considerable—Moral Theology. As long ago as 1912 he wrote for *The Church Quarterly Review* an article on "Probabalism" in which he pleaded for serious attention by the clergy to the questions which Roman moral theologians were accustomed to handle, and for the development of an Anglican tradition of spiritual direction free from some of the Latin presuppositions. Dr. Kirk and others have paid tribute to Shebbeare's article as a pioneer piece of writing. His preoccupation with problems of conscience remained to the end of his life; and in his last conversation with me he said that for many years he had worried over the problem of "the doubtful conscience" and was worrying still.

In his last years Shebbeare became acutely conscious that he had committed to publication only a fragment of what he had to say. His *Christianity and Other Religions* (1939) in the "Christian Challenge series" has a misleading title. It is not a text-book on comparative religion (a field in which Shebbeare had read little), but an exposition of the uniqueness of Christianity in terms of his favourite conception of pardon on the basis of the good will or justifying faith. Into the book the author packed an assortment of odds and ends which he wanted to say; but the book scarcely fulfilled its role in the series. Lastly, in the *Problem of the Future Life* (1939) Shebbeare drew out, with great fullness, the argument which had appeared in two earlier books. If the book seems to err in asking questions which need not be asked and to probe into mysteries which are best left unexplored, it shows the restlessness of the author's mind in ignoring no problem which is raised by his main contention that heaven is the fulfilment of all good. Will Homeric heroes in heaven fight and enjoy their battles? Will our friendship with dogs have its place? "And hares?", interposed the reviewer in the *Journal of Theological Studies*. "Perhaps in heaven there will be beagling in which it is really fun for the hare."

Shebbeare taught his parochial flocks conscientiously. If Swerford was puzzled by the "categorical imperative" he could use an idiom which Stanhope could understand. Among his papers was a little book of Confirmation addresses, prepared with great care, in which his most characteristic ideas are put in the simplest language of practical religion; the sense of "I must", the feeling of failure, the good will, the assurance of pardon through Jesus Christ, the claims of our Lord, the necessity of prayer and communion, the doctrine of the Trinity, the difficulty of the doubtful conscience. It is all there, including the Hegelian view of the universe: "if there were no evil, there would be nothing to fight against. Thus the world as a whole is good". While Shebbeare attended to duty, there was always about him a sort of detachment from time and place. He would be unconscious of an icy cold temperature in his study; and in argument he would suddenly refer to a point which the other person had made many years ago as if it were a part of the present conversation. But if some of his tastes and ways recalled the eighteenth century he would often show himself to be shrewdly contemporary in his grasp of what was going on. The blending of reason and passion was one of his fascinating characteristics. The story is told in Durham of an address which he gave to a gathering of clergy upon the duty of thought and the perils of emotion, and while he spoke tears poured from his eyes. On another occasion he read to the theological society at Durham a paper on Miracles. It was shortly before his retirement, and probably the last theological paper which he delivered. He argued, on the one hand, that the belief in Miracle was not indispensable for Christian faith: but when he quoted the gospel-stories the warmth of his own belief in their miraculous character burst out and he repeated with fervour the words *τὸ εἶ δύνασει· πάντα δύνατα τῷ πιστεύοντι*. The proposer of the vote of thanks, noting the double strain in the discourse, remarked that Shebbeare had been at once "running with the hare and hunting with the hounds" and none laughed more heartily than Shebbeare himself.

This paper has dwelt mainly upon Shebbeare's writings, for he had a place of his own among the theologians of his generation. He was characteristic of his age in his belief in the alliance of Christian faith and idealist philosophy, though few can have been so relentless in the pursuit of every problem to which that alliance gave rise. At the same time he had an independence of his age and a readiness at any moment to criticize its common assumptions as a result of his wide intellectual sympathies and his evangelical religion. Those who knew him, however, will delight most of all to remember the man himself: honest as the day, versatile without a trace of shallowness, unobtrusive in his stores of knowledge and kindness, constantly surprising them by the contrasts in his enthusiasms yet ceasing to surprise as they realized that the secret of his lovableness was his utter unlikeness to any other man they had known.

THE GOTHIC LEGACY[1]

By HUMPHREY PAKINGTON

WHEN I was a small boy, my father—in the way Victorian fathers had—asked me what I intended to be when I grew up. I replied, I believe without hesitation, that I intended to be Bishop of Lincoln. I have had many ambitions, a few of which have been satisfied, but time is getting on, and I do not think that that particular prayer will be granted to me. It was not, however, that I desired in those days so very greatly to be a bishop, but merely that the image of that stately group of towers on the hill above the plain had fired my imagination. To-day, perhaps, I would select Durham or Ely as my see, for a closer acquaintance with Lincoln has bred a considerable distaste for the west front of that cathedral, with its stiff stone screen stretched taut between the flanking pinnacles and masking the bases of the western towers.

The outstanding example of a west front in this country is, I suppose, to be seen at Peterborough—a superb *tour-de-force* which succeeds in hiding its lack of relationship with the rest of the building. Normally, our Gothic builders let the west front "happen", so to speak, in a perfectly natural manner, and, where western towers played their part by making a stop for the aisles, and where those towers were allowed to show their feet planted firmly on the ground—as at Durham, York, Canterbury, Lichfield—the effect was usually satisfactory. But this west front question is, I feel, a somewhat delicate matter to raise in this company, for our own cathedral is woefully lacking in this respect. The west end of Worcester Cathedral —I cannot dignify it with the name of "front"—gives me the

[1] An address delivered to the Friends of Worcester Cathedral.

impression that a length of ready-made nave has been chopped off to fit the site—sliced off when they found they were getting near the river. The aisles are shown as what they are—mere lean-to's. There is to my mind always something a little sordid about a lean-to, and the lean-to of the aisle roofs at Worcester is undisguised, unhidden by tower or parapet. Had it not been decided, probably with wisdom, to put our cathedrals into cold storage, to stop adding to them or subtracting from them, I would have liked to appeal to-day to some wealthy donor to give us a nice little pair of western towers for Worcester. They need only be quite small and inexpensive, in the manner of Canterbury, and in no sense competing with the central tower. After all, one of the Canterbury towers dates from 1840, doesn't it ? No English cathedral exposes its west front more boldly than does ours, but I am inclined to fear that few have less justification for doing so.

But I must not follow that red herring any further. I started to explain my early attachment to Lincoln, and found myself telling you what I disliked about Worcester. That there is much that I love I need hardly say. The foundation of my love for Lincoln lay in the recesses of a romantic imagination—where indeed our love for Gothic architecture usually lies. I had been brought up to believe that Gothic architecture was good and all else bad, and that a religious service could only be performed properly under a pointed arch—or under a round one provided it were Norman. The picture of St. Paul's Cathedral, shown to me in the drawing-room after tea, was turned over hurriedly, as though there were something indecent about it. I hope that most of us have learned by now to be more catholic in our taste : to take pleasure in a baroque pediment or a stream-lined facade : but still, when we let ourselves go, when we (so to speak) wallow in architecture, when we give the heart rein and let the head go hang, it is to the Gothic that we turn—the architecture of romance.

I say "we", and risk the modernist sneering at me. I remember once, in Norway, dining at a country restaurant set upon a lake. I sat next to a Norwegian architect who was an

extreme modernist. At dinner he explained to me his belief that architecture should be a matter of pure reason and calculation, and that personal feeling, emotion, romance if you like, should not enter into the matter When dinner was over we rose to go, and as we went out into the darkness of the night we saw that, according to an ancient custom of the country, a row of flares had been set along the garden wall to light our departure. It was a beautiful and moving sight, and my Norwegian friend clutched me by the arm and whispered, " That's what I like ! There's romance for you ! " I turned in surprise, but the modernist, realizing, I suppose, that he had given himself away, had slipped off into the darkness before I could reply. That man was afraid of the romance in his soul; afraid that if he gave it play he would slip back into the past instead of marching forward into the future ; afraid that the revivalist in him would submerge the creative artist ; unaware of the possibility of sublimating the romantic feelings for the past into a romantic feeling for the future ; unaware that unless he did so, unless he gave free rein to his powers of imagination, of sentiment, of romance, then indeed the creative artist would die in him.

A refusal to cultivate the emotions is, I believe, a defect of the present day. Perhaps the Victorians overdid it, with William Morris and Burne-Jones weeping copiously as they read *The Heir of Redcliffe* together, while even hard-headed publishers were to be found seated at their desks in floods of tears as they scanned the manuscripts submitted to them. Nevertheless, when I hear it said of someone in tones of scorn that " his heart is stronger than his head ", I turn my pity in another direction, and commiserate with him whose head is stronger than his heart, the man to whom logic is all, emotion nothing, for it is a false logic which discards emotion. Architecture has been defined as " Building touched with Emotion ", and I know no better definition.

When, therefore, I speak of Gothic as the architecture of romance, I do not, of course, mean the Romance of the so-

called Romantic Age, when every nobleman built a Gothic ruin in his park, and when men planted dead trees in Kensington Gardens to enhance the appearance of antiquity : the age when that King of Romantics, William Beckford, declared that he loved " composing airs, building towers, forming gardens, collecting old Japan, or writing a journey to China or the Moon ": the age when this same Beckford, desiring to build himself a new house, instructed his architect to prepare a design for " an ornamental building that should have the appearance of a convent, be partly in ruins, yet contain some weather-proof apartments which would afford shelter from sun or rain ". No, that is not the Romance I mean.

Nor do I mean the Romance engendered by the association of ideas : by the peopling of an ancient building with the men and women of another England : the monks chanting their antiphon across the echoing chancel, or walking the cloisters on a summer's afternoon, with the bees humming in the garth and the cuckoo calling from the green beyond. We are apt to fit such images to our taste, to picture the great church as we see it now, with its stone walls mellowed by the years and the sharp contours of canopy and pinnacle softened by the wind and rain of many centuries : apt to forget the clean, clear-cut stone of the building when it was new : apt to forget, too, the blatant colouring and crude form of the frescoes smeared upon the walls, whose faintest image we uncover with reverence to-day, but which, if repeated in all the brightness of their garish colours in some modern design, we should class as examples of gross vulgarity !

No, it is not this sentimental romance which is the gift of Gothic architecture to the modernist, but rather the untrammelled imagination which built the long nave of St. Albans, set the Five Sisters of York in their transept end, conceived the fantastic design of King's College Chapel, and sent the tower of Ely soaring to the sky, vanishing in the mist which lies over the fens, making of the tower a Jacob's Ladder which seems to climb to Heaven. Those were, indeed, samples of building " touched with emotion ".

Imagination, then, is a prime gift handed down to us by the Gothic builders. For the dying race of architectural revivalists romance may, of course, lie only in what is old, traditional, historic : they may dream of recreating the past. But for the creative artist romance lies in the future, in the vision of fresh creation. The romantic temperament, the ability to see visions and to dream dreams, is indeed to him a necessity. As Mr. Goodhart-Rendel has said, " There is nothing so really practical as to have Imagination ".

What other gifts beside this great gift of Imagination has Gothic architecture bequeathed to the builders of to-day ? Well, if you can call it a gift, I suppose the quality known by that dreadful word " Functionalism " should be included. Anthony Trollope once wrote that the well-dressed woman decorates her constructions, whereas the badly dressed one constructs her decorations. If that be true of architecture, Gothic architecture was well-dressed. The flying-buttress, transferring outward the thrust of the vault, became a thing of gracious beauty, as did the weighted pinnacle on the outer wall, which finally sent that thrust to earth. There is merit in beautifying your construction if you cannot hide it, as the Gothic builders did in this instance, but there is no merit in the actual showing of the construction. There was a " functional " phase a few years ago : a phase when even such a retiring thing as a chimney-flue could no longer be buried in the wall, a phase when it was considered better art to conduct the smoke away by means of a stove-pipe crawling up the wall. One might as well say that the beautiful body should expose the skeleton.

Closely allied with this heresy is the idea—common some twenty years ago—that " fitness for purpose " connotes beauty. Of course, a tool or a building should be supremely fit for its purpose, but because a saucepan or a pillar-box or a collar-stud suits its purpose it is surely ridiculous to say that it must be beautiful. I suppose this fallacy is partly the fault of Keats, who in one of his vaguer moments announced that " Beauty is truth, truth beauty ". I have never understood this

statement, and I doubt whether Keats did either. No, functionalism is not one of the gifts for which I most greatly value Gothic architecture.

But there is one great gift of Gothic architecture which is apt to be overlooked. I refer to the grouping of masses to form a finely contrasted composition. I am not at all sure that the Gothic builder realized that he was conferring this boon upon mankind, for it was surely for practical rather than artistic reasons that he turned the rectangular basilica into cruciform shape by building a transept to give a greater congregation easy sight of the high altar. This innovation, this cutting of the building into planes of sun and shadow, was furthered by the addition of tower and spire.

But the Gothic builder did more, and by linking together abbey and monastery produced such a superb unsymmetrical composition as can be seen in our own cathedral buildings when viewed from College Green. Here, again, the aesthetic result was obtained fortuitously, but in some Gothic groupings there is surely a conscious art, as evidenced by that lovely group of church, almshouses, and school at Ewelme in Oxfordshire, or the group round the church at Higham Ferrers in Northamptonshire. Here, in Gothic architecture, we see the genesis of the grouping of buildings to form a beautiful and related whole. Such a conception was lacking among the ancients. In the highest expression of classical architecture, found upon the Acropolis at Athens, we see the various buildings scattered about the rock with as little consideration for grouping, as little harmony of lay-out, as is to be found in the normal poultry farm. And even in Ancient Rome, seat of ordered rule, the building is still considered as an end in itself and rarely as part of a greater composition. The Forum at Rome showed a collection of buildings of various sizes and shapes dumped down in disarray on the surface of the earth. It is not perhaps too fanciful to count among the gifts of Gothic architecture to a later age, the sense of the picturesque grouping of the masses of a building which we see exemplified in such Renaissance

examples as Vanbrugh's Blenheim Palace or Castle Howard, or the grouping of related buildings shown so superbly in the setting of the Palace of Greenwich.

Yet, when all is said, the supreme lesson of Gothic architecture was surely to be venturesome : the tradition of Gothic architecture was to experiment. The Gothic builders had a superb confidence in their own work and a supreme and most refreshing contempt for that of their forebears. The essence of Gothic architecture was that it was a living, changing art : an art of perpetual venture and experiment : an art of trial and error : an art which seized eagerly upon the latest knowledge of materials : an art which followed the changing fashions and customs of the race from the rude barbarity of Norman days to the cheerful vulgarity of Elizabethan times. How thankful we should be that this great cycle of Gothic art was allowed to work itself out to its ultimate realization without the check of the revivalist. How thankful should we be that Alan of Walsingham, in that wonderful central lantern over the crossing at Ely, did not consider it necessary to ape the rounded arch and massive piers of the nave, and that the monks of Gloucester, finding their coffers suddenly filled by the lying-in-state of the murdered king, had the supreme effrontery to throw a perpendicular screen over their Norman chancel ! Marcel Proust, in his novel *Swann's Way,* describes such a Gothic transformation, telling how in the church at Combray the rugged barbarity of the eleventh century was " veiled by the graceful Gothic arcade which pressed coquettishly upon it, like a row of grown-up sisters who, to hide him from the eye of strangers, arrange themselves smilingly in front of a countrified, unmannerly, and ill-dressed younger brother ". Who that has seen that classic example of the blending of the styles at the church of St. Mary at Oxford—the great baroque porch with its barley-sugar columns and broken pediment set upon the background of the perpendicular church—who that has seen this blending of the styles would have it otherwise: would prefer a porch by some Gothic revivalist apeing the manners of another age ?

For this is surely the true value of tradition : to learn the

great lesson of the changing world ; to learn that the great tradition of our forefathers was to experiment with new materials, new motives ; to adapt their art to the changing needs and customs of a changing world.

There are, I suppose, those who believe that the world can never again recapture the beauty of the past : who believe that the designers of Ancient Greece, or of the Ile de France, or of the early Florentine Renaissance—whatever their particular choice may be—expressed once and for all the very height of architectural beauty, and that the best we can hope is to reproduce those wonderful treasures of the world's art. But that to me is not the value of tradition. As I see it, tradition tells us of the vital, ever-changing, unfolding world in which we live. Who are we to say that we know all that there is to be known of beauty ? that in the far-off chambers of time no greater beauty can be conceived in the mind of man than that which has gone before ? We are so apt to think of this world as of something old and tired and played-out, instead of as something young and fresh, scarcely launched upon its long career. May I quote to you two lines from Robert Bridges' *Testament of Beauty* :

> Knowledge accumulateth slowly and not in vain ;
> With new attainment new orders of beauty arise,
> In thought and art new values . . .

I am speaking to the Friends of Worcester Cathedral. I myself can claim a long friendship, for I knew the lineaments of the building as a very small boy, even before I first saw that dark tower printed against the Malvern Hills. I am sure that all of us here get help and inspiration from this much-loved cathedral of ours; and though I do not undervalue the worth of looking back with reverence to the past, I feel that these hallowed stones have a more important lesson to teach, namely the need for looking forward to the future, the value of eager experiment, so that indeed " New orders of beauty may arise, In thought and art new values ".

THE CHAPEL OF MAGDALEN COLLEGE

In the Time of President Frewen

By R. D. MIDDLETON

On October 24, 1626, Accepted Frewen was elected President of Magdalen College *unanimis sociorum suffragiis*.

Accepted Frewen was the son of John Frewen, Rector of Northiam, Sussex. Born in Kent, he was baptized at Northiam on May 26, 1588. He was educated at King's School, Canterbury; in 1603 he became Demy of Magdalen College and Fellow in 1612. "About that time", says Anthony à Wood, "he entered the sacred function, and became a frequent preacher, as being puritanically enclin'd".[1] Wood describes the father as "the puritanical Rector of Northiam".

In 1617 Frewen went to Spain as chaplain to the Ambassador, Sir John Digby, at once time a Commoner of Magdalen College. When in Spain he preached before Prince Charles who, on his accession to the throne, made him one of his chaplains. Frewen was Vice-Chancellor in 1628, 1629, 1638 and 1639.

No sooner had Frewen been installed as President than he set himself to repair and beautify the college chapel. It was a time of considerable activity in the adornment of college chapels in Oxford. Brian Duppa, the Dean of Christ Church,

[1] Wood, *Ath. Oxon,* iv, folio 821. J. S. Sidebotham in his *Memorials of the King's School, Canterbury*, says: "His own views were the reverse of puritanical, and it is recorded of him, that, when an undergraduate, he steadily resisted the proselytism of his puritan tutor, Anthony Chibnal".

was busy taking up the old pavement at the cathedral and putting down new. He was also employing the Dutch painter, Abraham Ling, to make new windows in place of the priceless mediaeval glass. The present Jacobean organ screen and pulpit date from Duppa's time. But much work was in progress throughout Oxford partly perhaps under the inspiration and encouragement of Archbishop Laud, in whose election as Chancellor the President of Magdalen had assisted.

In 1622 Bernard Van Ling was busy painting the east window of Wadham College, " and he there produced the finest specimen of seventeenth-century glass that Oxford can show " (J. Wells). The chapel of Lincoln College was consecrated in 1631, and to use the description of Dr. James Ingram, is " very handsomely furnished in the interior with wainscot of cedar, rich screen, glass of the most brilliant hues said to have been procured from Italy in 1629 ".[2] The chapel of Oriel College was begun in 1637 and completed in 1642. The chapel of University College was begun in 1639, but, according to Ingram, not completed until 1665. Ingram's description of the furnishing is worth quoting: " The interior is fitted up in the Grecian style; and, notwithstanding the incongruity of Corinthian ornament in a Gothic room, is much admired for the elegance of its general appearance."[3] The carving round the altar is by Grinling Gibbons, the screen is the work of Robert Barker of London. The glass in the side windows is the work of Abraham Van Ling, in 1641.

Not only in Oxford, but at the President's old home at Northiam, where his father had been rector, was similar work in progress. In 1638 Thankful Frewen, the President's brother, erected some oak panelling, an altar of oak and altar rails, possibly in memory of their father, who had died in 1627, when John Frewen, another son, had succeeded him.

But nowhere does the work of repair and adornment seem

[2] James Ingram, *Memorials of Oxford*, 1837, vol. i, p. 15. Lincoln College.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 13, University College

to have been undertaken in a more lavish manner than at Magdalen. A good deal of money was spent, judging by the college accounts, on repairs to the organ, as well as to the chapel, and generous sums were expended on copying music and providing books for the choir. There are payments also for additional candlesticks and for a candelabrum to hang in the middle of the choir. In 1627 there are payments for London workmen; such names occur as Badger, Abbots, Lenton and John Carpenter. Lenton provided a new screen of oak, it was decorated, Bloxam tells us, "with pedimental canopies for the President and Vice-President, and supported by Corinthian pillars and pilasters".[4] Doubtless this screen, which has completely vanished, was similar to that at Christ Church. In 1630 the beams of the roof were painted. In the year following £39 14s. 7d. was spent on repairs and decorations *pro reparatione et ornatu Capellae.* In 1632 two pounds was paid to Richard Greenbury, but the purpose of this expenditure is not stated.[5] Perhaps it was for painted windows. Greenbury is said to have been responsible for the small windows in the ante chapel which were removed in 1660 to the choir to fill the places of windows which had been destroyed. In 1633 a Mr. Boughton gave a candelabrum to hang from the roof of the chapel. In the same year a brass eagle lectern was provided, the following is the entry in the college accounts: *pro vectura aquilae aeneae* £1 11s. 6d. About this time the floor of the inner chapel was taken up, after the manner of the cathedral choir, and repaved with black and white marble. It is interesting to note entries of payments for an augmented choir at festivals. In 1633 also a man of the name of Christmas was paid £7 13s. 4d. for eight statues, evidently for the high altar.

"It should not be forgotten", Dr. Bloxam remarks, "that the ancient stalls were about this time decorated with paintings

[4] J. R. Bloxam, *The Magdalen College Register*, vol. ii, p. xc.

[5] Greenbury was a well-known portrait painter who flourished at this time. In 1638, the entry in College accounts occurs: "*Magistro Greeneberry pro pictura Fundatoris* £5 15s." Sampson was paid £7 5s. 0d. for repairing pictures on the cloister walls.

of Apostles and Saints, recalling as it were the memory of the old Chapel of Tittenhanger, built by Abbot John of Whethampstede; where he is said to have painted at the back of the stalls the figures of all the Saints who bore the name of John".[6]

These painted panels were removed early in the nineteenth century together with much woodwork and stonework. Dr. Bloxam traced them many years afterwards when he was living at Beeding Priory. He wrote, on December 8, 1877, to Major General Rigaud as follows: "I enclose a letter from Dr. Fell announcing the sale of Studley Priory of the Pannels with the Saints painted on them, which had been in the Chapel and were taken down in 1832, and presented to Sir Alexander Coke for his Chapel at Studley, where however they were never placed. On my first coming into residence as Fellow in 1836, I rode over to Studley and asked Sir Alexander to show them to me, he had put the broken pieces together and had repainted them himself, for he was a bit of an artist. They were not remarkable as works of art, but had an interest as belonging to our College Chapel, and after Sir A's death I made some abortive attempts to recover them, thinking at that time they might have appropriately pannelled the Choristers practice room—or some other room in the College. Now they are to be sold, and if you should happen to learn what becomes of them you will much oblige me by telling me. If I could fly I could be at the sale."[7] The panels were bought by Dr. Fell, Rector of Worldham, and, by him evidently, returned to the college.

Such arrangements in the decorating of the chapel and the ordering of the services would naturally attract widespread attention, especially in view of the new President's supposed Puritanical leanings. The Visitor of the college, Dr. Walter Curle,[8] Bishop of Winchester, addressed a letter to the Presi-

[6] J. R. Bloxam: *The Magdalen College Register,* vol. ii. pp. xciii-iv.

[7] *MS. Letters of Dr. J. R. Bloxam to Major-General Rigaud,* Bodleian Library. Letter dated Dec. 8, 1877.

[8] Walter Curle, Bishop of Bath and Wells, 1629-30, of Winchester 1632-47. A supporter of Archbishop Laud. Evicted by Parliament 1647, died in retirement.

dent and Fellows of the college in which he expressed his warm satisfaction: "Having taken into consideration the government of your Colledge, as it hath been represented in to me by some that know it well; out of my love to it, I cannot but expresse to you the great content and comfort I take therein, as knowing how much it concernes the good government of the Church abroad, to have these places of piety and learning well governed at home. Yet forasmuch as there is hardly any government so absolute and well ordered in every part thereof, but that some deficiency may be found therein, I shall take the liberty as your freind and Visitor, to deliver my opinion concerning some things, which I conceive may admitt of a reformation and betterment. And first, as I cannot but commend you for your wisedome and moderation in preserving peace and unity amongst yourselves, which is the blessing of all societies, so I shall dayly pray for the continuance of that blessing upon you. Next, as I must make it a part of your commendation that you have a good care of your Colledge in general, in keeping it sufficiently and decently repaired, so especially I cannot but to your honour take knowledge of the great, and extraordinary great, cost and charge you have been at, in adorning and beautifying your Chappell, whereby it may in some degree of decency represent the majesty of Him, Whose House it is. But, withall, to this beauty and decency of the place, I shall also desire you to adde a decent and comely carriage of your persons in that place, by an uniforme reverence in all parts of Divine Worship and service, according to the canonicall injunctions of the Church, and the commendable and imitable prectise of his Majesty's Chapell, that so God may be worshipped, not only in Holiness, but in the Beauty of Holiness."[9]

Archbishop Laud was delighted. He noted in his Diary in 1635: "the repair and beautifying of the Chapel of St. Mary Magdalen, which began the year before I was Chancellor, was completely finished, as also another new building of theirs towards the waterside in this year".

[9] W. D. Macray: Register of the Members of St. Mary Magdalen College, Oxford, vol. iii, pp. 51-2,

Peter Munday, a notable traveller, who was making a tour through " some parte of England & Wales ", visited Oxford and Magdalen College in August 1639. He wrote of the east wall of the chapel as being adorned with representations of the Passion, the Resurrection and Ascension " off our Saviour very largely & exquisitely sett fforth in coulours." This he says is not very common in churches in England, but he found it distinctly pleasing.[10]

Not all visitors to the college chapel expressed approval of the President's revival of church furnishing and worship. " About this time ", says Calamy in his Nonconformist Memorial, " Dr Frewen, President of Magdalen College, changed the Communion-table into an Altar, which was the first that was set up in the University after the Reformation. Several of the Preachers at St. Mary's inveighed against this innovation, particularly Mr Thorn of Balliol College, in a Sermon on I Kings xiii, 2, about the Altar at Bethel; and Mr Hodges of Exeter College, in another on Numbers xiv, 4, ' Let us make us a captain, and let us return into Egypt '. Mr Thomas Ford, also, in his turn, on II Thess. ii, 10, 11 (June, 1631) made some smart reflections on the innovations then creeping into the Church; the magnifying Tradition; making the Eucharist a sacrifice; setting up Altars instead of Tables, and bowing to them."[11]

These sermons were naturally the talk of the university. They were not only directed against Dr. Frewen, but were obviously intended as an attack on the Archbishop as Chancellor.[12] The matter was brought to the attention of the King and Council and the offending divines were banished from the university. This was an effective method of silencing opposition, but one likely to be a source of trouble in days to come. The archbishop, as we have seen, had noted in his Diary " the repair and beautifying of the Chapel of St Mary Magdalen." One of the charges subsequently brought against him was

[10] Rawlinson MSS. Bodleian f. 178, *Itinerarium Mundi.*
[11] Calamy, *Nonconformist Memorial,* vol. ii, p. 27.
[12] Wood: *Annals,* vol. ii, p. 361, f.

" that in Magdalen College there was a crucifix placed over the Communion-table, and pictures in the windows ".[13]

Of all President Frewen's devoted work in these memorable years nothing now remains except the eagle-lectern, the windows of the ante-chapel and the marble floor. The painted panels are preserved, but the rest of his work, or what was then left of it, was taken away at the time of the restoration of the chapel at the beginning of the nineteenth century. H. A. Wilson, in his history of the college, says: " In the course of this later restoration much stone and woodwork was removed from the Chapel. Some of this material was used in the building of the parish church of Theale, other portions were given for like purposes, and the remainder, with other interior fittings, was sold ".[14] There is at Theale a sham Chantry Chapel, made partly from stonework from the college chapel. There is also an oak door and some pews with poppy heads. There is no Jacobean work at all.

The object of this paper has been to discuss the work done in the chapel by President Frewen, but a brief mention may be made of the gateway designed by Inigo Jones and erected during this period. It stood almost at right angles to the site of the existing gateway, and opposite the " Gravel Walk ". The mutilated figures of St. Mary Magdalen and of the founder, with which it was adorned, perhaps the work of Nicholas Stone, Master Mason to Charles the First, remain to this day in the room at the base of the tower.

[13] Brooke: *Lives of the Puritans,* vol. iii, p. 226.
[14] H. A. Wilson, *Magdalen College* 1899 p. 148 note.

REVIEWS

THE MISSION OF THE ANGLICAN COMMUNION. Edited by E. R. MORGAN, THE BISHOP OF SOUTHAMPTON, and ROGER LLOYD, Canon of Winchester. (S.P.C.K. and S.P.G.). 10s. 6d.

IT is to be hoped that one of the results of the Lambeth Conference will be the quickening of the sense of loyalty and affection for the ancient *Ecclesia Anglicana* in many provinces and dioceses throughout the world.

We have had perhaps too much of the idea that loyalty in religion is simply a matter of deep-seated instinct and that it is sufficient to urge every now and again that people should strive to adorn the Sparta they have inherited. Reticence and reserve may well be the natural expression of Churchpeople who inhabit the ancient home of the *Ecclesia Anglicana,* where the great past presses upon the imagination at every turn—but the Anglican Communion is a world-wide fellowship, which needs a good deal more than a vague instinct of loyalty in order to create and sustain missionary Churches among ancient civilizations or primitive races or found more securely the growing Churches of the Dominions under the Crown.

The writers of this book have set out to supply an answer to this whole problem and, though much has had to be left out for lack of space, it is a remarkably successful book for its purpose and deserves to be widely read in every diocese that is in communion with the see of Canterbury. Moreover, it is both informative and interesting: there is some deep theological thinking and many problems are discussed by experts, but it is not a book for experts. It is calculated both to increase the understanding of the mission of the Anglican Communion in the purpose of God and to quicken the zeal of both clergy and laity everywhere. Just as in the more secular affairs of Government, we are living in an era of fresh experimentation in the British Commonwealth of Nations and the British Colonies, so it would be strange if the ancient *Ecclesia Anglicana* were not able to revive her unity and prepare the way for fresh advance by genuinely new insight and inspiration.

There are some 21 essays written by people all over the world, the majority of whom have never met—and yet the book as a whole comes to life, because there is a real unity of spirit

based on an increasing grasp of the fullness of the Gospel and on a power to speak the truth in love.

The first essay, "The Theology of Missions", by the Rev. Norman J. Blow, is based on an analysis of the Missionary Theology of Père Charles, S.J., of Louvain, and a critical appreciation from the Anglican standpoint of his teaching. "The work of missions is the planting of the visible Church in all its completeness in areas where it has never existed".

But what is to be understood by "planting"? Without laying down any rule of thumb, such tests are suggested as (a) stability, e.g., ability to recruit a local clergy; (b) effective contact with the new environment and ability to extend beyond a clique; (c) the new work must be affecting in some degree the whole range of the life of the country; (d) the new Christians must be sufficiently educated, healthy and economically strong to support their Church; (e) adequate organization and discipline.

Now from this it must follow that the Church at home, in so far as it is a Church and not merely a mission, must be creating in all its members a common concern about the growth to fullness of the Body of Christ by the provision of the means of salvation for all men. This can be understood as a proper end of the Church's effort, because there is in non-Christian humanity some providential preparation for the reception of the Christian gospel. This involves a distinction between "destruction" and "fulfilment" of non-Christian religions.

Some readers may desire further elucidation of this point and the reviewer would venture to refer to *The Salvation of the Nations,* by Jean Danielou (Sheed and Ward) for a fuller discussion of this important distinction. There follows some admirable criticism of Père Charles's views:—"The Church is still in viâ, therefore neither her Unity, Holiness, Catholicity nor Apostolicity must be looked for on earth as completed realities, but as foretastes". In other words, a theology of missions depends on the theology of the Church, and Mersch is quoted: "*The Church and her Unity are still in process of formation*—it is mankind in its totality which God in his eternal thought has destined to be the Body and Bride of Christ".

In the second essay the Rev. E. Sambayya, of Bishop's College, Calcutta, writes on "The Genius of the Anglican Communion". If anyone fancies that the special witness of Anglicanism is simply the expression of some (possibly temporary) qualities of the English people, he had better read this essay. The writer shows that there is in the Anglican system, authority

combined with freedom, universality with nationality and "the twofold heritage of Catholicism and Protestantism".

The third essay, by the Bishop of Southampton, deals with "The Church and Secular Society". Here are wise words which are applicable in every land. Quoting Dr. Temple's words that "Men's fundamental attitudes and habits have ceased to be in accordance with their conscious aims", the author points out that there are three levels to the good life, viz., that governed by natural law, that governed by positive law and custom in particular societies, and that governed by revelation and grace. He argues forcibly that positive law and custom cannot produce a stable and progressive society apart from the sanctions of natural law, and natural law cannot maintain its authority without the level of revelation and grace. Yet there must always be a tension produced by the duality of Church and State.

There follows a telling description of "The Sufferings of the Church in Japan", by Bishop M. H. Yashiro, of Kobe. This must be read and pondered. It is interesting to observe the influence of the work in Japan of Father H. H. Kelly, S.S.M.

Essay V is about "The Evangelistic Task of the Church in the Coming Age", by Canon Roger Lloyd. He looks to Church history to give us the true strategy at the present time and sees that God uses the weak to confound the mighty and that unplanned spontaneity can often make a mock of the organizers of campaigns. In fact, the word "evangelism" is regarded as of dubious value as compared with the New Testament words "witness and proclamation". We must bear witness to such of the truth as we have made our own and proclaim the Gospel through every medium which circumstances present. Organization can only build channels in which the life of the Spirit can flow; but the life of the Church is not in the organization, which can easily kill versatility and the power of adaption. The proclamation which must be characteristic of the Church in the twentieth century is that of the Christian doctrine of man, with its recognition of freedom both within society and within himself. There is some admirably clear writing about the true idea of corporate life as not opposed to, but creative of, true individuality.

Essay VI is an excellent essay by Dr. Broomfield of the U.M.C.A. on "Commerce and Christianity or Back to Livingstone". It is a wise reminder that Christianity and civilization have to go together in Africa as elsewhere.

In Essay VII Canon G. W. O. Addleshaw, of York, has

written a most useful resumé of "The Law and Constitution of the Church Overseas." It is full of education for those in Britain who know little or nothing about this important subject and it will help to cross-fertilize various parts of the Anglican Communion overseas. The dangers, as well as the opportunities, of the present situation are emphasized. The helpful bibliography given does not contain Dr. P. A. Micklem's valuable Moorhouse Lectures entitled *Principles of Church Organization* (S.P.C.K.).

The Assistant General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, the Rev. O. S. Tomkins, contributes a chapter on "The Anglican Communion and the Oecumenical Movement." After giving a short history of the modern Oecumenical Movement, he contends effectively that "co-operation without compromise" is a real possibility. Isolationism is condemned as "the assumption that no other body of Christians exist but one's own", while undenominationalism is described as "the attempt to escape from the dilemma by ignoring theological principles". It is well said that "When the varying types, which Anglicanism rightly comprehends, place their secret loyalty above their professed loyalty, they are not only fifth columnists in their own Church but also distort the corporate relationship of Churches to each other. . . . Only faithful Anglicans can have fruitful relations with other Churches". This is an excellent essay and should be amplified by reading the author's *The Wholeness of the Church* (S.C.M.).

In Essay IX Canon W. F. France deals with "The Place of Missionary Societies within the Church". This is a judicious and well-informed handling of a problem which is as old as the Church. It is well to be reminded that it is not wise to jump from one extreme to the other in the matter of organization.

Part II of the book is entitled "Giving and Receiving." One feels that there is a great deal for us all to learn in this matter; and yet considerable progress has been made in the last generation towards the true attitude of mind. Miss Laura Jackson, Principal of the College of the Ascension, strikes the basic note when she says that the supernatural gift of fellowship in Christ is the prerequisite of any giving and receiving. The Rev. H. de Candole introduces this whole subject. Giving and receiving in worship and prayer is well considered by the Rev. R. N. Russell, Warden of Zanzibar Theological College. Canon J. R. Peacey, of Bristol, and formerly Principal of Bishop's College, Calcutta, writes on "Giving and Receiving in Faith and Order." There follows an interesting consideration of "Giving

and Receiving in Christian Conduct" as follows:—African-English by the Rev. G. E. F. Laing, Rector of St. Augustine's College, Kumasi; English-African by the Ven. Donald Parsons, Archdeacon of Luatala; English-Indian by Bishop H. Pakenham-Walsh, formerly of Assam and now a member of Christa Sishya Ashram; Indian-English by a Priest of the Church of India; Chinese-English by Dr. T. C. Chao, Professor of Yenching University, Peiping; English-Chinese by the Rev. G. Mather, formerly a missionary in North China.

Finally, there are essays on "Giving and Receiving in Standards of Living" by Miss Helen Martindale, of the diocese of Nasik, and on "Giving and Receiving in Art" by the Rev. Edward Paterson, Principal of Cyrene, an experiment in African education.

We hope that this book will have a wide sale and bear much fruit.

H. K. ARCHDALL.

THE REACH OF THE MIND. By J. B. RHINE. (Faber and Faber). 10s. 6d.

IN this important book Dr. Rhine carries farther his account of scientific investigations into capacities of the human mind lying beyond the scope of sense-mediated perception and action.

The experiments here recorded, carried out at Dr. Rhine's university and elsewhere, prove beyond reasonable doubt extra-sensory perception, E.S.P., whether telepathy and clairvoyance or the latter alone is at present, for reasons here given, doubtful: that is to say, perception of truth without the mediation of sense perception, including precognition and, the most baffling of all the results attained, motor influence exerted on an object directly by the mind without bodily intervention, P.K. The discreditable attempts by representatives of "science" to reject out of hand or suppress facts unacceptable to orthodox materialism are already meeting inevitable and well-deserved failure. These scientists, however, have failed to observe—nor does it seem clear to Dr. Rhine himself—that normal human perception and action in which the mind knows the outside world and acts upon it through the instrumentality of the body, are every whit as inexplicable and as impossible from the materialist standpoint as the phenomena studied in this volume. From this point of view there is no difference between the mind knowing through

changes in the cells of the brain and knowing directly, or between the mind moving objects through the body and moving them directly. The only philosophy logically consistent with "scientific" materialism is behaviourism.

Nor even are these powers of the mind (aspects, it is shewn here, of a process designated by the term "psi") abnormal. On the contrary, they have been proved to belong to the normal human being, and in their exercise to be closely correlated with general mental ability. That the operation of "psi" is nevertheless so fitful and so unreliable is due, so Dr. Rhine shews, to its subconscious character. The conscious mind does not know when "psi" is being exercised. Dr. Rhine hopes that a technique may be devised to render the exercise of "psi" conscious and therefore reliable. If his hopes should be realized the result would not by any means be the unmixed blessing he supposes. True, wars of surprise would, as he says, become impossible. But social, or even family, life would be intolerable if we could at will tap the thoughts of others.

We agree with Dr. Rhine that although there is a certain amount of evidence favouring survival of death it is at present very far from being scientifically proved. But we cannot agree that failure to give such a proof would amount to disproof of what God may will to remain an object of faith. Still less can we agree that a wide extension of human power, wisdom and happiness resulting from the discovery and control of "psi" could compensate for the presumed disproof of survival.

Time does not, as Dr. Rhine holds, depend on space. It depends on change which occurs also in the psychical order.

The evidence for ghostly apparitions and poltergeists is conclusive. What is lacking is a satisfactory explanation. Dr. Rhine throughout attaches too little value to spontaneous evidence which, though it cannot be controlled in a laboratory, is far more striking, detailed and complex, and equally well attested. Nor is a neutral substrate of mind and matter, which is neither one nor the other, conceivable. The parallel between them is to be explained by the analogy which exists between all grades of reality, as proceeding from one divine source and reflecting it in various degrees.

That is to say, we find Dr. Rhine more satisfying as a psychologist than as a philosopher. But it is as the former that he has accomplished the brilliant, successful and immensely important work recorded in this and his earlier writings.

Incidentally, it results from these discoveries that no form of gambling can be really fair. For some of those taking part in them

will, however honestly because subconsciously, make use of E.S.P. and precognition to discover, for example, the position of cards in a pack or spot a winner. It has always been known that some people have outstanding "good luck" in a gamble. We now know it is not luck—for their success exceeds chance—but "psi".

E. I. WATKIN.

THE BOGOMILS: A STUDY IN BALKAN NEO-MANICHAEISM. By DMITRI OBOLENSKY. (C.U.P.). 25s.

THERE have been three main lines of reaction against the Christian faith. There is the denial of God in a Messianic Materialism, which is Communism: there is the denial, on ontological grounds, of all distinctions within the Godhead, and of the possibility of Incarnation, which culminates in Islam: and there is the denial, on moral grounds, that the material world could have been created, or could be redeemed or sanctified, by an All-Pure God.

The third of these heads of heresy was the first to find its classic expression—in the Religion of Mani, which has made two bids, in the course of history, for establishment as a world faith; once in the centuries immediately following its appearance; and again, in a revised form, in the early Middle Ages.

Recent discoveries are making possible a far more authoritative account of the teaching of Mani, based on the scriptures of the sect, than has been possible hitherto. And books like that under review begin to show us how much can be done, by careful research, in piecing together the somewhat baffling story of the later phase, and showing the character of its links with the earlier. It is the second published within less than two years in this field by the Cambridge University Press. Steven Runciman, in *The Mediaeval Manichee*, gave a rapid but suggestive survey of the whole subject. Prince Obolensky's work is concentrated on the origin, development, and decline of Bogomilism proper, in its Bulgarian home and in Byzantium. But its first three chapters give a valuable summary of Manichaean origins, of the rise of the "Neo-Manichaean" Paulician sect in Eastern Asia Minor, and of the spread and early history of this latter in the Balkans.

The fundamental dualism of Mani is to be traced, it appears, rather to Gnostic perversions of Christianity than to Zoroastrianism, whose dualism is of a far more naïve character, and does

not involve that attribution of the material creation to the principle of Evil, which is the mark of true Dualism. But a further distinction is to be drawn between the "absolute Dualism" of two eternal opposed principles, and the "mitigated Dualism" which conceives of the demiurge, the devil, as a fallen angel—the "eldest son of God". This latter view, which becomes distinctive of Bogomilism, is foreshadowed in the mythology of Zarvanism, the form of Zoroastrianism commonest in the Sassanian period. A link is needed, and remains a problem.

The direct relationship between Manichaeism proper and the Neo-Manichaean sects also remains obscure, though indubitable. Paulicianism, springing up, in the regions of Armenia, in the same century as Islam, is a modification which, retaining the absolute dualism of Mani, dispenses with its accompanying asceticism, and soon becomes an aggressive military force, which at the height of its power, in the ninth century, was able to challenge the Byzantine Empire. It was willing to anathematize Mani, and our author contrasts it, as an attempt to reform Christianity on a dualistic basis, with Manichaeism as a non-Christian dualistic religion, while noting that its rejection of the Old Testament, and its veneration for St. Paul (which may account for its name) suggest that its Christian elements are due rather to Marcionite than to Orthodox influences.

The transference of Asiatics to the Balkans by the Byzantine Emperors brought Paulicians, Massalians, and other heretics, into immediate contact with Bulgaria before her conversion to Christianity, and offered a natural line for Bulgarian national reaction against conversion to the faith and culture of the traditional enemy, Byzantium. But Paulicianism itself seems to have remained somewhat distinct and unassimilated. The *Pop* Bogomil (the Slavonic for Theophilus), in the first half of the tenth century, found conditions ripe for his fusion of Paulician and Massalian elements in what was in many ways a new heresy. Absolute Dualism was replaced by the myth of the "Two Sons of God": the readiness to veil heresy under Christian terminology was carried still further: and, in a land and age where monasticism was thriving, Bogomilism borrowed from the Massalians their strongly ascetic and monastic character (though not, it seems, the orgies to which their "perfect" are said to have been entitled), an absolute condemnation of marriage, and probably a whole technique of prayer. At the same time, some of these Massalian traits, such as the gradations by which the initiate reached the rank of "elect", are strongly reminiscent of early Manichaeism proper. (It should be noted that in referring

to the Massalians on several occasions as " dualistic " our author gives a rather misleading impression of the basis of this heresy, though he corrects it in another passage by pointing out that there is no evidence for attributing to them a dualistic cosmology).

Macedonia would seem to have been the cradle of Bogomilism. When, in 1018, Basil the Bulgar-slayer overcame this last stronghold of Bulgarian independence, the absorption of Bulgaria into the Byzantine Empire helped the spread of the heresy to the city and elsewhere: and it becomes more clearly defined in doctrine, ritual, and organization. Its literature also develops, and is spread abroad. Our author devotes to this period the longest chapter in his book, giving a lucid account of the evidence of Zigabenus, Psellus, etc., and of the history of the efforts of Alexius and of Manuel Comnenus to suppress the heresy—we note that Basil the Bogomil seems to have been the only one actually put to death by Alexius. Certain modifications by way of assimilation to the Great Church are to be noted in Byzantine Bogomilism—e.g., the acceptance into the canon of certain Old Testament books.

It is during this period that the sect appears to have extended its mission to the West, quickly appearing as a definite dualist organization from the Black Sea to the Bay of Biscay at the very time when Christendom was becoming split in two on geographical lines. The division which appears within the dualist camp, between Absolute and Mitigated Dualism, was not a geographical division—both parties appear in the West, looking to the Balkans for their origin and centre: and fuller research is needed to find out how far they were able to work in cooperation, if not to share a common organization.

Runciman had supposed this division to be within the Bogomil sect—the *Pop* Jeremiah introducing the Massalian elements into the Paulicianism of Bogomil, and mitigating his dualism. Obolensky, in an able appendix, shows how little evidence there is that this apocryphographer was a Bogomil at all. And he argues cogently that the division corresponds simply to the continued distinction between the Paulician and Bogomil sects. Runciman's book is too rapid a survey to give us the basis for sure conclusions, while Obolensky wisely limits himself so as to leave close study of the Western evidence outside his field, in the hope that his work may be followed up by other scholars with similar detailed study on other branches of the subject. His short appendices are an able summary of the problem in regard both to the Western Cathars and to the Bosnian Patarenes.

In the decline of the sect, described in the final chapter on the Second Bulgarian Empire, all distinction between Bogomils and Massalians seems to disappear (Psellus had already described as Euchite—Massalian—doctrines which are clearly Bogomil, though Zigabenus makes the distinction quite clear): they melt away with the Turkish conquest, to survive in apocryphal literature and folk traditions. Only the Paulician community in Philippopolis retained its identity, to be absorbed in the seventeenth century into the Roman Catholic Church, while retaining its special devotion to St. Paul.

So, as an organized heresy, Mani's dualism died out: and it is hard for us to remember how real was the threat to Catholic Christendom which provoked the horrors of the Albigensian Crusade, thus giving to the Western Church a twist from which, perhaps, she has not yet recovered. But as an attitude of mind, the heresy did not disappear. Superficially, the reasons of the Protestant Reformers for rejection of the Church's organization and Sacraments, and her veneration of the Mother of God and the saints, might seem utterly different from those given by the Manichaean sects. But psychologically, is there not in both the same failure of sinful man to believe effectively that the Holy Spirit can continue to sanctify and "deify" not just one human body of the Incarnate Lord, but the Whole Body of the Church which is the Body of Christ?

Prince Obolensky enters the field of letters (this is his first book) with a work of careful and generous scholarship. Perhaps his fault—if it be a fault in a Christian—is to believe too well of human nature. He adduces the purity of Bogomil morals as a reason for not identifying with them the Euchites whose orgies are described by Psellus. But can we be sure that there were no Bogomils whose practice distorted their teaching, or that no satanistic sect had sprung from among them, or, alternatively, that Psellus might not be repeating a slander? But this is a small point. We welcome unreservedly a scholar whose Russian Christian roots and Cambridge training assure for Byzantine Orthodoxy in this country a worthy and loyal champion in the historic field.

DERWAS J. CHITTY.

T. B. STRONG. By HAROLD ANSON. (S.P.C.K.). 8s. 6d.

IN 1937 the English Church still had a bishop in harness whose ecclesiological standards seemed near to those of the first year of Victoria. He wore no purple and affected black mittens. He had the old Anglican precision of mind and speech, as well as

its allergia to enthusiasm and all forms of pietism. All this anachronistic high churchmanship was made alive by perennial springs of wit, irony and mimicry not unlike those of Voltaire. As an undergraduate he had been a noted comic singer.

Thomas Banks Strong was in fact descended from Chateaubriand (as well as Banks the sculptor) and his quick and elegant mind seemed basically Gallic. Like many original and interesting clerics he had no clerical relatives. He had his French ancestor's abundant cultivation, though a Westminster schooling in the 'seventies neglected to inculcate art appreciation. He was guiltless, too, of Chateaubriand's Romanticism, the virtual *fons et origo* of that ritualistic side of Tractarianism which only bored Strong. His view that the introduction of imitation cathedral choirs into parish churches was a mistake is now general. Also he resented the reduction of church worship to the singing of lengthy rhymes and ditties to simple melodies, saturated with bathos and sentimentality. He learned music, however, of Turle, early becoming an accomplished executant at both the organ and the piano, sometimes playing the service at St. Peter's, Cranley Gardens, for Sir Arthur Sullivan, at the time Jenny Lind was a pew-holder. In later life he was to grow deeply adept in the sciences of musicology and score-reading.

Perhaps Strong's real significance is that he constitutes a recognized link between clerical and laicized Oxford. If the setting up of the permanent Ecclesiastical Commission was the "second Reformation", the Universities' Royal Commissions carried through the third. He became a don in the 'eighties, always keeping to the old pastoral conception of tutors' work, and that with an inspired zeal. When Dean of Christ Church, the greatest since Aldrich, and Vice-Chancellor and a member of the Oxford Royal Commission of the nineteen-twenties, he continued to help to make the break between Old and New Oxford less sharp than it might have been.

Not liking post-war Oxford too well, Strong was given the bishopric of Ripon as a retiring post. He had a proper sense of the importance of his office as head of a great Oxford college, though he was quite without any personal pomposity about it, and undoubtedly felt that it would have been more fitting had he not been "jockeyed out of the Bishopric of Durham by Henson". He lacked Lloyd George's enthusiasm for preaching, and doubted if preachers served any purpose at all.

Strong suffered from chronic shyness through being bullied and snubbed at school, and accordingly he obstinately disdained to acquire the facility for stump oratory and synthetic enthusi-

asm for minor functions expected of modern bishops. He gave no undue encouragement to those endless subsidiary and adventitious Church activities which have developed an involved, and costly, encrustation over its essential spiritual life, but in compensation, individuals who sought him out, to their joy or annoyance as the case may be, never found him a gaitered replica of a big business executive. All the same, at Ripon he secured keen laymen to work the organizations arising out of the Enabling Act, and established an efficient Board of Finance of a power that annoyed his first successor and delighted the second.

Yorkshire claims to know a good thing when it sees it. It sensed both Strong's unusual first-water quality and his warp-and-woof sincerity. Also, he was never at any time *du haut en bas*. Strong did not talk about respect for human personality, but he had it.

At 64 Strong took up the sprawling three-counties diocese of Oxford, a near-miss ecclesiastical appointment, for its appropriateness was superficial. Samuel Wilberforce, astonishingly enough, used that see to demonstrate his new-model non-stop episcopate. Neither Mackarness, Stubbs, Paget, Gore, Burge nor Strong repeated his pace.

Strong always read omnivorously, and learned languages for fun. Among many other things, he had a good knowledge of liturgics. He realized how totally unqualified were the *en bloc* bishops to accomplish the liturgical feat they essayed in the twenties, though he supported loyally the house-that-Jack-built result of their painful labours, and misliked at first its wrecking in the Commons. His *viva voce* private comments on his colleagues in revisionary conclave, apart from their beautifully detached satirical quality and masterly characterization, must, if he ever finished writing them out, be of some historical significance, and ought to see the light.

Actually, Strong had the makings of a great novelist, though he never seemed to realize it. None could sum up a situation or disentangle it better, his judgement of persons was almost infallible, though never unkind, and his gift of enthralling narration and close observation uncanny. He had entrancingly effortless felicity of phrase: "You could not have put a flat fish between the classical tutors' backs and the ceiling"; "The sort of man who is always shaking hands with you"; "We pranced about Liverpool Cathedral, the congregation being supposed to sing the odd verses of a newly-written hymn, though I heard but one voice, that of an elderly lady like a thrush in the winter". Asked, at immense length, by a headmaster about whether it

would be advisable to introduce very early morning studies, Strong gave brief judgement: "Well, the studious calm would be disturbed by the rataplan of empty bellies". On being told the doubtless fabricated story that a well-known collector of saints' relics had labelled his crate "natural history specimens—with care", he at once riposted: "And I suppose he got qualms of conscience and went down to the hold and added 'super'".

This memoir by the Master of the Temple, one of Strong's first pupils, has much charm and genuine personal appreciation. It is, however, somewhat too slight for its not at all inconsiderable subject, one of the important academic and ecclesiastical figures of his times, and a man who influenced innumerable persons, many eminently worth-while. The book is repetitive, ill-arranged and not without inaccuracies, with minor contradictions as in the case of some dates. The Rothenstein drawing, and the Orpen portrait are pleasantly reproduced, as well as an excellent photograph, and a not very well-drawn cartoon from the 1903 *Varsity*.

R. C. White.

The Apocalypse of History: Problems of Providence and Human Destiny. By E. Lampert. (Faber and Faber). 18s.

Dr. Lampert, a disciple of the late Sergius Bulgakov, is already known for a valuable interpretation of his master's thought on the theology of the sacraments, and for a brief exposition of the philosophy of Nicolas Berdyaev. He has now entered a field which has assumed crucial significance in contemporary thought: the Christian interpretation of history. We have been given, in recent years, a number of weighty contributions to this subject, from Berdyaev himself, as well as from Niebuhr and Tillich; although it must be admitted that the secularist interpretations of Marx and Sorokin have perhaps outweighed those of the Christian thinkers, while the work of Toynbee has been aptly described as posing the problem of the Christian historian. Dr. Lampert's book must be welcomed, therefore, as making a valuable contribution to the discussion. We are deeply impressed by its thought and content, which displays considerable learning, insight and critical power; at the same time, it must be admitted that the form and manner of the book leave much to be desired: it is poorly constructed, frequently arrogant and almost petulant in tone. The western tradition has clearly a great deal to learn from the east, and while we are grateful for the stimulus which Dr. Lampert has given to us, we feel that he himself has still

something to learn from the west before he is entitled to treat it in such a cavalier fashion.

The author's approach to the subject is made through the problem of time. The temporal character of human existence, and the profound and intimate relation between time and history which precludes either their identification or their separation, must always exert a deep fascination for the philosophical theologian. Dr. Lampert characterizes the eschatological conception of time in Christian thought, which " is not the teaching about the last things after everything else, but rather the teaching about the relation of all things to the 'last things' " (p. 14). Therefore, the Christian faith " requires an attitude of mind sustained by a constant awareness of an End intensely present and powerful in the here and now of man's historical existence and imbues this existence with meaning." This immediately raises the problem of the relation between the End and Time, which has been answered in two ways which have both influenced human thought profoundly: either man makes the attempt to extricate himself from the demands of temporal existence in order to find salvation in a realm beyond or above time; or he attempts to find salvation within the line of temporal succession by positing it in the future. Having thus posed the problem, Dr. Lampert provides an acute criticism of the cyclic conception of time in Greek thought (which has affinities with Dr. Cullmann's treatment of the same theme), the idealist conceptions represented by Kant and Hegel, and futuristic theories presented by Saint-Simon.

The mysterious contradictions of time are examined, which derive from its enigmatic relation to creation, and demand mythical conceptions of the beginning, the centre and the end, since these concepts are thrust forward by the linear conception of time in Christian thought although they cannot be rationalized from the finite creature's situation in time. The overcoming of these contradictions by Christian faith is made possible by the Kairos, the fullness of time, the manifestation of God-manhood, and the Kingdom, all of which find concrete expression in *liturgical* time, a conception upon which Dr. Lampert makes some observations in the closing pages, but which requires much more detailed consideration than he has given to it. In posing the whole question of the eschatological conception of time and the fullness of time in Christian thought, we feel that the writer has not been altogether successful in coming to grips with the mystery of the relation between a realized and a proleptic eschatology.

The contradictions of man's temporal existence are further

illustrated by a valuable discussion of the problem of freedom in which the implicit Marxist anthropology is brought to light which shows that the consciousness man has of himself does not always correspond to what he truly is (p. 83). The Marxian concept of estrangement or alienation is presented as a secular version of original sin; it is a division within man in which he loses his creativity (which Marx identifies with freedom), and is exemplified particularly in the domain of labour under capitalism in which man loses his essential dignity. " History is a call to man's freedom, and it is sustained in freedom, in which he is conscious of and communicates with other selves. He is brought face to face with the challenge of unique and irrevocable situations; and it is freedom which makes him share, understand, espouse, rather than observe them differently " (p. 77).

These are no more than samples of some of the topics with which Dr. Lampert has dealt in a most illuminating and stimulating manner. They should justify, however, a recommendation of the book to the serious reader who will find much upon which to ponder concerning the most intimate of human problems; and although he will often be provoked to disagreement in his pondering, his thought will have been enriched in the process. Dr. Lampert is a thinker whose subsequent work will be awaited with keen interest.

R. H. DAUBNEY.

THE OLD TESTAMENT: Newly translated from the Latin Vulgate by MGR. RONALD A. KNOX at the request of the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. (For private use only). Volume I, Genesis-Esther. (Burns Oates and Washbourne).

NEARLY forty years ago, *eheu fugaces* ! Mgr. Knox, in a famous and witty parody of Dryden's *Absalom and Achitophel,* described his great contemporary, the late William Temple, as one who " did everything by turns and nothing wrong ". The words may serve as an apt description of the many and varied literary activities with which Mgr. Knox has for so long delighted, amused, and edified an admiring world. Now he has turned his great gifts to the arduous business of translating the Scriptures from their Latin dress into literary English. His translation of the New Testament appeared six years ago, and its excellent qualities were quickly recognized. Now we have before us the first half of his translation of the Old Testament, and it may be said at once that it is a great achievement, indeed amazing as the work of a single mind.

Leaving on one side the question of the value of Jerome's version as a faithful rendering of the Hebrew original, it is undoubtedly a great gain that students of the Bible should be able to make the acquaintance of this remarkable version in such an admirable English dress.

It is generally supposed that the biblical quotations in the Latin writings of Cyprian (250 A.D.) afford evidence for the existence at that period of a Latin version of the Bible. Between this date and the beginning of Jerome's activities a very large number of variations and corruptions had found their way into the Latin texts then in use in the churches. Augustine speaks of "*Latinorum interpretum infinita varietas*", and goes on to express his preference for a version which he calls "*Itala*" and which he describes as being "*verborum tenacior cum perspicuitate sententiae*". The meaning of the term "*Itala*" has been much discussed, and Professor Burkitt's view is that Augustine was referring to Jerome's new Latin translation which at that time (397 A.D.) was already far advanced. Be that as it may, we know that after attempting to revise the existing Latin texts with the help of the LXX, Jerome felt himself compelled to undertake the task of translating the whole Bible afresh from the Hebrew and Greek originals. With regard to his qualifications for such an undertaking, Augustine, in his *De Civ. Dei*, speaks of him as "*homo doctissimus, et omnium trium linguarum peritus, qui non ex Graeco sed ex Hebraeo in Latinum eloquium easdem Scripturas converterit.*" Accordingly, at Bethlehem, in 390 A.D., Jerome began the work which occupied the next fifteen years of his life. In his introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes he claims that his translation has the value of independence, as being a direct translation from the original Hebrew; he acknowledges, however, that he has adhered to the renderings of the LXX where they do not diverge widely from the Hebrew. He also acknowledges his debt to the Greek versions of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, which he used, no doubt, in the form in which they were preserved in Origen's Hexapla. At the time when Jerome was making his translation from the Hebrew text, the Massoretic text had not yet assumed the form in which we know it to-day, hence his version is often an important witness to the state of the Hebrew text at a comparatively early stage of its development, and some of the interesting variants which it presents may represent genuine early readings. In the estimation of a modern scholar Jerome's version possesses "the characteristics of a good translation, and aims at giving the sense of the original rather than at extreme literality of rendering". Occasionally, however,

it is clear that Jerome did not know the meaning of a Hebrew expression, and he is found resorting to an expedient of which the LXX translators had already often made use, namely the transliteration of the unknown word. For example, in Ps. 68, 13 (Vulg. 67, 14), there is a well-known crux which R.V. mg. renders "when ye lie among the sheepfolds", and the Vulgate, "*si dormiatis inter medios cleros*", a rendering which has caused some innocent merriment among recent reviewers and various attempts at explanation in letters to the Press. We do not yet know how Mgr. Knox will render this phrase as it stands in the Vulgate, but in his recent translation of the new version of the Psalter published by the Pontifical Biblical Commission in 1945, he has rendered it "resting quiet among the sheepfolds". It has been assumed that the word "*cleros*" is to be taken as meaning "lots, or inheritance", but Latin usage affords no justification for this assumption, and the true explanation of this curious rendering would seem to be that Jerome, like many modern commentators, found the Hebrew word *ashpoth* unintelligible, and simply transliterated the LXX *klērōn*, which, of course, does mean "lots".

Another interesting Vulgate variant, which Mgr. Knox has not thought it necessary to indicate in a footnote, occurs in II Kings, ii, 14. In his translation the verse runs, "with this mantle that had fallen from Elias he struck the waters; *but they did not part*. Alas, cried he, where is he now, the God of Elias? With that, he struck the waters again, and they parted this way and that, for Eliseus to cross over." The italicized words are not found in the Massoretic text, but they add vividness to the scene, and seem to give point to Elisha's exclamation.

It is well known that all translation involves interpretation, and the translation of a translation, unless it is constantly checked by reference to the original, is always in danger of deviation. A venial example of this tendency may be seen in the closing verses of David's lovely lament for Jonathan, in II Sam. i, 26-27. Mgr. Knox's fine rendering of this passage runs: "Shall I not mourn for thee, Jonathan my brother, so beautiful, so well-beloved, beyond all love of women? Never woman loved her only son, as I thee. How fell such warriors, what could blunt such swords as these?" Here Jerome could hardly have missed the plain meaning of the Hebrew words "thy love to me", and hence it is very probable that he intended *amabilis* to have an active sense, "loving", rather than "beloved", though against classical usage. But Mgr. Knox has followed the strict classical meaning and so failed to convey the intention of the poet. It

is impossible to say where Jerome found the next clause, as it does not occur in the Massoretic text nor in the LXX, but it seems to have influenced the translator's rendering of the previous clause. Finally, picturesque as is the translation of the last verse, it hardly expresses the spirit of the Hebrew perfects which breathe rather the consummated bitterness of Cleopatra's lament over Anthony, "O withered is the garland of the war, the soldier's pole is fallen."

In the translator's prefatory note, which disarms while it invites criticism, he frankly states, concerning his translation, "the book gives my idea of how the Old Testament ought to be translated, and does not claim to do anything more." It would have been interesting to know whether Mgr. Knox had set up for himself any canons of style and any standards by which we might judge the degree of faithfulness to both the Latin and the original Hebrew behind the Latin, to which he felt himself bound to conform. Without such guidance we can only form an estimate of what his idea is by reading his translation. About the second point something has already been said, and it seems that the translator has wisely decided not to be too closely tied to the letter of his text. But with regard to the larger question of style it is not easy to pass judgement. The present writer has had occasion for many years now to make constant use of the various versions of the Bible which have appeared from time to time, and he does not hesitate to say that in comparison with these Mgr. Knox's translation is distinguished by a vividness of phrase, a lucidity, and a dignity which give much delight to the reader. Scholarship without imagination is apt to produce a version which, for all its accuracy, may be sadly pedestrian. Mgr. Knox's scholarship is beyond question, but the result is never pedestrian. Most of the poetic parts of the Old Testament belong to the volume which has yet to appear, but in the poetic passages which occur in this volume the translator's happy fertility of imagination is particularly striking. The translation of the splendid poem in Deut. xxxii is a veritable *tour de force*, and one has the impression that his elegance and felicity of style find more scope in the rendering of poetry than in the prose narratives of the Old Testament. There is a great difference between the spirit of Latin and that of the Hebrew language. The articulation of Hebrew sentences and the general movement of narrative are hard to reproduce in Latin, or in Greek for that matter, although *koiné* Greek has certainly succeeded in providing a curiously satisfactory vehicle for the rendering of Semitic forms of speech. Moreover, much of early Hebrew narrative is saga, and

has the characteristic simplicity and love of repetition that belong to saga style. Hence one cannot help feeling at times that Mgr. Knox's style, with its touch of subtle sophistication, is not always completely satisfying in the rendering of the somewhat stark simplicities of Hebrew saga. But this is a personal judgement, and may well be deemed hypercritical. One's general feeling is that we have here a magnificent achievement, worthy of the author's reputation, and not unworthy of that unique collection of sacred literature which he has undertaken with such courage to translate into English.

S. H. HOOKE.

THE TELL-TALE ARTICLE. A Critical Approach to Modern Poetry. By G. ROSTREVOR HAMILTON. (Heinemann). 10s. 6d.

THIS little book consists of three essays. The third, "The Meaning of Tradition", was written first. Finding the word "traditional" used vaguely or ambiguously in current criticism of poetry Mr. Hamilton set out to explore. There is a great difference between slavish copying of the past and new work created in the consciousness that it has ancestors as well as individuality. "The stream [of tradition] is the same, yet not the same: change, no less than permanence, is the essence of tradition, internal to it and not added from outside."

What (to keep to the previous metaphor) is the relation of progenitors to progeny? Mr. Hamilton finds T. S. Eliot's essay on "Tradition and the Individual Talent" unhelpful here. He works out his own answer, which merits the most careful study: the clue to it lies in the fact that there is a tradition of everyday experience as well as a tradition of literature.

The first essay, "The Tell-Tale Article", takes up half the book. The old fable is reversed. The mouse has produced a mountain. This study of the definite article in English poetry leads to very important critical conclusions. Mr. Hamilton was struck by the apparent frequency of the word "the" in modern poetry and also by the special way in which it is often used. An examination of the poems in the *Pelican* anthology showed that the greater frequency is real, e.g., the percentage of definite articles in Eliot and Auden is 10 as against about 4 in Shakespeare and 6 in Milton. Donne's percentage is 2, though in some poems it rises to 5. Mr. Hamilton shows why these percentages vary: indeed, his whole exploration from this novel

direction is most rewarding. The excessive use of "the" in modern poetry is due to lack of synthesis in the poets' vision. They see a disintegrated world. Hence their language, too, lacks structure. It is insufficiently vertebrated by verbs. They tend to point at this and that, attaching the appropriate epithet and the definite article. The latter too often assumes that the reader shares the writer's familiarity with the object: sometimes it indicates a sort of meditative memory of things as seen in a dream or from the past. This of Eliot's is a very favourable example:

> And the lost heart stiffens and rejoices
> In the lost lilac and the lost sea voices
> And the weak spirit quickens to rebel
> For the bent golden-rod and the lost sea smell.

These lines are quoted in the last section of the essay, which is closely reasoned and documented and should be read in full. Mr. Hamilton's conclusion is that

"Eliot, in his expression as a poet, is out of touch with the active virtue and strength which even to-day survive in ordinary men, and which make the drama of their life worth while. 'Quit you like men—be strong' is a note which we never hear. And, although a religious poet of unusual power, he lacks an invigorating sense of the greatness of man—this man, in the words of Donne—

> This man, whom God did woo, and, loth to attend
> Till man came up, did down to man descend.

It is, I suggest, the failure of the sense of man's greatness, both from the religious and humanistic point of view, which more than anything else has weakened English poetry, of whatever school, for the last fifty years."

In the third essay, "Tradition and the Sense of Man's Greatness: The Work of T. S. Eliot", Mr. Hamilton does not state exactly what he means by the "greatness of man." "Great" is a relative term, but it is fairly clear that by it he means standing in a relation to God which makes man worth saving (or, as some would say, worth damning). The greatness comes from sonship, the tragedy of his "tragic greatness" from the Fall. It may, however, be conceived in humanistic instead of theological terms: the tragic greatness remains, and, without the sense of it, poetry about man must fall below the highest. Certainly this sense of greatness, with or without the qualification of "tragic", permeates Shakespeare, who has remarkably few merely trivial characters. Mr. Hamilton runs through the ages from Sidney to Hopkins to show that the poets did anything but belittle man

as such. In the twentieth century he finds it otherwise, and, much as he admires Eliot and in spite of Eliot being " a solitary figure " fully aware of " conviction of sin ", he finds in him a belittling of man which is both a weakness and a cause of weakness in his poetry. This belittling, obvious in *The Waste Land*, he finds still at work even in the *Four Quartets*.

Now against this one can argue that the *Four Quartets* are interior poetry of a very special kind. They deal with what can quite properly be called a mystical achievement (whether Eliot's metaphysical explanation of the intersection of time and the timeless is accepted or not—Wordsworth spoke of " spots of time " and Mr. Hamilton would probably prefer that). This achievement or experience is represented as worth while, perhaps as the only thing that is worth while: but, if so, the experiencing soul of man must also be worth while, be, to use Mr. Hamilton's terminology, " great ". But Eliot, says Mr. Hamilton, seems to reserve the " hope of redemption " for " the rare and refined spirit ", he " does not give generous recognition to the goodness which in fact exists in ordinary careless men, whether it be in them a natural goodness or a divine grace working in spite of themselves ". If this is a just criticism, then, in his different way, Eliot is guilty of the heresy against which Wordsworth set himself to fight.

> There are who think that strong affection, love—
> Known by whatever name—is falsely deemed
> A gift, to use a term which they would use,
> Of vulgar nature; that its growth requires
> Retirement, leisure, language purified
> By manners studied and elaborate.

It is an interesting and important criticism, calling for careful examination. It is *prima facie* probable that an age, preoccupied with the external achievement of creating more varied and more powerful appliances and then becoming dependent upon them, should forget that man is more than what he makes. On the other hand, however mindful the poets and prophets may have been, this forgetting (in one form or another) is not a new thing, and, if " we, with our low estimate of humanity, neither deserved, nor could have expected, a poet of Eliot's force ", it almost looks as if Eliot may be what he is in spite of, not because of, the forgetting.

H. M. Margoliouth.

THE STUDY OF THE BIBLE TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW. Edited by H. R. WILLOUGHBY. (Chicago: University Press, and London: Cambridge University Press). 33s.

THIS substantial volume of over four hundred pages is composed of twenty-four essays by members and guests of the Chicago Society for Biblical Research. The first twelve essays are devoted to general surveys of the main fields of Biblical study: the Old, New and Inter-testamental fields are examined for the work done in the period between the wars, and for the problems which lie ahead; as well as the present state of Biblical archaeology, and the tendencies to be observed in Jewish and Catholic research. The essays in the second part are devoted to specific problems which are of particular importance at the present time. They reflect the general movement towards a Biblical theology, and discuss its possibility and methodology (essays 14, 23 and 24). Other notable essays in this section deal with the relevance of apocalyptic for ancient and modern situations, the teaching of Jesus in relation to first-century Jewish ethics, and two are devoted to the problem of Christian origins and the emergence of the Church.

The book is extremely well documented, and while the essays are inevitably of uneven merit and readability, it will provide a most useful introduction to the theological student or general reader who wishes to obtain a comprehensive account of the present state of Biblical studies in their various departments. It can hardly be expected in a symposium that the writers should approach their respective topics from a uniform point of view, although it would seem that a liberal form of Protestantism tends to predominate. It is interesting to have such an assessment from a group of American scholars who, while they do not by any means neglect the work done by British workers in their field, bring the English student into touch with work that may well have been missed during the war years.

R. H. DAUBNEY.

NEVILLE STUART TALBOT, 1879-1943. By F. H. BRABANT. (S.C.M. Press). 8s. 6d.

THIS illuminating memoir reveals, in flashlights, at times in floodlights, the unique personality of Neville Talbot, who was a robust, forthright, natural man with the spirit of a child.

His relationships with his notable father and his vital mother

" were from beginning to end uncommonly close." The entire Talbot family was deeply rooted in the Christian faith, as real to their spirits as the air they breathed was to their bodies.

Neville's " father and his father's mind served him as a lode-star of abiding power " brilliant in its simplicity. Even so, Neville's impetuosity and impatience were quite alien to his father's character.

The details of his developing career, notably in the Rifle Brigade, at Balliol, as Army chaplain, as Bishop of Pretoria and at Nottingham until his passing, are clearly recorded. His work throughout must be judged by what he strove to do. " He always influenced people by what he was rather than by what he did or said." In the simplicity of his spirit Neville faced sorrow and suffering as inevitable in the Christian life, but, if rightly faced and endured, creative of love and power. " Even when you are at the bottom you find God ", he wrote. " How dear love and pain are." " Christ is risen " was the conclusion of the cable he sent home, in his own deep sorrow, at the passing of Cecil Mary, his beloved wife. " I had no thought ", he recorded on a fragment of paper discovered after his passing, " that Gilbert's body was he himself, nor that Cecil Mary's body in her coffin was she." " We must very simply look on and up to the heavenly home whither they have gone."

There are many characteristic utterances in the memoir. One or two examples may be quoted, which reveal that he was passionately eager for the fundamental simplicities of the faith to burst out and destroy the artificial impositions upon it. " He had a profound sense of the spiritual treasure parcelled out among the broken fragments of Christendom." " Personal religion ", he said to the Student Christian Movement, " will be the pastime of the few until the whole body of Christian people face up to the christianizing of all life." " Christianity is crippled by its success."

His sympathy with the academic approach to things was not marked. He felt that his message was to the ordinary man. On the eve of his departure to Pretoria, responding to a farewell at the last meeting of a " Religion and Life " series at Oxford, " in a moment stamped in the memory with the impress of the eternal ", he burst out: " There standeth one among you whom ye know not."

In 1943 this faithful son of the Church passed on, leaving behind him unrecorded manifestations of the faith, sparks of

which have burst into flame in many lives. He has affected, and will affect, the movement of the Christian Churches towards that unity, in the fundamentals of the faith, which is essential in our time, despite differences in outward expression.

ALBERT MANSBRIDGE.

THE PRINCE CONSORT. By ROGER FULFORD. (Macmillan). 18s.

THE nineteenth century, despite its comparatively recent demise (recent enough to be within many living memories), makes an increasingly heavy demand upon the credulity of its successor. So many of its leading figures, of the people that stand out as the creators of the special character and atmosphere of the period, strike the modern generation as frankly incredible. Gladstone, Ruskin, Jowett—to take only a few examples almost at random. Did such people ever really exist? And if they did, why has the secret of their reproduction so completely disappeared? What has happened once should, according to all the accepted rules, be capable of happening again. And yet it is impossible to believe that English politics will ever breed another Gladstone or that the artistic taste of the country (if so " bourgeois " a commodity is destined to survive at all) will ever bend the knee before another Ruskin. Such things do not happen nowadays. That is easily said; but it does not alter the indisputable fact that they did happen in the nineteenth century. The evidence is too strong for scepticism or disbelief: we can only look back, through the distorted glasses of 1949, upon an epoch that seems in the retrospect to have possessed every imaginable quality except reality; upon an age of giants, it is true, but of giants out of a fairy-tale book, whose adventures make good reading but bear no relation whatever to the normal experiences of life. Just a string of old wives' stories: as well ask us to believe in the she-wolf that suckled Romulus and Remus or in the Saxon countrywoman who chided King Alfred for burning her cakes. The whole epoch, as Thucydides said of the early Greek legends, has won its way into the realm of romance.

Of all the legendary figures of the century, none presents more enigmatic features than Albert the Prince Consort. Nobody really knows—perhaps it is impossible to know—what on earth to make of him. About the leading events of his short life (he was only 42 when he died) there is no secret whatever. His mission, from early childhood onwards, was to marry the prospective heiress to the British throne. That mission he duly ful-

filled, and for the best part of twenty years (after overcoming a good deal of initial prejudice) he became the virtual sovereign of the British Empire; and a sovereign, moreover, who aspired to exercise, and did in fact exercise, much more political power than falls to the lot of most constitutional monarchs. He was upright, fair-minded, unselfish and wholly devoted to his public duties. When Tennyson dubbed him "Albert the Good", he coined a phrase to which not even the most captious of critics could seriously demur. He *was* good; good both morally and intellectually, good not only by Victorian standards but by any code of ethics that philosophers or admirers of virtue could reasonably formulate. Yet he still fails, as he failed so lamentably in his life-time, to excite any widespread feeling of sympathy or affection. His contemporaries (with some notable exceptions) did not like him; and it is difficult not to believe that, were he to come alive again to-day, most of us would like him even less. Outside a narrow circle, says his latest biographer, the Prince was "friendless and alone." It is perhaps sufficient to study his portrait; his face was not that of a man born for popularity. For all its regularity of feature, it lacked endearing qualities. It suggested a nature too remote from human weaknesses, too indifferent to the trivialities of everyday life, to make any strong appeal to the hearts of men. There was a stiffness about his appearance, and about all his recorded utterances, that did not wholly belie his character. In his intercourse with others (all but his few intimates) he seldom shook off the professorial manner: perhaps he did not even wish to shake it off. "Aspasia", wrote Horace Walpole of a famous blue-stocking among his own contemporaries, "has both knowledge and wit, with many virtues, but, mercy on us !, they are both indefatigably for ever at one's service !" From that defect, if defect it was, the Prince Consort could claim no immunity. His wisdom and virtue were "indefatigably for ever" at everybody's service. He would have scorned to hold them in leash. They were gifts which, under his high Teutonic sense of duty, he felt bound to scatter with a lavish hand among his erring fellow-creatures. It would have been admirable enough in a German lecture-room, but it had less success with the easygoing English governing classes. They proved unresponsive, and even resentful, under the treatment.

"His English contemporaries", says Mr. Fulford, "suspected—and they were perfectly right—that the Prince never liked them." The case could not be more succinctly stated. There was a fundamental antipathy between the Prince and the majority of his wife's subjects which affected, and to some extent embittered, the whole of his career in England. It added to his

difficulties and embarrassments at every turn. It clogged his efforts towards university reform; it marred the triumph of the Great Exhibition of 1851, the most outstanding of all his achievements; it led to the outrageous campaign of calumny ("nothing so shameful since the warming-pan story", said Macaulay) that broke over his devoted head just before the Crimean War. It does not appear that the Prince was greatly disturbed by the enmity that he aroused, or that he made any special attempt to present himself in a more popular light. That was not his way. Conscious (almost too conscious) of his own rectitude, he was content to let the critics rage against him. It was not his fault, he seemed to argue, if he was misrepresented and misunderstood; the reflection that he might have been better understood if he had tried to understand others better, does not appear to have occurred to him.

Taking a wide view of the Prince's activities as administrator and statesman, it is possible to discern two major political objectives which, according to his lights, he set himself to achieve. The first objective (and in this he was the pupil of Stockmar and King Leopold) was to remodel the pattern of constitutional monarchy on less equivocal and more effective lines. The second may be summed up in the phrase "Social Services": an expression which, though a commonplace in our own political vocabulary, aroused little enthusiasm in the Prince's day and had acquired no very definite significance with the mid-nineteenth century politician. In both these articles of policy the Prince had the ill-fortune to be born out of his time. He was too late for the first and too early for the second. The hour had passed when constitutional monarchy, as conceived by Stockmar and Leopold, could stem the advancing tide of democracy. There was as yet no general realization, at any rate among the dominant English aristocrats, that the needs of social reform presented a problem that would brook no delay. In either case the Prince was a voice crying in the wilderness; it need occasion no surprise that he incurred the distrust and opposition to which such voices are only too often exposed. It made matters no easier that his personal position was always an anomalous one; he had no *locus standi* of his own; whatever he attempted could be achieved only under the cover of his wife's name. On the whole, the wonder is that he accomplished so much, not that he did not accomplish more. But the enigma remains unresolved.

Mr. Fulford has written an excellent biography, which acquires a special interest and importance by reason of the author's access to hitherto unpublished documents in the Windsor

archives. He has made good use of his material, and has produced a well-balanced and well-constructed narrative. His style, if it lacks special distinction, is easy and agreeable. His judgement, on most points, is sound and impartial; and there emerges from his pages as clear a picture as is ever likely to be obtained of so enigmatic a personality as the subject of his book. There are minor blemishes here and there. Some sarcastic remarks about the Prince's brother Ernest are attributed (p. 22) to Queen Victoria's Private Secretary (Sir Henry Ponsonby); in fact they occurred in a letter addressed to Ponsonby by a member of the Duke of Edinburgh's household. And when Mr. Fulford speaks of the " characteristic waspishness " of Charles Dickens (p. 274)—well, perhaps it may be left to the Dickens Fellowship to deal with that hyperbolical accusation.

JOHN PULLEN.

PERIODICALS

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THE PRESENT RELEVANCE OF THE PATRISTIC AGE [1]

By F. L. CROSS

I.

In inviting an audience of the twentieth century to consider the significance of primitive theology for the Christian life to-day a lecturer cannot but be conscious that his subject may seem somewhat remote. It is now exactly twelve hundred years since the death of St. John of Damascus, the last of the Greek Fathers, and one can almost hear the sound of voices asking what possible relevance to Christian ministers and those training for the Christian ministry in the twentieth century theologians and writers of so long ago can have. The Fathers, it will be objected, belonged to a wholly different age from our own; they lived in a widely different social and political milieu; they knew nothing of the problems of the contemporary sciences and the issues of contemporary philosophy; their very art-forms are quite remote from those known to us to-day. No doubt they are of some interest, as are all peoples of the past from whom a literature which modern man can read has come down to us, to a few specialists. But can their theological notions and their ideals of life have present actuality? After all, most of us nowadays do not know a great deal about them and had we not better let them remain in their oblivion?

Whatever force there may be in these objections, there is a consideration of a general kind which ensures that the Patristic age will always have an interest for the Christian Church of

[1] The second of two lectures given at the Opening Session, 1949-50, of the United Theological College of the Presbyterian Church of Wales at Aberystwyth, October 12, 1949.

later times. This age stands in the direct line of descent from primitive Christianity and has left a permanent imprint on its history. The beginnings of the Gospel were on Semitic soil: the language spoken by the Lord and his earliest disciples was Aramaic, not Greek; and the original context of the Gospel, as modern study of the background of the New Testament has increasingly shewn, was Hebraic not Hellenic. The setting of primitive Christianity is thus to be sought not in Greek ideas but in the thought of the Old Testament and its development in later Judaism. Nowhere has this become more evident than in recent studies of the background of the Lord's Supper and the early Christian Liturgy. Their context was Jewish and not, as was widely held a generation ago, the pagan mysteries. And yet the pre-condition of the Gospel becoming the immense force that it has in fact become in Western civilization was its transplantation to Greek soil. A process of Hellenization was inescapable; and already in the New Testament this process of Hellenization began. Even the most primitive elements in the Christian tradition have reached us not in the language in which they were originally expressed, but in a Greek version. The Aramaic survivals in the New Testament — Maran atha, Golgotha, Talitha Cumi, Ephphatha, and a few others—are negligible.

And when we are dealing with fundamental ideas and principles, translation is a matter of much moment. For differences of language are expressive of real distinctions of outlook. There is not here the equivalence that, until recent times, existed between pounds and dollars and francs, so that the one could be converted into the other without any gain or loss on either side. Where matters of real life are concerned such translation without modification is not possible. Even those with but a limited appreciation of languages can sense the effect of translation on the Bible. The Bible is superb in seventeenth century English, perhaps even better still in Martin Luther's German, superb also, but in a different way, in Jerome's Latin, but far less satisfying in the modern successors of the Latin language, French or Italian. Whether or not

Welsh adds to or detracts from its meaning and beauty, many of you will know in a way that I cannot.

Now as a purely linguistic fact translation had already taken place when the New Testament was written. Though a Hebrew of the Hebrews, St. Paul wrote in Greek. And the sayings of the Lord have only come down to us in a Greek dress. But the translation of language was but one aspect of a much wider process. To make an impression on and be accepted by European civilization, the Gospel was compelled to express itself in terms of Greek thought. This process, begun in the New Testament period, was to be carried forward with the preaching of the Gospel through the Roman Empire in the centuries which followed. It was in this milieu that there gradually grew up that attitude to the Christian revelation which is comprehended under the word Patristic and to which I wish to direct your attention in this lecture.

II.

I would begin with what seems to me the most characteristic mark of the Patristic spirit, its inclusiveness. This, I would suggest, was the reflex of its want of systematization. What is meant soon becomes clear if we contrast the Patristic age with those which followed.

Never was the ideal of systematization more fully realized than in the medieval synthesis. This synthesis in speculative thought, which reached its culmination in the thirteenth century, appears on the surface to owe much to an historic accident, the sudden recovery in the West of the long lost writings of Aristotle. Not that these writings alone would have brought the process to completion. It is a matter of common knowledge that they were received at first with strong hostility, and that in 1210 a synod at Paris forbade members of the university to read them. But it was not long before a change became manifest. A mitigated decree was issued by Gregory IX in 1231, still forbidding, indeed, the study of the Aristotelian writings but only until such time as they should be purged of

all heresy. Within a few years there was a complete reversal of the earlier attitude. The validity of their principles was accepted by the greatest philosophical theologians of the age and the magnificent (even those who quarrel most with it cannot refuse it this epithet) system of St. Thomas Aquinas brought the process to completion.

Few would deny that systematization has its uses. It encourages the attempt to survey and interpret the whole range of life in terms of a single principle, to explain the interrelation of the manifold facts of experience in their mutual relationships, to see things as a whole. And when the facts to be thus comprehended cover that immense range which the Christian revelation has shewn to be so great in number and so diverse in character, it is no matter for surprise that the classical Christian and post-Christian systems have all been the work of powerful intellects. Only an Augustine or an Aquinas or a Calvin or a Kant or a Hegel has been sufficient for such a task. There is a kind of completeness about such systems which evokes our admiration. We know that to whatever question we had set before them they would have had their answer. So sure are we of their general outlook that we can safely deduce the replies that they would have given not only to the questions of their own age, but to those of later times. We can judge pretty accurately (or we think we can) what St. Thomas's answers would have been to the problems of modern physics or modern politics.

But there is also another aspect of this situation. For a systematic principle has a strong constraining effect. It interprets the whole in terms of a particular standpoint and it must in consequence be asked whether there are not aspects of reality which the use of a systematic principle does not necessarily distort. Calvin and St. Thomas were both concerned to interpret the same range of facts. Each could find a place for the same *datum* in his system. But it might wear a very different aspect in the two cases; and this aspect again would in each case be quite different from what it would wear in Hegel. Clearly all cannot be right. All but one must give a distorted picture of the facts. And is it not possible that they all do?

It is here that I think that we are on the track of a great positive excellence in the spirit of the Fathers. If we except St. Augustine (and he was already half way to the Middle Ages), the Fathers were not makers of systems. They had a comprehensiveness of outlook which has since been largely lost in Christian theology. Perhaps it is a somewhat facile view that the wholeness of Christian truth has been split up among the various Christian bodies and that each holds a certain element of truth. But it is hard to deny that the fragmentation of Christianity with its conflicting systems represents a departure from the wholeness of faith realized in the Primitive Church.

III.

May I try to illustrate the matter from the Patristic teaching about Redemption? The main division in later Western theology of the Redemption has been that comprised under the two names Catholic and Protestant. Catholicism has tended to put the Incarnation at the centre of its faith and historic Protestantism the Atonement. Thus, Catholic theology has constantly found the heart of the Gospel in the Word made flesh and the means thereby granted to man for his sanctification in the mystical Body of Christ. Protestant theology, on the other hand, has laid greater emphasis on the all-sufficiency of the work of Calvary, on the wholly changed relations between God and fallen man thereby achieved, and on the utter worthlessness of human effort in the light of the Redemptive Work of Christ. But behind this dichotomy—and you will have already recognized that I have Professor Gustav Aulén's book entitled *Christus Victor* in mind—is the Patristic view of the Atonement which comprehends the fullness of both aspects of redemption. Here in the Fathers we have what the Swedish professor has taught us to call the "classic" view of Redemption and to sum up in the two words of his title, *Christus Victor,* or in the Pauline saying "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself." For the leading Patristic theologians—Irenaeus, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine—the Incarnation and the Atonement belong inseparably together. They see the work

of Christ in its widest range. Christ for them is supreme over the whole of creation, exercising dominion in glory over the universe and his elect as he is depicted in the mosaics of the period, or, as in the early crucifixes, actually reigning from the tree. For the Fathers the work of Redemption extends to the whole universe; they accept the close connexion of sin and death; seeing in the Redemption the restoration of the principle of life to fallen man. They adopt the language of II Peter, making redeemed man a partaker of the divine nature, so that, as St. Athanasius puts it in the *De Incarnatione,* " Christ became man that we might be made divine."

IV.

This comprehensiveness of the Fathers in their account of the central doctrine of the Christian faith is characteristic. They were not bound by the fetters of a precise theological system and they saw Christian truth in its wholeness. And what has sometimes been made a charge, that among them there were very few minds of the first order, was really an asset. It is not without significance that, as though the Church did not wish to be hemmed in by the restrictive force of strong individual thinkers, it condemned Tertullian and Origen, the two greatest minds in pre-Nicene times, as heretics. Tertullian, whose acuteness was chiefly as a dialectician, does not specially concern us, but a word or two must be said at this point about Origen.

The reassessment of the place of Origen in the history of Christian theology in the last few years is significant. There is little doubt that many of the suspicions as to his orthodoxy, frequently entertained in the early Church, were not more than expressions of the distrust aroused in lesser minds when they came face to face with a thinker too great for them. Origen's speculations ranged over an immense number of subjects; and the fact that some of them were mutually incompatible, and doubtless not intended by him as more than hints, was overlooked by literalists of the next generations. The view that

stars have souls, a particular scandal to later Christians, was in any case a matter of no great moment.

It is true that Origen had warm supporters even in the early Church. There are few more attractive pieces of Patristic literature than Gregory Thaumaturgus' Address to his teacher with its description of Origen's aims. We remember how Gregory tells us that in Origen's lecture-room "no subject was forbidden to us, nothing hidden or inaccessible." "We were allowed to become acquainted with every doctrine, barbaric or Greek, on things spiritual or civil, traversing with all freedom and investigating the whole circuit of knowledge and satisfying ourselves with the full enjoyment of the pleasures of the soul." And he adds how Origen, in words "thrilling alike by their humility and their confidence," proclaimed that "as the eye seeks the light, as our body craves for food, so our mind is impressed with the natural desire of knowing the truth of God and the causes of what we observe." And the abiding worth of Origen's philosophical teaching was still recognized more than a century after his time by the Cappadocian Fathers, two of whom, Basil and Gregory Nazianzen, put into circulation a collection of extracts from his writings, and all of whom, but especially Gregory of Nyssa, were deeply influenced by Origen's thought. But such a sympathetic understanding of Origen's outlook and ideals was the exception, and at a Council of Constantinople in 543 Origen was formally condemned as a heretic. Such has been the generally accepted view of orthodox Christians ever since. Origen was excluded from the *Library of the Fathers*.

It is the more significant, therefore, that within the last twelve months an important study by a distinguished French Jesuit, Jean Daniélou, has appeared in which a complete revaluation of Origen is attempted. He applies to Origen some words which another modern French scholar had used of Pascal—"all the orders of greatness in a single man and one who is in every respect a Christian" (*tous les ordres de grandeurs dans un seul homme, et qui justement est un*

chrétien). And in his own words Daniélou says that Origen belongs to that very rare class of men who are equally great in the ranks of genius and sanctity. It is a striking instance of the fresh valuation of the Fathers which is going on over large parts of the Continent to-day.

V.

The inclusiveness which, as we have tried to suggest, was one of the marks of the Patristic outlook is carried a stage further in their attitude to the problems concerning the relation of man to God. The relation of divine and human reason has constantly exercised the Christian intellect at least since the time of St. Anselm; it is part of the problem of natural theology, acutely posed in our own day by Karl Barth. Can the human intellect apart from divine grace have any true knowledge of God? Can it, as St. Thomas held, setting out from the analysis of the facts of experience, prove the existence of a divine being? Or must it, as Karl Barth maintains, renounce for ever all attempts to reach even a modicum of knowledge about the things of God? The divergences between the two points of view are sufficiently deep, and neither side shews any inclination to minimize them. But, however great the disagreement in the answers given to the fundamental question of natural theology, it must not be overlooked that St. Thomas and Barth are at one in denying that supernatural revelation is in any way accessible to the human intellect. Both alike refuse to allow that the human reason can obtain any knowledge of such mysteries of the faith as the doctrine of the Holy Trinity or (to take another instance which was specially alive in St. Thomas's own day) the creation of the world in time. Revelation and reason, that is, are utterly disparate.

It is true that many modern theologians have attempted to overcome this hiatus between revelation and reason. One answer is that revelation and reason are different aspects of the same fact. Viewed from the human aspect, a truth is a truth of reason; viewed from the divine aspect, a truth is a truth of

revelation. And those who accept this answer sometimes use the illustration of the convex and concave sides of a curve. The single curve appears either the one or the other according to the position from which you view it.

Yet it is hard to believe that this interpretation is wholly satisfying. I may note in passing that the analogy of the two sides of the curve implies the same sharp division between revelation and reason as we met with in Aquinas and Barth. I do not think that we can escape the observation that the Christian intellect is concerned with more than one class of truth. There are certain propositions of the natural order, such as the mathematical verities ($7+5=12$), which present themselves to the human intellect with a clarity all their own. Quite otherwise is it with the mysteries of faith. To the believer these latter may have all the certainty of mathematical truths. But the evidence which belongs to them is evidence of a different kind and the conviction of their truth rests on wholly different considerations. And it would seem that if we examine the whole range of human knowledge we shall find that there is a long series of evidential processes leading up from the simplest human verities to the profoundest mysteries of belief. To revert to our earlier instances, the evidence which we have of the existence of God appears intermediate between what we have of mathematical propositions and what we have of the doctrine of the Trinity. Despite St. Thomas and his modern disciples I cannot believe that the human intellect by its own unaided powers can devise proofs of the being of God which are compelling. Otherwise how is it that some of my friends, whose intellectual sincerity I cannot doubt, are not theists?

The line of argument we have just been following is, I would suggest, substantially that underlying the theology of the Fathers. It is true that they pay little express heed to the problem of reason and revelation which has so much occupied the minds of Western theologians since the earlier Middle Ages. But this is because the idea of two separate bodies of truth was foreign to their ways of thought. Rather they held that there was gradual transition from the one to the other. Their attitude

is indicated by the teaching of Clement of Alexandria that while faith is the initial venture of the Christian life it is gradually transformed into knowledge and this in turn is transmuted into love which unifies the knower and the known.

VI.

And what does all this mean except that the Fathers were Platonists? The Platonic metaphysic, as understood in later centuries, with its equation of goodness and being and its teaching about degrees, was perhaps the greatest contribution which Greek philosophy made to the elucidation of the Christian revelation in Patristic times. There were many channels through which the Platonist teaching entered the Christian tradition. We need only recall the Alexandrian influences on Clement and Origen in the third century, the indebtedness of St. Augustine to Victorinus Afer and the direct influence of Proclus on that unknown speculative mystic of Syria whose writings have reached us under the pseudonym of Dionysius the Areopagite. How far Platonist influences are traceable to the New Testament is questionable. A generation ago the best English scholarship was ready, and sometimes eager, to see Platonic influences in the Johannine writings, though to-day, under the influence of Sir Edwyn Hoskyn's *Commentary on the Fourth Gospel,* there has been a reaction. Dr. Inge even went so far as to hold that St. Paul was deeply imbued with Platonist beliefs, and once wrote: "The whole doctrine of the Spirit in [St. Paul's] epistles corresponds closely to the Platonic *Νοῦς*." At the least Platonism provided for the early Church a medium common to Christians and the outside world, just as the German language did for Luther and the music of Palestrina for the Counter-Reformation.

This is not to say that the Gospel can be expressed wholly in terms of Platonism. Of course, it cannot; and to attempt to do so would be to try to eliminate from it the peculiar glory of the Christian revelation. Greek philosophy knew nothing of that wholly new understanding of the meaning and worth of the indivdual in the sight of God which it was one of the purposes

of the Incarnation to reveal. A passage in the 7th book of St. Augustine's *Confessions* comes irresistibly to mind. "And Thou, willing first to shew me how *Thou resistest the proud, but givest grace unto the humble,* and by how great an act of Thy mercy thou hadst traced out to men the way of humility in that Thy Word was made flesh and dwelt among men—Thou procuredst for me . . . certain books of the Platonists, translated from Greek into Latin. And therein I read, not indeed in the very words, but to the very same purpose, enforced by many and divers reasons, that *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God*: *the Same was in the beginning with God*: *all things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made*: *that which was made by Him is life, and the life was the light of men, and the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not.* And that the soul of man, though it *bears witness to the light,* yet itself *is not that light;* but the Word of God, being God, *is that true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world.* And that *He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not.* But, that *He came unto His own, and His own received Him not*; *but as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, as many as believed in His name;* this I read not there.

"Again I read there, *that God the Word was born Not of flesh nor of blood, nor of the will of man, nor of the will of the flesh, but of God.* But that *the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us,* I read not there."

It is this historic element at the root of the Christian faith which gives not only Christian metaphysics, but also Christian mysticism, its peculiar stamp. I speak as a layman in matters of New Testament theology; but it has always seemed to me that one of the great merits of Schweitzer's *Mysticism of the Apostle Paul* is the clearness with which he sees the fundamental distinction between St. Paul's mysticism, with its emphasis on the Christian life at its highest, being life *ἐν Χριστῷ*, *in* the Christ of history, and all forms of purely Platonic mysticism. It is the historic element which prevents Christian mysticism from

becoming the possession of a spiritual aristocracy, to be acquired by a special technique, as was the case in the later Neo-Platonists and is still the case in Eastern religions to-day. If few of the Fathers saw the antithesis as clearly as did St. Augustine, I do not think that as a whole they can be charged, either in their theology or their teaching about the spiritual life, with not keeping in close touch with the historic reality of the Incarnation.

VII.

May I draw attention to one further point at which the thought of the Fathers is of present-day significance? A mark of recent theology has been its rediscovery of the doctrine of the Church. It is this rediscovery which is the theological expression of the movement all over Christendom drawing Christians of different historical allegiances together. Perhaps it is also bound up in some obscure way with the movement against individualism in politics and economics which have brought with them the various totalitarianisms and the welfare state. Be that as it may, there has certainly come about in our theology within the last fifty years an increasing awareness that the Gospel is addressed to men not in their isolation and individuality, but as members of the Lord's Body and hence also as members one of another. We see the influence of this new discovery in the changed title of Karl Barth's classical work from *Die Christliche Dogmatik* to *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik* or in Mr. Daniel Jenkin's *Nature of Catholicity*. Among Biblical students we see it in the researches of such N.T. scholars as Dr. Newton Flew and several of the contributors to Kittel's *Wörterbuch,* or, for the Old Testament, in Dr. Wheeler Robinson's stress on the notion of corporate personality. In the Roman Catholic Church we see it in the spread of the Liturgical Movement with its insistence that the Mass is the action not of the priest alone but of priest and people together, or again on the fresh emphasis laid on the theology of the Church in such a work as Pere Mersch's *Corps Mystique du Christ*. As instances of the same emphasis by members of my own Com-

munion I might mention Fr. Lionel Thornton's *Common Life in the Body of Christ* and Professor Michael Ramsey's *Gospel and the Catholic Church.*

Here again we have much to learn from the Fathers. Their outlook was moulded by a vivid consciousness of the Church as the Body of Christ and by the conviction that it was only in the Church that the individual found his salvation. The individualist piety of the Middle Ages, which reached such heights in St. Bernard and Thomas à Kempis, was foreign to their spiritual aspirations. The characteristic Patristic theology of the Church was that expressed by St. Irenaeus—*ubi ecclesia ibi et spiritus dei, et ubi spiritus dei, illic ecclesia et omnis gratia* (haer. 3.24.1). This theology grew out of the belief that the Church was the New Israel, which, even in the days before the New Testament existed as a separate canon, was developed in such writers as Clement of Rome and Barnabas. Most of all was it seen in the worship of the Patristic period. I cannot do better than quote a passage from a modern German Benedictine, cited by Fr. Hebert in *Liturgy and Society,* pp. 83f: "In Christian antiquity the Mystery gave the point of view from which the whole of life was seen and no part of it left out of sight, not even the commonest things in the world: through its relation to the Mystery, each individual being passes out of its isolation and is incorporated into a great organic whole, without, however, losing its own individual light. The Middle Ages, in which men made a new discovery of the world and its beauty, separated the complex of life ever more clearly into two spheres, the natural and the supernatural. The cleavage shows itself in individual men: a great joy in this world stands side by side with a vastly increased mortification, a warmer and a gladder openness to this world with a tense personal and spiritual piety. The early Christian found Christ in the mysteries, above all in the eucharistic offering and the fellowship of the mystical Body, the Church, in which the Christian became an *alter Christus.* The medieval man seeks Christ in the historical life of the Saviour according to the Gospels and in His ethical

teaching: to him Christ becomes a moral example" (Herwegen, *Kirche und Seale,* p. 29f.).

VIII.

I have tried in this lecture to set before you some of the ways in which the theology of the Fathers seems to me relevant to religious life and thought in the twentieth century. There can, of course, be no question of a mere return to the Patristic age. We are men of the twentieth century and not of the second or fourth or seventh, and we can look back only as those whose vision has been profoundly affected by the influences of later times whether of the Victorian era or of the *Aufklärung* or of the Reformation or of the Middle Ages. But even a past which we see in a perspective not its own may have very much to teach us, especially when, as in this case, it happens to be a past of which we are all the direct heirs.

THE MESSIAH'S BAPTISM AND THE HOLY GHOST

By T. NICKLIN

I.

THE distinction between THE LAW and Law is recognizably important to St. Paul's argument in his Epistle to the Romans. The distinction between THE DEITY and Deity is assumed in the Fourth Gospel when the precedence of The Word is to be defined. In the same way the distinction between THE HOLY SPIRIT and holy spirit requires continual attention. Unfortunately these distinctions are not easily or deftly to be conveyed in a Latin translation and our English theological terminology has largely been derived from or through Latin. In consequence loose and erroneous thought has at times escaped examination and passed for orthodox.

II.

St. Mark declares that the good news of Jesus being the Messiah began with John who for some time was baptizing those who listened to his teaching. In the same way it may be said that the doctrine of the Holy Ghost (or Spirit) began with the Baptist. To trace and understand its development we must scrutinize what our records tell us of the Baptist's teaching in so far as it bore upon the doctrine.

Mark gives from St. Peter's mass of *chreiai* or *ana* only one scene in St. John's mission, although he had been one of the Baptist's disciples. John, he says, made the pointed and positive statement "I have baptized with (or in) water, but

there is coming he that is stronger than I . . . He shall baptize with (or in) (a) holy spirit." When afterwards Jesus was baptized, as he came up out of the water, a dove settled upon him, and Mark reports as St. Peter's understanding of the incident that THE SPIRIT descended upon him in this figure. This is the normal and habitual title under which the early Christians spoke among themselves of The Holy Ghost, so that it is clear that we have Petrine warrant for believing this to have been the first inception of baptism with (a) holy spirit. In harmony with this is the further statement that immediately THE SPIRIT impelled Jesus to withdraw into solitude.

Matthew adds extracts from the Baptist's preaching but repeats the Marcan record confirming its evidence as to the enigmatic obscurity of John's prediction, except that he writes instead of THE SPIRIT the less distinctly Christian phrase THE SPIRIT OF GOD in the first passage, retaining THE SPIRIT in the second.

Luke has a still fuller account of John's preaching, though he is without Matthew's precision as to the Pharisees and Sadducees being specially criticized. Otherwise he also attests that the prediction was darkly enigmatic. In relating the actual baptism he uses the fuller and later expression THE HOLY SPIRIT (or GHOST).[1] In his account of the Lord's retirement into the wild he replaces the Marcan THE SPIRIT by writing Jesus full of (a) holy spirit.

John adds what makes it possible to follow the course of the story more clearly. The Baptist was divinely instructed to expect that the identity of the Christ-King would be shown to him as he baptized. He was to see THE SPIRIT descending

[1] After this was written I had the opportunity and advantage of studying Swete's exhaustive and illuminating volume *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament.* He meticulously observes the distinction which for some years I have urged should be made between "holy spirit" and "The Holy Ghost," but when discussing the Incarnation he incautiously substitutes the second expression for the former, a logically illicit change.

and remaining upon Some One, and this One would be he whom he was to expect to baptize with (a) holy spirit. He saw the likeness of a dove so descend and rest upon our Lord. Accordingly, to the commission of priests and Levites sent six weeks later from Jerusalem he said that the Prince whose forerunner he was was amongst them while they did not recognize him, and to his disciples the next day he pointed him out.

III.

It is imperative here for the purpose of our special inquiry to dwell a little on the facts given in our records and scrupulously to weigh them. We must be careful not to interject into the early scenes of our Lord's life ideas drawn from later incidents. We are to understand the Child Jesus to have no full anticipatory knowledge of his Mission. He learned by experience. We may believe him to have gathered that he was consecrated to be the Christ but what the office destined for the Christ was to be he did not know. The voices of the prophets and the words, we may suppose, of Simeon and of Zachariah might supply food for thought, but he was without any clear interior word of Jahveh, such as came to the ancient prophets, by whom, as we Christians avow, the HOLY SPIRIT spoke. His moral sense was trained and guided by THE LAW and we shall perhaps be right in applying to him in his youth what St. Paul asserts of himself. The fragmentary narrative preserved to us from the Gospel of the Ebionites may give a faithfully historical picture of his mental and spiritual state at the time of the Baptist's Call to repentance.

But now two new factors emerged of distinguishable development in the world order. John proclaimed as a Word from Jahveh that the Kingdom of Heaven was at hand—in other words that God was shortly about to vindicate his claim and establish the fact of his control over the course and issue of the struggle between Right and Evil. More than this the Baptist declared that amongst his initiates One should be that Superior and Successor who should baptize with (a) holy spirit and this Superior should be marked out to him by a visible

sign of THE SPIRIT coming down and remaining upon him. The descent of the dove and its settling upon him, the Voice sounding within him, confirmed his faith that he was indeed the Anointed of Jahveh, the Anointed King of Jahveh, the Anointed King of Israel, the predicted Christ. But what this implied, he had yet to learn, and by what means he was to achieve his sovereignty. How did this incontrovertable disclosure of his office alter or affect the measure of his duty? What, if any, were the powers with which he was now vested? By faith he held fast to the conviction that the SPIRIT of Jahveh had now permanently invaded his humanity and perpetually instigated and inspired his will. Prophets and heroes of old had been moved by THE SPIRIT to utter some Word from Jahveh or to execute some deed of daring deliverance. But he was henceforth to be guided at every point of fresh progress in his Mission. Samuel had indicated that kings ordinarily used their position to secure a luxury of comfort and plenty for themselves: his commission, he found, did not exempt him from hunger: did his powers extend to the transmutation of stones into bread? He learned that the Christ King was to live his life still within the limitations of humanity wholly dependent upon God. Yet at the same time he learned that God ordained for mankind to eat other kinds of sustenance than what was free from the Mosaic taboos or the restrictions of a Nazirite vow. But what was the work for God which it was the Christ's office to undertake? If he was to be God's vicegerent, must he not extend Israel, the people who served Jahveh, albeit part of the Mosaic Law was to receive a different emphasis from that given by the Rabbis? Was this national expansion to be brought about by force of arms? Was his rule to be like that of Julius Caesar or even that of Augustus? If it was not a civil supremacy but a moral, were men to be convinced by demonstrative proof or won by attraction and affection?

To all these questionings the Holy Spirit interpenetrating the human spirit of our Lord guided him to the true answer, and three points may be noticed incidentally. The illapse of

THE SPIRIT did not preclude, as sometimes young Christians are discouraged to discover, the possibility of temptation. Passages of Scripture recurring to his memory served by THE SPIRIT'S prompting to assist his choice and right resolve. Some of these temptations not only had to be met later in his disciples but, it may be thought, recurred again even to himself. After the feeding of the five thousand the popular enthusiasm suggested an earthly throne. Peter after his confession of faith demurred to his King's death and defeat, however temporary, and a postponement of visible victory. On the Cross the penitent presented the same temptation, and, once again, the priests challenged him to demonstrate his immunity from death.

IV.

If, after his human spirit was possessed by the Holy Ghost, the Lord was conscious of a new and wider vision of his duty, he very intelligibly declared to Nicodemus that men must be born anew, and that in such quickening of spiritual life THE SPIRIT was as mysterious, as unpredictable, as the wind of the natural world.

To the Samaritan woman he indicated his office and commission to vouchsafe Eternal Life through the gift of THE HOLY SPIRIT and avowed himself to be the Messiah who pronounced that God should be worshipped in all places alike and that his worship must of necessity be in Spirit and in truth. Presently in the synagogue at Nazareth he applied to himself Isaiah's words which affirmed his anointing with Jahveh's Spirit for his work of preaching the gospel to the poor, deliverance to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind. Such altruistic charity, such expansiveness of interest, such understanding sympathy and overflowing generosity he had himself imbibed as the Holy Spirit interpenetrated his human spirit, and enabled him to apprehend the meaning of his mission as the Son of God. So it was that he declared his hearers should be sons of God if they loved their enemies.

V.

THE SPIRIT had impelled him to withdraw into solitary retirement, and had assuredly directed his human spirit in its survey of the scope and method of his Messianic enterprise. THE SPIRIT had furnished him with spiritual mottoes from the Scriptures, and we may believe that similar guidance from the Scriptures was supplied to him at some at any rate of those cardinal moments of decision where Matthew notes that his actions fulfilled some word of prophecy, as e.g. when he withdrew rather than face the angry clamour of criticism.

But not only so: THE SPIRIT at each successive crisis of experience interpreted for his human consciousness the Father's Will. At the marriage feast in Cana THE SPIRIT signalled the hour, as THE SPIRIT infused the generous sympathy which stirred him to supply the lack of wine. The Pharisees' watchful suspicion of his popularity became the signal for his withdrawal into Galilee. The arrest of the Baptist struck the hour for him to begin his open call for disciples to follow him. The sight of sickness moved him to essay his authority to heal. The manifest ignorance of the populace untaught or mistaught by the Scribes impelled him to teach. His insight into the heart of the hopeless but repentant sinner drew from him the assured assertion of God's Absolution and ratification of its pronouncement on earth. The Baptist's martyrdom gave the sign for the commissioning of the Twelve.

Thus every circumstance under THE SPIRIT'S guidance ministered to our Lord's growth in the understanding of and obedience to the Father's Will. It is unnecessary to pursue the matter further, but it should be noted how the shock of circumstances constantly led our Lord under THE SPIRIT'S guidance to some new understanding of his Mission and of his own office.

VI.

So far, it may be said, the Gospel story reveals our Lord as he established the new cosmopolitan theocracy under his

vicegerency, but shows nothing of any bestowal by him of (a) holy spirit. The last few months, however, before the Crucifixion laid the train for the coming of the stupendous Gift at Pentecost.

The Twelve were authorized by our Lord to exorcise evil spirits, and while he with the chosen Three was away on the Mount of Transfiguration the remaining nine failed in an attempt to deal with a paranoic youth, whom the Lord himself healed the next day; whereupon Scribes said he was in league with Beelzebub. The sequel of the story becomes plain when, with the help of that great central narrative in Mark which was missing in Luke's copy, we set in their proper context two sections which Luke was obliged to take over from Q without any clear guidance as to their date. (1) The joyful declaration of the Seventy stirred the Lord's spirit—not alone his human spirit but his co-ordinate Eternal Spirit—to an exultant satisfaction in this decisive evidence of the Father's Will. He had himself been anointed with the self-spending and expansive Holy Spirit, and now it was no longer a small band of Twelve trained for many months, but a large number of simple folk whose qualification was simply this—that they trusted his power and will to vanquish authors of disorder in the world. These plain men demonstrated the Father's purpose of redeeming Man. THE SPIRIT transported the Lord's human spirit with the glad knowledge that the Son not only knew the Father's mind but was revealing him to others. It is noteworthy that from this point onwards Jesus asserts his intimate association with the Father. He is conscious of a constant communion with him, a confluence of Being, a union of Spirit. This divine assurance, inspired by the Eternal Spirit guiding his human spirit, must, we may believe, have been the more sustaining and welcome when his critics reiterated calumny that he was demented and possessed by a spirit of anti-Judaic irrationality. His critics detected the new tone of confidence in the identity of his and the Father's spirit and purpose and grew fiercer in their rejection of any possible approximation

between God and Man. (2) Finding themselves again in the neighbourhood where three years before they had been baptized by John, the disciples asked for a form of prayer which they could recite. To encourage them with a conviction that God answers sincere and spiritual petitions our Lord expresses the sum of highest blessing in the words "(a) holy spirit"; and in the Lucan record of the Lord's Prayer some transcriber has given THE HOLY SPIRIT for "The kingdom" as that for whose coming we are to pray.

VII.

The Scribes' specific naming of Beelzebub would seem to have stirred our Lord's mind to a not less specific naming of Jahveh's Spirit, whose guidance he himself knew to be the power through whom he healed and taught. A week or two later when speaking of misrepresentations of his teaching, he declared that those who decried as evil the animating purpose of his Life, were past forgiveness, since they were attacking THE HOLY SPIRIT.

This new form of speech he used again a little later. He promised his followers that when the time came, as it surely would, that they should be arrested and arraigned for their adherence to him, THE HOLY SPIRIT would prompt them for their defence. Thus it would seem he came to realize that Jahveh's Spirit was as Personal as was he himself, and so on the night before his crucifixion he told the Twelve that when he was slain the Father would send Another to be for them what he had been, and even more, and this for ever.

VIII.

The Baptist had been inspired to announce that the Christ should baptize with (a) holy spirit, but Jesus never found himself guided to impart the gift to his disciples till after his Resurrection. Then he did once Breathe on them and bade them receive (a) holy spirit. Yet perhaps this insufflation should not be understood as intended for anything but a part

of the instruction as to what was to be realized at Pentecost. It helped to prepare the apostles for a right understanding of the " mighty wind " and the " tongues of fire." It was followed by the assurance that henceforth the apostles would be authorized to pronounce, as he had done, the absolution of men's sins. The reserve of the Gift till after the Ascension may be thought to be the point of John's remark that Jesus did not himself baptize.

The last words recorded by Matthew to have been spoken by our Lord to his apostles continued and extended their instruction and preparation for Pentecost. To make them ready for that, teaching was needed as gradual and progressive as it had been necessary to give them before the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. They were bidden to initiate converts into their company by baptizing them upon their putting their trust not only in the God of Israel (now shown to them as Father both of the Christ-King and his followers), not only in that Christ-King (the Son in whom they had seen the Father), but also in THE HOLY SPIRIT. Jesus had told them before that THE HOLY SPIRIT was shortly to be sent to them from the Father to be his Counsel as Jesus was until he departed to the Father, and THE SPIRIT'S presence within them, he now told them, would mean that he himself was with them " all the days."

St. Luke similarly records that before his Ascension our Lord gave yet another instruction to his apostles, which should prepare them for the Pentecostal gift. He defined further the time and manner in which his commission to baptize with (a) holy spirit should be accomplished. It should come about in a few days' time after his withdrawal from the earth and then, THE HOLY SPIRIT having come upon them, they should receive power and should be his witnesses.

IX.

The gradual development of our Lord's human understanding is shown in his growing awareness of the manner in which his mission of Redemption was to be achieved. THE HOLY SPIRIT, the Father's Counsel dwelling within his

human spirit, both interpreted to him the events of his experience and assisted his human will to conform to the Will of the Father. The rightness of our viewing in this light our Lord's fulfilment of his Mission is confirmed in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The writer declares that it was through (an) Eternal Spirit that Christ offered himself without spot to God.

The same development in our Lord's understanding is to be seen in respect of his commission to baptize with (a) holy spirit. At the first John spoke of this in language which may be fairly represented in English by the words "(a) holy, hallowed, consecrated or saintly mood or disposition." Jesus was later guided to see that an unclean or wicked mood or spirit might return in a yet more violent and vicious mood or disposition, and if it was to be exorcised, it must be not expelled only but permanently replaced by another Power. This Power was a Spiritual Person, as God was Spirit, and from this time onwards our Lord spoke of this Personal Power as the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless it remains that the human mind at times will pronounce that a holy mood or spirit is recognizable in some action or decision. In the opening words of the Acts St. Luke tells us that it was through (a) holy spirit that our Lord gave his final orders to the apostles. In the Nicene Creed we affirm that Jesus was incarnate through (a) holy spirit, the very words used by Matthew and confirmed by St. Luke "(a) holy spirit shall come upon thee." In other words the Blessed Virgin would be spiritually prepared to be willing, in spite of human reproach, to accept the divine Will to create or generate[2] within her a human body which should receive the Incarnate Lord. The creed of Latin-speaking Christians could not make the distinction between this and THE HOLY SPIRIT, and our English creeds have been lamentably misled by the Latin, but Bishop Pearson was led to reject the confused and bizarre suggestions which the English and Latin had been used to support.

[2] St. Basil pointed out the impropriety in this instance of "conceive," though the Latin Creed uses it.

X.

It may be well to complete our enquiry by retelling as plainly as we can the story of Pentecost. It was the anniversary of Jesus's birthday. Some hundred and twenty of the disciples were resident or staying at Jerusalem. Memory would awaken in them the thought that but for the Crucifixion they would be celebrating his birthday on this Sunday, and, besides, it was the seventh weekly recurrence of the glad Resurrection morning. With unanimous resolve they gathered in the House of God as soon as the Temple gates were opened, the very hour of dawn when their Prince had risen from his sepulchre. They were astir with an eager expectancy. None was absent. As they were sitting there, they heard suddenly coming out of the sky what sounded like a violent blast or breath of air rushing towards them, as if, shall we say?, God were blowing or breathing upon them. In an abandonment of thankful rejoicing they broke out into cries of praise and jubilation, each in his own mother tongue. The puzzled onlookers took up the hasty notion that all were Galileans. This was an error. Adherents from other domiciles had attached themselves to the disciples' company. All alike, but in diverse and extra-liturgical ejaculations, magnified the Lord. They knew that the Promise was fulfilled. THE HOLY SPIRIT was active within them. Now and henceforth for ever THE HOLY SPIRIT was in the Communion or Fellowship of "the Saints" or Nazoraeans, i.e. the Holy Catholic Church.

NATURE IN EARLY AND MEDIAEVAL CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

By J. V. LANGMEAD CASSERLEY

"MANY attempts have been made," says Charles Singer in his popular *Short History of Science,* "to rehabilitate the intellectual achievement of the Middle Ages. So far as science is concerned they have been unsuccessful." It is no part of my purpose to question the general validity of this dictum. Mr. Singer's use of the term "science" is no doubt unwarrantably narrow, but it is at least a familiar one, and we all know what he means. I shall use the word in the same popular sense throughout this article.

It cannot be denied that although the mediaeval philosophers prized and preserved such remnants of Greek scientific speculation as they were acquainted with they possessed no technique for either criticizing or adding to them, and felt no need of one. True, the growth and flowering of the scholastic philosophy was not the only intellectual process which was taking place during the Dark and Middle Ages. There was also, for example, the underground and in some ways sinister devotion to the practice of alchemy, mixed up with many magical and superstitious elements, but yet employing crude experimental techniques which were to develop later into modern chemistry. Again, there was the often imaginative and charming allegorical use of nature as the source of parables and poetic illustrations of the divine being and activity. But of these I shall say nothing here. Too little is known of the alchemists. Their contemporaries charged them with practising the black arts, and posterity has credited them with the invention of experimental chemical analysis. No

doubt both observations are true, and they are certainly not incompatible. On the other hand, to turn to the allegorists for the characteristically mediaeval view of nature would be like turning to Richard Jeffries or Wordsworth for the characteristically modern view of nature. Unscientific though it may have been, mediaeval philosophy represents undeniably the most sustained and serious intellectual enterprise of its time, and it is with its characteristic attitude towards nature and the problems of natural knowledge that we must concern ourselves here.

If we have to describe that attitude in a word we can only call it " Socratic." It was in revolt, that is, against the scientific way of knowing nature and the scientific method of interpreting nature. " When I was young, Cebes," says Socrates in the *Phaedo,* in a passage of world-shaking importance, " I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature; to know the cause of things, and why a thing is created or destroyed, appeared to me to be a lofty profession." In a brilliant and sometimes witty discourse he proceeds to outline the content of early Greek science, narrates the story of his growing disillusion with it, and finally debunks the scientific treatment of human motivation and action. He tells of his disappointment in studying Anaxagoras, and compares him to a man who " began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but . . . . went on to shew that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic and they cover the bones . . . . and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture . . . . and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; for I am inclined to think

that these muscles and bones of mine would long ago have gone off to Megara or Boeotia—by the Dog they would—if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best . . . ." He concludes with the story of his philosophical conversion. "I thought that I had better have recourse to the world of mind and seek there the truth of existence."

To the end of the Middle Ages the socratic revolution continued to be the dominating impulse in philosophy. Its characteristic preoccupations were the ethics of personal and political action, metaphysics and theology. Now, whatever its merits, such an attitude cannot give us, and does not attempt to give us, a science of nature in the modern sense. Nature is significant for it only as a metaphysical problem. It is concerned only with the status and place of the system of nature as a whole in the order of reality. Our problem is this: What was this metaphysic of nature towards which some mediaeval thinkers gravitated and at which others arrived, and has it any significance at all in the general history of the development of modern science? I can sum up the view which I am going to put forward quite shortly. I believe that the mediaeval philosophers, hardly knowing or caring what they did, in fact laid the metaphysical foundations of modern science, or at least the better part of them.

For if modern science has no significant relationship to the mediaeval speculations which preceded it, if the two are discontinuous with each other, an almost insoluble problem arises. Is modern science a mere reversion to Greek models? But it was precisely against the survival of Greek physics in mediaeval philosophy that the founders of modern science revolted so strongly. It was the Aristotelianism rather than the mediaevalism of mediaeval thought which was so contemptuously rejected in the seventeenth century. In any case, Greek science had petered out very largely because it lacked a metaphysic in terms of which its methods and achievements could make sense even to their exponents. A mere reversion to the Greek attitude could only have met with a like fate. The

very success of modern science indicates that it possessed a metaphysical basis, existed in a particular philosophical atmosphere, very different from any which the Greek world had known. Was modern science then an example of the process of creation *ex nihilo,* an intellectual Melchizedek? That is a hypothesis which would contradict every assumption of the modern historical mind. Creation *ex nihilo* is not an activity for mortal men. Everything human has a history. And so I return to my own hypothesis, as the only one which holds out even the slightest prospect of solving our problem.

Natural science can only appear to be a feasible and worthwhile activity to men who believe in the objective reality of an order of nature. It may, indeed, be a hidden reality, very different from what it outwardly appears to be—that only heightens the excitement of the quest for the revelation of its secrets—but about the existence of an ultimate datum which is the theme of science the scientist can entertain no doubt. This is his working faith. Natural science as a human activity presupposes the reality of nature.

Now it might appear that theistic metaphysics is inherently hostile to this conception of an objectively existing order of nature. The Arabic and Jewish theologians of the Dark and Middle Ages in particular tended to take this view. Their tendency is to make God himself directly responsible——vertically, so to speak—for each thing that happens, and to deny the reality of horizontal causal relations between the different occasions and episodes which constitute the life of nature. Even within Christian philosophy Augustinian thought bears clear traces of not easily suppressed impulses towards the same conclusion. All things are seen in God: every act of cognition on every intellectual level is interpreted mystically as implying a degree of union with and insight into the divine Mind. If the world of sense perception is the world of appearances, as both ancient mysticism and modern science agree that it is, what hinders us from assuming that God imprints these appearances upon our powers of appre-

hension without employing any superfluous material intermediary? Nor is this a mediaeval viewpoint only. Malbranche, at the end of the seventeenth century, reproached the great scholastics on the very ground that they acquiesced in what he called the "pagan conception of nature"; and the rejection of the reality of an objective natural order lies at the very heart of Berkeley's brilliant synthesis of Augustinian mysticism and the mere phenomenalism of the pure empiricist. Berkeley had as little use for the hypothesis of nature as La Place had a hundred years later for the hypothesis of God. He could explain everything without it, and so with a flick of Occam's razor he eliminated all trace of it from his immaculately clean-shaven philosophy, perhaps the simplest and most brilliantly lucid in the whole history of thought.

If, in fact, St. Augustine and the Augustinians refrained from such a dogmatic denial of the existence of nature, with noble forbearance and self-discipline, it was loyalty to Holy Scripture rather than metaphysical reasoning which persuaded them. Aristotle, following in this the main lines of Greek thought from Thales onwards, based his conception of the objectivity of nature on the supposition of its eternity. But Christian thought derives its faith in the objectivity of nature from the biblical myth of creation. There is an important distinction here. If nature is real because it is eternal then it must be a self-sufficient self-authenticating system. The ground of its being must be revealed in the analysis of its being. Eternal being is necessary being. Its existence is the essence of its nature. It is the kind of being, in other words, whose nature is best explored and understood by the methods of speculative philosophy. It is primarily a rational, self-authenticating system, and pure reasoning is clearly the most appropriate method of analysing its rational structure. But if nature is objective because the necessary Being who transcends it determined its shape and structure and willed it into existence, an entirely different account of it must be given. Nature, according to such a view, is, as the scholastics say, "contingent." It is the existing thing which need not have existed, or might

equally well have existed in quite another guise. It is sheer factuality, not a rational self-authenticating system, although, of course, stamped with the clear impress of the rationality and consistency of the mind of its creator. Such a conception of nature carries with it the clear implication, which somebody had to perceive sooner or later, that nature cannot be known by purely speculative methods. If any kind of being exists of necessity, if any conceptions are necessarily valid, it is for the pure speculative reason to determine what they are. But the contingent, sheer brute factuality, that which need not have existed, or might just as easily have existed otherwise, can only be known through the minute observation of its factual behaviour. The Greeks played about with the observational and experimental study of nature, usually in a rather half-hearted way, but all the time their real metaphysical convictions and presuppositions pointed in another direction. The waning classical world needed science and scientific technology desperately. Only so could it have surmounted the internal crisis inherent in an economic system based on slave production, and the external military challenge of the barbarians. The Marxian interpretation of the collapse of Greek science cannot survive careful historical criticism. The real causes of that collapse were metaphysical presuppositions, and the first of these is the contingency or sheer factuality of nature. Greek metaphysics could not supply it. Christian metaphysics, precisely because of its loyalty to Holy Scripture, was compelled to.

Thus even Augustine, although metaphysically speaking "he had no need of that hypothesis," affirms the objective reality of nature. Indeed, in his sustained crusade against the incipient heresy of biblical fundamentalism he can even appeal to the verdict of Greek science as a wholesome corrective. "It frequently happens that there is some question about the earth, or the sky, or the other elements of this world, the movement, revolutions, and even the size and distance of the stars, the regular eclipses of the sun and the moon, the course of the years and seasons; the nature of the animals, vegetables, and minerals, and other things of the same kind, respecting which

one who is not a Christian has knowledge derived from most certain reasoning or observation. And it is highly deplorable and mischievous and a thing especially to be guarded against that he should hear a Christian speaking of such matters in accordance with Christian writings, and uttering such nonsense that, knowing him to be as wide of the mark, to use the common expression, as East is from West, the unbeliever can scarcely restrain himself from laughing." Indeed Augustine is even reputed to have tried his hand at a little experimental verification on his own account. Thus he is said to have refuted the belief that the flesh of the peacock does not putrefy by employing empirical methods.

But Aquinas is more unreserved in his affirmation of the reality of nature precisely because his metaphysics as well as his loyalty to Holy Scripture indispensably requires it. He labours to shew that even if we accept the Greek supposition of the eternity of nature it still remains true that nature is contingent and merely factual. Nature is the realm of the secondary causes, and its primary characteristic is its uniformity. The realm of the secondary causes is marked by its perfect consistency. "That which is called natural is that which invariably occurs in the same way, because nature always operates in an identical manner." Both Aquinas and Augustine are agreed that miracle involves neither the suspension nor the abrogation of Natural Law. On the contrary, miracles only happen in accordance with law. It is because they are so rare that we are unable to investigate and know their causes and modes of operation. If there were people rising from the dead every week, a theory of the causation and mechanism of resurrection would be well within our reach.

The real affiliation of the concept of miracle is with the modern concept of technology. When we think of natural science as primarily a form of intellectual knowledge, we tend to conceive nature as a closed system which can be passively and externally known and contemplated, but not permeated and altered by our initiative. As early as Francis Bacon, however,

natural science was presented to modern man not only as a form of knowledge but also as a way of power. With scientific knowledge there comes the new gift of power, power to control natural forces, to turn them, as Bacon says, "to the occasions and uses of life" and "the relief of man's estate." Technology and miracle have, then, this in common. They result from and signal the power over nature possessed by beings who enjoy a knowledge of nature, and the power is proportionate to the knowledge, absolute in the case of God, because God's knowledge is absolute, and limited in the hands of men because our knowledge is finite.

But the important point for us to notice is that both miracle and technology are only feasible and valid modes of operation because nature is not a closed system. The belief that nature is an open system, permeable by and sensitive to the influence of initiatives which originate beyond its frontiers, is the second of the great revolutionary modifications of the Greek view of nature which we owe to early and mediaeval Christian thought. That such a momentous change had occurred first becomes explicit in a remark of Marsiglio of Padua. In the course of developing his own view of the State in opposition to the accepted mediaeval view—there can be no doubt that Aquinas is the primary target of his criticism—he remarks, truly enough, that according to Aristotle the State is a closed, comprehensive and omnicompetent political system, a *perfecta communitas*. The real point of this thrust is to invoke the authority of Aristotle against the mediaeval Aristotelians. Aquinas is not really such a good Aristotelian after all. Where Aristotle gave us closed systems, Aquinas insists on opening the gates. There can be no doubt that Marsiglio's charge is unanswerable. Nature in the Greek view is a comprehensive and all-inclusive closed system. Where it is teleologically interpreted, as by Aristotle, it is indeed open at one end, open towards the future, towards the Unmoved Mover who is the goal of its desire. But apart from that single, and by no means universally Greek, exception, it is a closed system to be interpreted only in terms of itself. In Christian thought, however, nature is transcended by both

the divine mind and the human, and is open to both divine and human initiative and intervention. Nature is open to God in the activities of creation, providence and redemptive grace. It is at the same time open to all the influences which man can bring to bear upon it in science and technology. "Both God and man," says Collingwood, in a passage of characteristic insight, "are regarded by Galileo as transcending nature; and rightly, because if nature consists of mere quantity its apparent qualitative aspects must be conferred upon it from outside her, namely by the human mind as transcending it; while if it is conceived no longer as a living organism but as inert matter, it cannot be regarded as self-creative, but must have a cause other than itself." It is, indeed, of the essence of the conceptions inherent in modern science—indeed it is inherent in the nature of the knower to the known—that the scientist in science must transcend his datum. Hence the profound crisis in the whole philosophy of science which has arisen in more recent times as a result of the effort of the humane sciences, like psychology and sociology, to reincorporate man in nature and to interpret human activities, including of necessity science itself, by analogy with natural processes. The moment scientific inquiries are treated no longer as truth-seeking and truth-bearing arguments but as just more phenomena to be causally interpreted and woven, so to speak, into the web of things, the inherently scientific character of science is inevitably called in question. To interpret, for example, all reasoning as rationalization or as ideology is to deny the possibility that any theory at all can have a truly scientific character. Indeed all such theories are inherently self-destructive and self-refuting, because they imply a denial that they themselves can possess any scientific character.

The meaning of my initial contention, that the metaphysical foundations of modern science were well and truly laid by mediaeval Christian thinking, has now been made clear. Nature in Christian thought, as never in Greek thought, is (a) contingent, brute factuality, to be apprehended and investigated only by empirical methods; and (b) open, transcended

by mind and yet at the same time permeable by mind, so that creation, providence, grace, miracle, science and technology are all shewn by the same argument to be equally conceivable. The question may arise: why, if the mediaevals laid the foundations of natural science as we understand it, they never built upon these foundations and failed to construct any kind of science for themselves? The answer is to be found in the prevailingly Socratic character of their range of interest. They were primarily concerned with the human predicament, with the problems and perplexities of human existence, with metaphysics, ethics and politics, and, naturally enough, those were the fields which witnessed their greatest achievements. The same failure to build on their own foundations is to be observed in the field of history. It is even more obviously and incontestably true that early and mediaeval Christian thinking laid the foundations of modern history. Theology and Christology were the first sciences of the singular, aiming not at broad generalization but at the exact delineation and description of unique beings. Yet modern history, like modern science, is nevertheless an exclusively modern activity and achievement, as apt as modern science to forget the immeasurable debt which it owes to the theologically-minded metaphysicians who made such an enterprise conceivable.

Yet early and mediaeval and Christian thinking did, in fact, create one science, and carry it on as a self-conscious activity, analysing its presuppositions and carefully formulating its methodical rules. The story of the conception and creation of the science of theology is completely neglected in all our histories of the growth and development of the sciences. Yet, in fact, we have here for the first time in human history a self-conscious modern science, which knows how to limit and define its subject matter with precision and which is aware of the necessity and appropriateness of its own methods.

No doubt in and for itself theology has little or no significance except for the Christian or the non-Christian historian of Christian times and seasons. Yet even when considered

merely as a shape in outline of things—that is, of sciences—to come it was in fact an event of immeasurable significance. All the chief characteristics of the methodology of the modern natural sciences are there in germ, more than a thousand years before Copernicus. By the word "there" in the last sentence I refer particularly to the Council of Nicaea where, as early as 325, the first great debate concerning the methodology of the new science was staged and brought to a determinate and significant conclusion. I cannot here even attempt to summarize the story of the growth and definition of the concept of theology and of theological method from the fathers to the scholastics. All I want to do is to summarize three important characteristics which theology has in common with what we now know and honour as the natural sciences.

(1) Its *Departmentalism* or *Specialism*. Theology is never just a particular branch of philosophy, as even the natural sciences continued to be described well into the modern period. It has a particular field and data of its own—the whole range of Christian belief, experience and practice. The complex of Holy Scripture, liturgical and devotional tradition, ethical sentiments and institutions, conciliar definitions and corporate ecclesiastical life are taken to constitute the unique data of a unique inquiry. In a famous phrase, theology is "the faith—regarded as an existing historical fact—seeking to understand itself."

(2) Its *Empiricism*. We have already noticed how in Christian thought loyalty to Holy Scripture may inhibit metaphysical tendencies which on strictly metaphysical grounds may seem inevitably to follow from the metaphysical premisses. Christian thought shews us something which Greek philosophy had never known: the soaring habits and capacities of the metaphysical mind disciplined by the necessity of deferring to a body of fact, even in relation to those ultimate and transcendental mysteries which the metaphysical mind had previously regarded as above all constituting its own subject matter. In mediaeval thought scripture is related to philosophy precisely

as in modern science fact is related to theory. It is no longer the function of reason to excogitate the real out of its own scanty resources, to conjure up the transcendental with a verbal spell, but rather to make sense and unity of experience.

(3) Its *Hypothetical* method. The basic characteristic of the logic of science is its habit of unifying and interpreting a whole field of phenomena by means of a hypothetical concept which does not appear in the phenomenal field at all. The apparent is unified and rationalized in terms of the non-apparent. The hypothesis is not one more phenomenon. If it were it would be incapable of performing its logical function. The purpose of the hypothesis is not to complicate the phenomenal field by adding to it an additional phenomenon, but to simplify it by interpreting it in terms of a concept which lies behind and beyond it, which, as Copernicus puts it, "Saves the phenomena." The apparent is rationalized as a function of the non-apparent. Some approaches to this method in Greek times are to be found in the mathematical mysticism of the Pythagoreans, and in the use of mathematical concepts as physical hypotheses, however crudely, in Plato's *Timaeus*. Indeed, Copernicus was doubtless greatly influenced by the *Timaeus*, the only Platonic dialogue known to the West throughout the Middle Ages. But normally Greek science attempted to make sense of the phenomena in terms of the phenomena. The atoms of Democritus are imaginatively constructed out of the data of experience. They are just very tiny little round bits of very hard matter. Similarly all the major categories of Aristotelian physics are drawn from what we may call the apparent surface of physical experience, except perhaps for the important concept of potency. But if the history of western thought and science bears witness to one great rule of rational procedure above all others it is that phenomena cannot be exhaustively interpreted in terms of phenomena. At some point the apparent must be construed in terms of the non-apparent, or the inquiry degenerates into an indefinite postponement of the conclusion. This is the essence of the hypothetical

method. Wherever modern thought forgets this rule it fails. Thus both materialism and idealism are attempts to explain away the apparent contrast between mental and material processes by reducing one to a special case of the other. But such a device does not really enable us to make sense of, "to save," the phenomena. It merely explains away the contrast by interpreting half the phenomenal field as illusion. And, if so, why not the other half? Now a theist—or even a rational pantheist like Spinoza—can make sense of this contrast without explaining it away, by interpreting it in terms of God. Matter and mind are distinct but make one creation. But that is to use the hypothetical method as I am defining it. Or consider the endless modern discussion of the mind-body problem. It is impossible to escape this phenomenal contrast by interpreting either in terms of the other. Biblical and Christian thought transcends this particular controversy by interpreting both mind and body as twin functions of spirit, a hypothetical term which does not itself appear in this particular phenomenal field at all. The methodological rule is clear and categorical. No particular field of phenomena can be interpreted in terms of itself.

But at what point in the intellectual history of the West does this basic principle of all scientific procedure first become explicit? At the Council of Nicaea. For the real issue at that Council was not whether or not to approve of Arius. The Arians were then a tiny minority. The real debate was about the legitimacy of the proposal to express the scriptural faith by means of a non-scriptural term—*homoousion*. In his story of the Council Athanasius dramatically recalls how the Arians were able to explain away every biblical term which was levelled against them. It was found that it was not possible to make sense of, "to save," the phenomena of biblical faith and Christian experience except by using a term drawn from outside the field of that experience. To save the faith the fathers were driven to the invention and justification of the hypothetical method. Latent within that one word *homoousion*—which Gibbon so grotesquely underestimated and misinterpreted—is the possibility of the Galileos, the Newtons and the Einsteins,

the quanta, the neutrons and protons and all the ponderable inapprehensibles of modern physics. The Nicene Creed contained the first outline of the intellectual shape of many things to come.

There is no point in quarrelling about words. It is, of course, possible, so to define the word "science" that to describe theology as a science would be ridiculous. For myself, I prefer a more comprehensive definition, but I should be quite content with the general statement that the logical structures of Christian theology and the natural sciences run parallel in certain important respects, if that would allay the conscientious scruples of those who are scandalized by the suggestion that theology was in fact the first modern science.

What Mr. Singer calls "attempts to rehabilitate the intellectual achievement of the Middle Ages" have suffered from the fact that they have seemed too often to be the activities of intellectual reactionaries and partisans. I do not believe that self-confessed neo-Thomists and neo-Scholastics will ever succeed by themselves in re-establishing the repute and prestige of the great mediaeval thinkers beyond all possibility of controversy and doubt. The glory of the great patristic and scholastic worthies is not that they said the last word about anything, but rather that they said the first words about so many things of which we now see the supreme interest and importance. The rehabilitation of the intellectual achievement of the Middle Ages is no proper theme for partisanship and anti-modern bias. It must come, if and when it comes, and if it comes at all, only as the great scholastics and fathers waiting in the shades would have it come, as a work of manifest justice and charity.

CONCENTRATED POWER [1]

By J. D'E. FIRTH

"We preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus as Lord; and ourselves your servants for Jesus' sake." II Corinthians iv, 5.

THERE is a problem which has already thrust itself upon the attention of thoughtful people and must increasingly demand a satisfactory solution. This is the problem of concentrated power, and how to moralize its use. Increasingly, there is a gulf yawning between the mass of ordinary citizens and the very few who, with expert technical information—a corporate governmental brain, so to speak—at their disposal, the control of vast public funds at their service, can already split the atom, will soon be able to split the personality, and are thus lords of life and of death. Gone are the days when a Boyle, a Cavendish or a Darwin could revolutionize knowledge as private gentlemen; gone are the days when a man with a fast horse and some good friends could be hid and discreetly maintain a point of view unpopular to the Government; gone are the days, or soon will be, when the last resource of the protesting individual conscience, the witness of a personal martyrdom, is still available. As recent trials on the Continent have shown, there are ways; one need say no more.

Now since this concentration of unlimited power in the hands of the few proceeds, not from the deliberate design of man, but as a result of technological advance, it must, I suggest, be taken as part of the providential order for mankind at this, and the next, stage of human history, and be faced as such. There is no going back; therefore there must be no looking

[1] A sermon preached at the Consecration of the Bishops of Peterborough, Kensington and Borneo in Westminster Abbey on November 1, 1949.

back. And it will fall to the Church of God, and especially to its leaders, the bishops, to set an example to the world of power moralized, by being used responsibly and aright.

How? Not, I feel sure, by any abnegation of power on the part of the bishops. That would, nowadays, be quite unreal. Where stringency in man-power and money is great enough, where public relations are complex enough, there, inevitably, power will find itself concentrated at the top, and relying upon expert information, and the available resources of men and money must be movable and applicable in terms of an overall plan. The sacredness of the parson's freehold, and of endowments and legacies for special purposes, and so on, can be held sacred no longer—and indeed, in any missionary diocese overseas, has already little or no meaning. There is perhaps something sad in all this; the very phrase "the parson's freehold" has overtones. The wayward, unrationalized, stubbornly individualistic tone of our inherited Church has something immensely English in it. Yet here, as elsewhere, the old moulds of our national life are visibly breaking under the pressure of events, and when the emergency is great enough, it will be seen that the bishops have now not too much power, but too little. As Bishop Gore used to say, half-humorously: "English people love to raise the bogy of the tyranny of prelates; but, in truth, only with immense difficulty can the bishops get their way against the really obstinate, if at all." No captain, no admiral, would take his ship or his fleet into action if he only had the effective disciplinary power possessed at present by the archbishops and bishops of the Church of England.

This position, I feel sure, cannot long endure. The last ten years' experience of my own small sphere of work has left me with the reasoned conviction that, increasingly, more and more things which, in former and perhaps happier days, could quite well be solved at the level of the ordinary priest or schoolmaster, now carry implications which can only be met at a higher level than this; and, therefore, that our inherited Eng-

lish set-up, our individualist and amateur way of getting things done, is now weak and inadequate. And so I would first ask this gathering now assembled here to support, with all its force, the prayer that our Fathers in God, the bishops, and those now called to this high office, may have their hands upheld, and that they may be—not weakened, not even criticized by us—but strengthened for God's service,—and for our own. For we shall have need of them, more and more. And let us not forget, in our prayers for strengthening, those called to be at the very summit of our affairs, and to appoint and guide those who direct and guide ourselves—His Majesty the King, his Prime Minister, and our Archbishop. There is a tendency, not in itself ignoble—because modest—to suppose that those called to the very highest office cannot really need our prayers. But it cannot in truth be so. Let us, then, remember them also with the prayer that they may be specially supported in their special responsibilities.

But if in the Church, as in the State, power is destined to be concentrated, how shall the bishops set to the world the example of the moralization of power? That this example shall be set is a matter of the utmost urgency. For maximized and concentrated power, if uncontrolled, if power without limit, if naked power, is, as we can already see it emerging over much of the world's surface, a frightful evil. And the appetite for power grows with feeding.

Now it cannot be shewn from history that ecclesiastics are any more exempted than anyone else from the temptations of power. Indeed, that great Christian historian, Lord Acton, the author of the famous phrase about the corrupting influence of power, included in the range of his thought ecclesiastical quite as much as civil government; no man was a severer judge of the Church than was this learned Churchman. And therefore our second prayer for those called to the episcopate must be that they may themselves be kept safe amid the manifold temptations which all power inevitably brings. This purity and integrity will itself be a notable example to the world.

And to this end, may we now consider together for a few minutes the implications of the term "Father in God," with the prayer that this time-honoured appellation of a bishop shall never be regarded as just a form of words. "Father." The very word implies an authority both real and limited—real, since the father has always been the true head of the family, the originator, support and guide of his children: limited, because responsible to God, since a father in creating a family, can but transmit what he has himself received, and responsible, also, to the inner check of love and the law of right reason, and to the general sense of the family itself. And this we see at once from the common use of language. The moment that these limits are overstepped, we at once speak of a "tyrannical father," an "unnatural father," and the like. The Gospels, written at a time when the *patria potestas* was much more authoritarian than it is now, assume that the world itself will so judge. Will a father give a stony answer to the child's request for food, will a father refuse to receive a penitent son? Our Lord could confidently assume that his audience would say "Of course not." It is, then, by being truly fathers that the bishops can best set an example in a world where, as Lenin said, the ration book can be a mighty weapon of politics, and where the slightest deviation from the official line can mean death.

The father also represents and defends his family in its public relations. And, in this connexion, I would ask for the prayers of all here present that the bishops, as the appointed guardians of Christian truth and doctrine, may be upheld as defenders of the Christian faith against the attacks of unbelief and the insinuations of doubt.

It may perhaps seem hard, almost harsh, to ask the bishops, pressed upon by the innumerable and increasing cares of administrations, and by the ineluctable needs of pastoral superintendence, also to face the necessity of intellectual leadership. With men, indeed, it is impossible; yet the necessity remains, it falls upon them, and by grace it must be borne. It

was noticed, during the recent mission in the diocese of London, that many people expressed themselves as alienated from the Church because they simply could not believe as true what they took to be the Christian answer to their questionings as to the nature of God and the universe, and the nature and destiny of man. Such perplexities, no doubt often ignorantly or confusedly put, are extremely widespread; and—as every teacher knows—they keep on and on turning up in the classroom or the Confirmation group with every fresh generation. All of us now here present have doubtless settled these obstinate difficulties in a way which seems to us satisfactory, and we may even feel impatient when the same questions and objections are put to us over and over again. But for the many, and for the young, these matters are very far from settled. And they never will be settled until, among other things, their Fathers in God speak to them with weighty arguments and with unquestioned intellectual prestige, publicly won in a fair field of open debate. The Christian faith will never recapture the allegiance of our nation until it is once more shewn to be the best, because intellectually the truest, world-view. This battle our Fathers in God must wage afresh in every generation. It is much to ask from them—but not too much to ask from the bishops of the Church of Tillotson and Butler, Westcott and Lightfoot, Creighton and Stubbs, Gore and Temple. Perhaps in our own day it is not possible yet to achieve, or even to visualize, any complete synthesis between the Christian revelation and the entire range of secular knowledge, and the problem must be split up into manageable fields of particular study. If so, you will, I trust, consider justified the fraternal loyalty, and now the filial piety, with which many of those engaged in education confidently await the work as a bishop of one who has proved himself, both as a teacher and in his published work, an expert and a master in education over the whole length and breadth of the subject, and not least in its relation to the Christian faith.

But as we know, it has not pleased God to save his people

by argumentation. And, indeed, the very mention of Bishop Gore reminds us that that great Christian "intellectual" always held the most powerful witness to the Christian faith to lie in the holy lives of the saints; and it has been said of him that his own best—though quite unselfconscious—testimony to the truth of the Gospel lay, not in his arguments on its behalf, but in the quality and tone of his life, even in his mere appearance upon the platform, the very look, the immediate impression, of a saint of God. And so the very best example which our bishops can give to the world is that of holiness of life. They are to be, not only "Fathers" to us all, but Fathers in God, and that God revealed in Jesus Christ. The term "Father," by itself, does not involve the concept of holiness; it covers the notion of authority, and of limited, reasonable, benevolent authority. But a Father in God is called to more than this; he is called to show forth virtues beyond the natural order, and perhaps, in particular, an endless patience and readiness to help, and the grace of personal humility. The great ones of this world have to be helped to remember that their title of "Minister" means in fact what the word means, and that highly placed public officials are meant to be the servants of the public. It says much for the extent to which the world has been at least partially Christianized that these titles of "Minister" and "Public Servant" are in familiar use; but it also says much for the recent de-Christianizing of the world that such names as "Duce, Führer, Dictator, Generalissimo," have recently become only too usual. It will be a fearful thing if the minister is replaced by the boss. Our bishops can set a great example to the world simply by being truly Fathers in God.

Patience, and readiness to help all men: and none need a pastoral ministry more at this time than those over whom the bishops are set in a way particularly their own—the clergy themselves. There are among us, to tell the truth, many discouraged men, for obvious reasons—and nothing for the renewal of their hope, and to revive the sense that they are

valued, could ever take the place of personal encouragement and leadership from their own bishop. As we all know well, there is no one more qualified, both by experience and understanding, to give just this kind of help, than our new Bishop of Kensington.

Humility—of this specially Christian virtue, this lovely grace, little need be said; wherever it shines forth genuinely in those called to high office, it is always recognized, even by the world, which pays tribute to that which it cannot itself promote. There is perhaps a special need and opportunity now for this grace where Englishmen go out to serve in the Far East. The old attractions, the old supports—as human nature reckons these—are now gone; no longer can the British go forth as members of an imperial race, a ruling class. They must now simply serve, and serve peoples impatient, restive, in a ferment, still needing help, yet difficult to help. We all feel sure, from our knowledge of him and of his previous work, that our new Bishop of Borneo will be found more than equal to his high task at a place and at a time where a bishop must and can stand forth simply as a man of God.

When we consider two only out of the many qualifications needed to make a true Father in God, we again see at once that "with men it is impossible." All the rest of us can at any time turn to our own bishop; we know that they must not fail us, and that they will not fail us; but to whom can they turn, for encouragement, comfort and strength? To the example of Christ, whose personal ministry was costly beyond limit, yet was never daunted or spared; to the promised power of Christ, the chief Shepherd of all the pastors of the flock.

And so let us, with our loyal prayers on their behalf and a confident hope, send forth our three brothers now to be consecrated as Fathers in God, to the high tasks which await them, and to a use of their God-given authority which shall be a blessing to his Church and an example to the world, as they "preach not themselves but Christ Jesus as Lord, and themselves the servants of all for Jesus's sake."

THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLISH CASUISTS ON BETTING AND GAMBLING

By THOMAS WOOD

I.

THE opinion has been held, and is still held by some writers, that every gaming contract, without exception, is "intrinsically evil" or "wrong in itself."[1] It has been argued that it is always immoral to decide the ownership of property, however small, by an appeal to chance; that such contracts are always prompted by some unworthy motive, most frequently avarice; and that the circumstances and consequences of gaming are always in some degree evil. An absolute condemnation of this kind is, of course, especially attractive to the zealous reformer who, having as his main concern the speedy remedying of what has become an intolerable social evil, requires an argument that is sufficiently clear and definite to make a strong and immediate popular appeal. It is obvious also how tempting such an argument must be to any serious Christian moralist, who is concerned not simply to reach speculative judgements but to influence practical affairs. To agree upon an unequivocal decision of this kind would be to provide

[1] For statements of this position among modern Anglican writers, see *Betting and Gambling*, by Canon Peter Green (1924); and *Gambling and Betting*, by R. H. Charles (1924). A searching criticism of these arguments, and full discussion of the problem can be found in: *Conscience and its Problems*, by K. E. Kirk (1927), pp. 306-319; *Gambling*, by R. C. Mortimer (1933), and the same author's essay (VI) on "Gambling" in *Personal Ethics* (Ed. K. E. Kirk, 1934).

a powerful weapon in the interests of Church discipline. That this has not been the case is, therefore, a fact worthy of notice. A close scrutiny of the strictly moral argument for the *absolute* prohibition of gambling shows it to be untenable at the bar of reason; and it stands to the credit of the long line of Christian moralists that they have repeatedly refused to sacrifice intellectual integrity for a practical expediency however pressing. Gambling has never yet been officially declared by the Church to be *in itself* an unlawful practice. For the most part, moral theologians have been content to assert that in itself it is a thing indifferent, and that (as with all indifferent actions, contractual or otherwise) it becomes sinful or remains permissible according to the nature of all the circumstances which surround it. Their evaluation of these circumstances has varied, of course, according to the laxity or rigour of their general outlook.[2]

The English casuists of the seventeenth century take their place in this tradition, and the qualified permission which they grant is all the more impressive when their general tendency towards rigour and severity is remembered. Again and again the arguments against gambling, the many ways in which it is so often abused, the evils which so frequently attend upon or follow in consequence of it, are piled up as if to lead to its absolute condemnation. And yet, in the end, such a judgement is consistently rejected. Each one agrees that though the limitations to be imposed upon gambling are so great that on almost every occasion it would be wiser to refrain, circumstances may conceivably be such that its practice would be innocent. This general unanimity, despite considerable differences of emphasis, may be illustrated by summarizing the respective contributions of Taylor, Perkins, Baxter and Ames.

[2] A useful summary of the traditional teaching on the subject is given by F. G. Belton in *Present Day Problems of Christian Morals*, cap. V. H. C. Lea's brief selection of the evidence from the time of the Apostolic Canons down to the seventeenth century is presented in a manner intended to suggest a progressive movement towards laxity—*A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences in The Latin Church* (3 Vols. 1896), Vol. I. p. 56, n. 3.

II.

Jeremy Taylor deals with the problem in answer to the explicit question: is it lawful to play at cards or dice?[3] He admits that many wise men have been so scandalized by these games that they have described them as inventions of the Devil. He also agrees that, all too often, they "are made trades of fraud and livelihood, they are accompanied so with drinking and swearing, they are so scandalous by blasphemies and quarrels, so infamous by the misspending our precious time, and the ruin of many families, they so often make wise men fools and slaves of passion, that we may say of them that use these inordinately . . . they are in an ocean of mischiefs and can hardly swim to shore without perishing." This being so, it is hardly surprising if, even in pagan times, holy men and wise commonwealths, "observing the great evil of them, and having not skill or experience enough to tell of any good that is in them, have forbidden them utterly." More particularly, one need not wonder if, in their zeal for souls, "christian and pious princes and prelates" have from time to time prohibited these games and censured Christians who have taken part in them. But, as he is quick to recognize, the crucial question is not whether these games are frequently played in evil circumstances or are productive of evil consequences, nor whether governments or other proper authorities have condemned them on prudential grounds, but whether they are in themselves lawful or unlawful; and about this he is quite clear. "Now that cards and dice are of themselves lawful I do not know any reason to doubt." He remarks that they are nowhere of themselves forbidden, and that the element of chance or risk in them, for which they are so often denounced, is a feature of all human affairs; therefore, a man "can never be suspected in any criminal sense to tempt the divine providence, who by contingent things recreates his labour, and having acquired his refreshment, hath no other end to serve." In short, if these games can be separated "from

[3] *Ductor Dubitantium*, Bk. IV. c. I. r. II. 27-39. Taylor's *Works* (Eden) Vol. X, pp. 587-601.

all the evil appendages, from the crimes and from the reproach, from the danger and from the scandal . . . they as well as other innocent recreations and divertisements may be used."

But it may be argued that the real objection to gambling is that the money transaction in a game of chance is not just an " evil appendage " but is an essential element in the contract; that is, even if all other evil circumstances and consequences were avoided, this would be sufficient to make it unlawful. To this view Taylor may at first seem to lend his support. For instance, in the second of his " Rules of Conducting our sports and recreations " which form the second part of his discourse, he declares: " he that means to make his games lawful must not play for money, but for refreshment." Again he writes: " if without the money he cannot mind his game, then the game is no divertisement, no recreation, but the money is all the sport, and therefore covetousness is all the design." Lest these statements, taken by themselves, should be misunderstood, however, two points should be emphasized. First, it must be admitted that on occasion Taylor's discussion becomes somewhat confusing, mainly because of the authorities he quotes. Secondly, it has to be remembered that he was as anxious as anyone to discourage the common practice of gambling at a time when, as it seemed to him, " nothing prevails but evil manners and evil propositions." This accounts, in part, for some of his more extreme statements, as (for example) about the lawfulness of a man keeping his winnings; it accounts, too, for his undisguised suspicion of the reasons some men give to justify their gambling. For, as we read further, it becomes clear that, in his view, the fact of there being a money transaction involved is not *in itself* sufficient to make the game unlawful. It is made so by the amount of money involved, by the covetousness which the money so often symbolizes, and by the wide door to all kinds of evil which such money transactions may open. Having remarked that " when money is at stake, either the sum is trifling or considerable," he makes the following distinction: " If trifling, it can be of no purpose unless to serve the ends of some little hospitable entertainment or love feast, *and then*

there is nothing amiss;[4] but if it be considerable, there is a wide door open to temptation, and a man cannot be indifferent to win or lose a great sum of money, though he can easily pretend it." To allow this distinction, even with reference to the most trifling instance is, in effect, to say that a gamble is not *in itself* sinful. To insist upon the second half of it, however, is also to imply that in all but a few cases it will be wiser to refrain. For most men it is, perhaps, difficult to indulge in the practice of gambling for very long without falling into covetousness, and "here indeed begins the mischief, here men begin for the money to use vile arts." It leads them to "venture their estates at it, and make their families sad and poor, because the dice turns up an unlucky chance."

As for the common excuse that a man plays for no more than he is willing to lose, Taylor remarks: "it is certain he is not to be believed: for if that sum be so indifferent to him, why is not he easy to be tempted to give such a sum to the poor?" This leads him to declare that, whenever there is such a call on a man's charity and he refuse to answer it, then he sins if he proceeds to play at cards or dice or any other games for money. Again, if it be asked whether a man may continue to play simply in order to regain the money he has lost, he replies: "I can give no direct answer, for no man can at first tell whether it be or no: but at the best it is very suspicious"; for, it means a further loss of time, still further risk of losing his money, and a sure sign that he was playing for more than he was willing to lose. In such a case, therefore, "the man had better sit down with that loss than venture a greater, and commit more sins." Similarly, when a man says that he will demonstrate his lack of covetousness by giving away all his winnings, it amounts in the end only to a "splendid nothing"; for, though covetousness may be absent, such a boast implies that a considerable amount of money is at stake, and "what kind of sport is that to bring it into my power to oblige my play-fellow with his own money? and what bounty is that by which I reward my friends and servants with another man's

[4] Italics mine.

estate?" Again, in the case where a man claims that he is gambling only in order to give his friend an opportunity to gain money which he badly needs, he remarks: "there are so many circumstances required to keep myself and him innocent, that it is a thousand times better in some cases to give him something, and in all cases to play for nothing." Probably Taylor also has in mind high stakes when he cites, with apparent approval, the severe opinions of Chrysostom and Augustine, that such gambling gains ought not to be kept: though the loser well deserves to lose them for his folly, yet they ought to be returned to him if he wish to have them or will accept them; otherwise they should be put to some pious use. His general conclusion is: "He that plays at games of fortune should put nothing to fortune's conduct but what he can perfectly subject to reason every minute . . . He that is thus even and serene may fairly play; but he that would be so, must not venture considerable portions of his estate, nor anything, the loss of which displeases him and shakes him into passion." He adds that since most young men, perhaps, cannot safely claim to be able to play in this manner, they are to be dissuaded from such games on grounds of prudence: "Young men are not to be trusted to play with such aspics."[5]

[5] Reference might be made here to an allied question raised by Taylor, and which is for some a real problem of conscience. It is sometimes asked "whether the trade of card-makers and dice-makers be lawful . . . because these things are used by the worst men, and to very vile purposes, to which these arts do minister, and therefore are reasonably suspected as guilty of a participation of the consequent crimes." His answer is worth noting, since it is one capable of more general application. He starts by making three distinctions. (1) Some things minister to sin directly, others only indirectly. (2) Some things minister to sin "inevitably and by their design and institution", others by the fault of those who abuse them. (3) Some things minister to evil and no good, others to both good and evil. He then continues: "Those things which minister to sin immediately, and by their very nature and design, and therefore minister to no good unless it be accidentally and by the virtue of something else nothing appertaining to them, are certainly unlawful; and of this there is no question." On the other hand, "if they can minister to good, if they of themselves are innocent, if they can be used without doing hurt,

III.

The nearest approach, among our casuists, to an absolute condemnation of all forms of gambling, is to be found in the opinion expressed by William Perkins, who introduces the question in his chapter on "Temperance" when discussing "What kinds of Recreations and sports, are lawful and convenient, and what be unlawful and inconvenient."[6] Games, he says, may be divided into three groups: games of wit or industry, games of hazard, and games which are a mixture of both skill and chance. Games of wit or industry are those "wherein the industry of the mind and body hath the chiefest stroke," and all games of this kind "are very commendable, and not to be disliked." Of these he mentions "Shooting in the long bow, Shooting in the Caleever, Running, Wrastling, Fencing, Musicke, the games of Chesse, and Draughts, the Philosophers game, and such like." Games of hazard are those which require no skill but are entirely dependent upon "meere chance in regard of us": "Of this kind is Dicing, and sundry games at the Tables and Cards." Rather sweepingly, he declares: "Now games that are of meere hazard, by the consent of godly Divines, are unlawfull." It is instructive to note the three reasons he gives in support of this opinion. (1) Such games are lots, and "the use of a lot is an act of religion, in which we referre unto God the determination of things of moment, that can no other way bee determined"; and, because a lot is a solemn act of religion "it may not bee applied to sporting." (2) These games are not properly recreations "but rather matter of

although they are generally abused, yet he that makes them in order only to such uses to which of themselves they can and ought to minister, partakes not of the sin of them that abuse the productions of his art and labour." So, in the particular case of making cards and dice: "it wholly depends upon this, if it be innocent, if it can be good to play at cards and dice, then the trade of making the instruments of playing is also innocent. If not, that which ministers to nothing but sin must be of the kindred of sin, and in the same condemnation." *Duc. Dub.* Bk. IV. c. I. r. II. pp. 586-7.

[6] *The Whole Treatise of The Cases of Conscience,* Bk. III. c. IV. sect. IV. qq. 2-3.

stirring up troublesome passions, as feare, sorrow, &c. and so they distemper the body and mind." (3) Covetousness is commonly the ground of them all. Games of the third kind are those "which stand partly of hazard, and partly of wit, and in which hazard begins the game, and skill gets the victory," and these include "some games at the cards and tables." He observes that it is the common opinion of learned divines that, although these games are certainly not unlawful in themselves nor to be condemned, yet they are not to be commended, and if they are used "they must be used very sparingly." There are some divines, however, who regard even these games as unlawful "and judge the very dealing of the cards to be a lot, because it is a meere casuall action." But, Perkins explains, this last opinion is one which he cannot share, arguing that in a lot there is not only a casual action but also "the applying the foresaid act, to the determination of some particular and uncertaine event," whereas in dealing cards there is certainly the casual act "but the determination of the uncertaine victorie, is not from the dealing of the cards, in mixed games, but from the wit and skill, at least from the will of the players." Nevertheless, he urges, though these mixed games are not lots, it is far safer and better to abstain from them, "because in common experience, many abuses and inconveniences attend upon them: and things unnecessarie, when they are much abused, because they are abused, they must not be used, but rather remooved, as the brazen serpent was."

In Perkins's opinion, then, games of skill are both lawful and commendable; games which depend entirely upon chance are unlawful because they are lots, "stirring up troublesome passions" and grounded in covetousness; and mixed games are lawful but not commendable because "many abuses and inconveniences attend upon them." This is, indeed, severe teaching. And yet not even Perkins is prepared to condemn outright every kind of game which can be included under the heading of "betting and gambling." He does not conceal his conviction that it is an abominable thing for a man to play with the sole purpose of winning another man's money; but, at the same time, he will allow that in certain circumstances it will be per-

missible to play for small stakes. He makes his position clear in the third of his four rules for the right use of our recreation. The end of all our recreation, he reminds us, must be that of physical and mental refreshment; and, by way of comment, he continues: "It is then an abuse of Recreation, when it is used to winne other men's money. The gaine that comes that way, is worse than usury, yea it is flat theft. For by the law, we may recover things stolne, but there is no law to recover things wonne." One could hardly speak more severely than that. But, in the end, he still finds it necessary to add: "And yet, if play be for a small matter, the losse whereof is no hurt to him that loseth it, and if it be applyed to a common good, it is lawfull; otherwise not."

IV.

Compared with the foregoing, the judgement of Richard Baxter may appear surprisingly lenient.[7] He allows that it is lawful to lay wagers "upon the credit or confidence of one anothers opinions or assertions in discourse," on condition that the wager is regarded as a penalty for rash or false assertions, and not made simply out of covetousness. The amount wagered must not be greater than can be demanded and paid without a breach of charity, and both parties must express themselves truly willing beforehand to stand to such a loss. He also allows that it is lawful to lay wagers upon horse-races, dogs, hawks and bear-baitings, if the amount willingly agreed upon is not great and can be paid without hurt, if the sport is not cruel to the animals nor endangers human life, and if it does not lead to an undue waste of time "which is the common malignity of such recreations."

Whether it is lawful to play at cards or dice for money, or to take part in any lottery, he will not say very definitely. He admits that "many learned Divines" have doubted whether such games are lawful, and that those who affirm that they are "lay down so many necessaries or conditions to prove them lawful, as I scarce ever yet saw meet together." Never-

[7] *A Christian Directory*, Pt. IV. c. XIX. Tit. 5, *Lusory Contracts*, qq. 1-6.

theless, he admits the possibility of their being lawful, in which case the same rules apply as in playing for money other games like bowls, running or shooting. These he allows when the game is not made sinful by attendant circumstances, when the wager is laid for sport and not out of covetousness, and when the amount is appropriate to the sport and no more than the loser will be willing to pay. Baxter insists, however, that if the loser should refuse to pay, he may not ordinarily be compelled to do so, for that would turn the sport into covetousness and would be a breach of charity.

V.

The most succinct and systematic treatment of the question is that given by William Ames, in a section entitled: "Of contracts by wagers, lots and gaming."[8] In each case he offers a definition of the particular contract under discussion, makes a general statement about its lawfulness in the light of the definition, and then adds a series of qualifications and limitations.

He defines a wager as "a contract, in which two contending about some truth, doe wager somewhat on both sides, from whence he shall have reward that attaines the truth, and hee punished that doth not." He affirms that, considered in itself, such a wager "is not plainely unjust." A man may "undergoe the hazard of a voluntary mulct to confirme his conjecture: and that mulct may deservedly bee required of the other, if so bee hee rashly trusts his own conjecture." Moreover, he allows that "there may also bee a reward appointed betwixt two upon mutuall consent, in some doubtfull event, that from the hope of the reward, hee, or the other may be stirred up to a laudable endeavour." But lest all this should appear to give too wide a liberty, he hastens to add that wagers become unlawful: (1) When they have an unlawful condition attached, "as if two strive betwixt themselves for this or that sinne; as who should overcome another in drinking . . ." (2) When they involve the "notorious losse" of either party, "for such danger ought not to bee undergone in that contract, which serves

[8] *De Conscientia*, Bk. 5. c. XLV.

neither to publique or private profit, and such are common wagers."

A lot he defines as "a contract, in which by the force of a foregoing agreement, lots are cast, that it may appeare, who oughte to bee Master of this or that thing." They may lawfully be used in three ways: (1) between those who have some claim to the object at stake, to decide how and among whom it shall be divided, or whether it shall be given to one only; (2) between those who had no claim to the object before, in order to decide who shall have it now, which is the commonest form of lottery; (3) as a method of determining appointments at elections. Besides being lawful in themselves, contracts of this kind are "approved in the Scriptures by divers examples. The reason is, that because everyone mutually doth expose his aequall right to the thing, or that part which hee ought to receive, to the hazard of lots, it is as it were an equall change." Yet there are many ways, which can be summed up under three heads, in which contracts of this kind can be made sinful: (1) "If any shall depend upon the stars or spirits, or fortune for the directing of the lots," because this is an expression of superstition and encourages more superstition; (2) if the intention of the lot should be an unlawful one, "or if an unlawful manner of doing it bee adjoined"; (3) if such lots are used "without some great cause, or due reverence," because "the casting of lots in its owne nature, hath a particular respect to the speciall providence of God." In this last, it will be noted, we have an echo from Perkins and a brief comment upon it.

Finally, a gaming contract is defined by Ames as one "by which the players doe agree betwixt themselves, that something shall be yeelded by the conquered to the Conquerour." It is really made up of two contracts, "of which the first is a mutuall changing both of danger, and interest for the good, either of this or the other, according to the event of the game, the second is a wager suspended either upon greater skill, industry or good hap." Once again, he affirms that such a contract is not in itself unlawful, "because such an agreement may bee in the lawfull power of the parties agreeing: it may be

ordained to a good end upon a good intention: it may bee also so used, that it shall not bring with it any violation either of religion, justice or charity." But, this otherwise large permission is severely limited by adding the phrase "an eager intention of gaine, maketh it vitious"; and, about this, Ames would have us remember four things. In the first place, the end of play is recreation and delight,which becomes impossible when play is undertaken out of a mere desire for gain, or to the notorious disadvantage of another. Secondly, it is a "prodigal rashness" for players of equal skill to risk a great sum; and, on the other hand, if there is a great disparity between the players, there is a danger lest the contract be vitiated by guile and deceit. Thirdly, man is not so absolute a lord over his own money as to be able to risk great sums without a just cause approved by the Word of God; and gaming does not constitute such a just cause. Fourthly, it is not lawful, ordinarily, to profit by another's loss, and when the *sole* intention of gaming is to profit in this way, then such gain is "a filthy lucre." The question then arises: What constitutes a lawful amount in such games? It is a question to which no very explicit answer can be given for, as Ames puts it, "that little for which it is lawfull to play, may admit some variation according to the condition of the gamesters." But, he continues, "it is certaine, that no man ought to venture more in play, than that which hath a just proportion to the end of gaming, that is, no more than a man of such a state can reasonably bestow on his recreation." As a last point, he recommends, like Perkins, that "those games which onely are by chance, or doe especially rely upon chance, are to bee removed from such contracts." He expresses this opinion on the grounds that such games involve no exercise of virtue; that in the form of a lot there is a reference to the special providence of God, and it is not good to play with holy things; and that such games occasion many sins like "grievous perturbation," cursing and blasphemy, "immoderate pertinacity in continuing to play in hope of better luck," and an unprofitable use of time and money.

VI.

Robert Sanderson offered no specific contribution to this particular subject, but a number of incidental references in his works are sufficient to indicate his attitude towards it. In concluding this essay perhaps we cannot do better than recall three of his very relevant observations.

The first may be regarded as a comment upon a point made at the outset: namely, that in a laudable desire to give straightforward teaching which might help to remedy an intolerable social evil, there is a temptation to speak of gaming contracts in language which suggests that they are wholly sinful in themselves. Sanderson alludes to this with special reference to preachers; and it is significant that he does so during a long discussion on "the different kinds, or rather degrees, of indifferent things."[9] He explains that there are some things which are equally indifferent, *indifferentia ad utrumlibet,* and some things which are unequally indifferent, *indifferentia ad unum.* Equally indifferent things "are such as, barely considered, are arbitrary either way, and hang *in aequilibrio* between good and evil . . . . as not having any notable inclination or propension unto either rather than other, as to drink fasting, to walk into the fields"—though, of course, there may be circumstances which make even these actions "accidentally evil." But unequally indifferent things "are such as, though they be neither universally good nor absolutely evil, yet, even barely considered, sway more or less rather the one way than the other." So, for example, outward actions like giving an alms, hearing a sermon or reproving an offender, are (he says) in themselves rather good than evil, and yet "some unhappy circumstance or other may make them ill." And, on the other hand, outward actions like "swearing an oath, travelling on the Sabbath-day, playing for money," though "in some cases lawful," are in themselves "rather evil than good, because they are ever evil, unless all circumstances concur to make them good." Each group of actions tends more one way than the other.

[9] *Ad Clerum,* Sermon II. 16-18.

though both "may be indifferently either good or evil, because so they may be done as to be good, and so they may be done also as to be evil." Having made these distinctions, Sanderson then continues: "Which difference well weighed . . . would serve to justify a common practice of most of us in the exercise of our ministry . . . . Ordinarily in our sermons we indefinitely condemn as evil, swearing, and gaming for money, and dancing, and recreations upon the Sabbath-day, and going to law, and retaliation of injuries, and monopolies, and raising of rents, and taking forfeitures of bonds, etc., and in our own coat non-residency, and pluralities, etc. Most of which yet, and many other of like nature, most of us do or should know to be in some cases lawful, and therefore in the number of those indifferent things which we call *indifferentia ad unum* . . . . we either do or should mean . . . that such and such things are evil as, now a days, through the corruptions of the times, most men use them."

The second observation refers to one whose conscience is in error.[10] If a man be fully persuaded that a certain action is evil and unlawful, when in fact it is permissible, then he may not do it without sin: "an erroneous conscience bindeth thus far, that a man cannot go against it and be guiltless, because his practice should then run cross to his judgment, and so the thing could not be of Faith." This would be the case of anyone fully persuaded in his own mind that gambling is intrinsically evil: "Say a man should hold it utterly unlawful, as some erroneously do, to play at cards or dice, or to lay a wager, or to cast lots in trivial matters: if it be in truth lawful to do every of those things, as I make no question but it is, so they be done with sobriety and with due circumstances, yet he that is otherwise persuaded of them cannot by reason of that persuasion do any of them without sin." Not only may he innocently abstain from these practices, since they are in no sense necessary, but he is in conscience *bound* to abstain so long as he hold the same opinion about them.

[10] *Ad Clerum*, Sermon IV. 24.

Last of all, a reminder about the duty of acting with expediency and, more particularly, of avoiding scandal so far as possible.[11] A man may recognize that gaming is not an intrinsically evil practice. He may also be convinced that a particular gaming contract is permissible. Nevertheless, if he has reason to suppose that his otherwise permissible gamble will scandalize a Christian brother, then it is his duty to refrain: "when a man doth something before another, which in itself is not evil, but indifferent, and so, according to the rule of Christian Liberty, lawful for him to do or not to do as he shall see cause, yet whereat he probably forseeth the other will take scandal, and be occasioned thereby to do evil . . . . [then] . . . . if the thing to be done be [such] that he might, without great inconvenience and prejudice to himself and any third person, leave it undone, he is bound in charity and compassion to his brother's soul, for whom Christ died, and for the avoiding of Scandal, to abridge himself in the exercise of his Christian Liberty for that time, so far as rather to suffer some inconvenience himself by the not doing of it, than by doing of it to cause his brother to offend." Not all lawful things are expedient; indeed, they may become so inexpedient that we cannot do them without sin: "the just fear of scandal may make an indifferent thing to us unlawful for the time." The expediency of things otherwise lawful is to be measured by "their usefulness unto edification," and our guides will be Discretion and Charity. The Church, he reminds us, is the house of the living God: "All Christians, members of this Church, are so many stones of the building whereof the house is made up. The bringing in of unbelievers into the Church, by converting them to the Christian faith, is as the fetching of more stones from the quarries to be laid in the building. The building itself, and that is edification, is the well and orderly joining together of Christian men, as *living stones,* in truth and love, that they may grow together, as it were, into one entire frame of building, to make up the house strong and comely for the Master's use and honour." Discretion will teach us how to evaluate aright the circumstances of time, place

[11] *The Case of Scandal*, 4; and *Ad Aulam*, Sermon XII, 18, 22-30.

and persons: "whatsoever we shall find, according to the present state of the times, places, and persons with whom we have to do, to conduce to the good either of the whole Church, or of any greater or lesser portion thereof, or but of any single member belonging thereunto, so as no prejudice, or wrong be thereby done to any other, that we may be sure is expedient for that time." Most important of all, Charity will teach us that we must bear with the weaknesses of our brethren and restrain our rightful liberty, in those cases in which we have reason to expect some good to ensue thereby. "For as the stones in a building, if they be well laid together, do give mutual strength and support one to another, so it is our duty to *bear one another's burdens,* that so we may *fulfil the law of Christ.*"

RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTIES AND DOUBTS OF THE PRESENT GENERATION

By G. T. LAPSLEY

[This paper appears to have been read at some time before the war of 1914-1918, probably at one of the annual Conferences of Dons and Schoolmasters, known as "Dons and Beaks." It therefore possesses a certain historic interest, in addition to its intrinsic merits: although, apart from the reference to Positivism, it is remarkably little "dated."

Its author, Gaillard Lapsley, who was born at New York on November 14, 1871, and died at New York on August 18, 1949, will be remembered chiefly as an authority on medieval constitutional history and as one of the outstanding teachers of his generation in the Faculty of History in the University of Cambridge. A graduate of Harvard, he established his reputation by a study of *The County Palatine of Durham* (1900), and was elected, in 1904. to a Fellowship and Lectureship at Trinity College. He adapted himself without difficulty, and indeed without effort, to this environment: Sir Shane Leslie, in *The End of a Chapter* (1916), pays a passing tribute to "Mr. Lapsley from Harvard, who put on the mantle of an English don with the autochthonous grace and ability typical of Americans placed in old English institutions." He was a master of the highly civilized art of formal entertaining; with a certain ceremoniousness and fastidiousness of manner he combined a dry academic wit, a choiceness of literary allusion, a polished geniality, and a deeply affectionate nature. His instinctive preference was for young men of the Pitt Club type, with whose social charm and cultivated manners he found himself naturally at ease: but those who suspected him of snobbery—a suspicion to which an academic society is perhaps particularly prone—knew little or nothing of the generosity with which he devoted himself to uncouth and obscure young men, often from

other and smaller Colleges, in whom he had detected intellectual abilities which, with that pastoral instinct which is the hall-mark of the true academic teacher, he set himself deliberately to foster and to mature. From 1919 to 1929 he was one of the four Tutors of Trinity, and discharged that office with conspicuous success. In 1931 the University, in recognition of his services to academic scholarship, created for him a Readership in Constitutional History, which he held until his retirement in 1937. His lectures were, quite literally, a model of their kind. As Dr. Pickthorn has written (in *The Times,* August 27, 1949): "He was, perhaps uniquely, skilled at helping young men to see in historical studies the immense complication and infinite subtlety of each event without ever losing hold of the simplicities which are the only permanence humanity lives and works by."

All this will long be remembered by those who came under his influence as a teacher, a mentor, or a friend. But what is more likely to be forgotten, and therefore needs to be put on record, is his decisive impact upon the religious life of the University at a very critical phase of its development. As the Dean of Winchester has written: when Lapsley arrived in Cambridge in 1904, "Agnosticism was fashionable among the younger Dons, who carried on an active propaganda in the undergraduate world; and Lapsley quickly became the centre of a group of younger men who believed that it could be met and defeated by an intelligent presentation of Christianity. One of the earlier moves in the conflict was the foundation of the Cambridge Church Society in 1906, which quickly came to have branches in every College, and had a membership three or four years later of over 600." A large proportion of the members of its Committee became Fellows of Colleges, including A. C. Turner of Trinity, Will Spens (now Master of Corpus), E. G. Selwyn (now Dean of Winchester), J. W. Reynolds of Sidney Sussex, Francis Clark of Magdalene, and T. Knox-Shaw (now Master of Sidney Sussex). It was essentially an undergraduate movement, and a great accession of strength came to it through the memorable Hulsean Lectures given by Dr. J. N. Figgis (subsequently of the Community of the Resurrection, Mirfield) in 1908-9, afterwards published as *The Gospel and Human Needs*: "but," writes Dr. Selwyn, "it could not have prospered as it did without the help and guidance of senior men: and none among those played a larger part than Lapsley. His advice was always available, and always sound." The University was impressed against its will by so striking a combination of great social and intellectual gifts with a strong faith and a robust Churchmanship: and this address, which was found among his papers after his death, and has since come into my possession by the kindness of his literary executors, may serve as a

memorial of the service rendered to the revival of Christian belief and practice in the University of his adoption by Gaillard Lapsley in his prime.

CHARLES SMYTH]

PROBABLY the reasons and excuses which people allege for repudiating the theological views in which they were instructed, and rejecting the rule of conduct in which they were educated, are as numerous and varied as the social classes and material conditions which form the environment of the men and women who take this step. A generalization which professed at the same time to explain the religious apathy of a Nevada cowboy, and to account for an Oxford undergraduate's conversion to Positivism, would meet with a cold reception from intelligent men. We can only speak of what we know, however small our knowledge may be, and in such a meeting as this I fancy that the interests of all of us are confined to a single class, almost to a single type of the present generation. Some of us certainly—I can speak for myself at least—can speak of the question of religious difficulties and doubts only as it relates to the young man who comes up to the university from some public school or other. There is, indeed, range and variety enough in the subject even so limited, to make generalization a dangerous business. But I take my risks with open eyes, comforting myself with the reflection that if my mistakes are very bad they will serve all the better to provoke and promote a lively discussion. The suggestion that I shall make is, after all, only tentative ; it must be for you to decide what possible value it may have.

It seems not unlikely that all the young men who come up to the university may for our purposes be roughly divided into two unequal classes. The first, and generally the most numerous of these, may be qualified as inveterate traditionalists, men who have conformed to some type of Christianity, who do conform and who mean to persist in conformity. Among all the varieties that mark men of this class, ranging from a simple, unquestioning faith to a blank indifference, there is this common trait—they do not experience either doubts or difficulties. They may feel that such things are impious, or uninteresting, or bad form, but in any case they do not admit them. Men of this class, then, although they offer many important and difficult problems to those interested in the religious life of a university, stand outside the scope of this discussion. Our attention is accordingly fastened upon the young man who, for whatever reason, is beginning with an aroused intelligence to take account of himself in his environment, and to try to frame some synthesis of his

experience. He will commonly, almost inevitably indeed, have to face and endeavour to solve, or at least to re-state, the problem of doubt in connexion with religion. Now although this problem may be stated in almost as many ways as there are individuals, I suspect that for young men of the sort and in the environment that we have suggested, it is really, at bottom, one. To make this clear, it is desirable first to form some notion of what a young man's religion may really be.

We may understand by "religion", I suppose, a disposition of the whole being, expressing itself in conduct rather than influencing conduct. Certainly it must be a condition rather than a matter of theory or choice, and can scarcely be said to depend upon, or even perhaps to have a very vital relation to, any definite opinions or philosophical propositions that may be formulated about it. Christians would doubtless go further than this, and regard religion as the sum of inner, or non-material, experience, which is suffused with, and made coherent and intelligible by, the consciousness of a personal relation with the Deity —a life which in its higher and perhaps rarer forms is parallel with a man's experience in the world of phenomena. Now it may be gravely doubted—it may even perhaps be denied—that the average young man of the type under discussion has any religion of this sort at all. He has, however, a number of qualities which constitute the elements out of which such a religion may be constructed by the wise use of the means humanly and divinely provided for that purpose. Of these we may briefly remind ourselves. Nearly every young man has a great, but often unsuspected, capacity for affection; it is a quality indeed which he has learned to conceal, to be afraid, to be even perhaps ashamed of; but I do not think that anyone can doubt its existence, nor that of a strong answering sense of responsibility for the affection which others have given him. I do not mean mere recognition or barren gratitude, still less any personal demonstration, but rather a deep if inarticulate sense of fellowship, of dependence and protection, some dim knowledge of love as the daily bread of life. Then again, with the eager spirit of wonder that is the very note of youth, there is a true and natural sense of reverence, an impulse to worship which continually seeks an object worthy of its devotion. However much this has been confounded with credulity and superstition, it is still, I am persuaded, fundamentally different from them. Then apart from these more personal and intimate qualities—for I do not speak of the natural decency and self-respect which are so general that the absence of them may almost be regarded as disease—one finds in most young men what may fairly be called a sense of duty. Perhaps it might be

better described as a well-learned lesson of obedience, but in many cases it seems to me a natural, if not always a prevailing, will to do what is right, just because it is right, and not for fear of consequences. Side by side with this, and often co-operating with it, is that mysterious quality of selection which we call taste, whether it be inherent or acquired. In some cases, of course, this is no more than conformity to some ill-understood social standard, but more frequently it is a personal quality that responds, and even contributes, to that standard. Along with these qualities, now opposing or confounding their expression in conduct, now stimulating and enjoying it, and always of course at once the motive power and the conscious realization of that expression, are the strong physical life and the restless intelligence. Surely it is possible that these elements should be harmonized and adjusted to one another, that these qualities should be fused and moulded into a true religious life. No doubt the young man must first be trained to submit himself to an external and possibly repugnant discipline. But the ultimate goal will be the free contented choice which results from some union with the Divine Will, some small but loving comprehension of the Divine purpose. To say that the young men who come up to the university have little or no comprehension of this ideal is not really, as it certainly is not intended to be, any reflection on the training which they have received at school; it is rather a re-statement of my original proposition, that their religious life is still all to make, that they have still to connect the religious experience of a predominantly emotional sort, which frequently appears at adolescence, with the development of the intellectual powers in general and the faculty of reasoning in particular, which may be expected to occur in the new and stimulating atmosphere of the university. The process is a difficult and a delicate one, and its difficulty is increased by the fact that these young men have too often neglected or misunderstood the teaching they have received. In many cases they have never questioned the forms in which Christianity has been imparted to them, and have never accordingly really modified or developed the very simple traditional notions which were given them as children.

Let me illustrate this with a few specific points. The problem of the inspiration of the Bible is one which often occasions difficulty and misunderstanding. I do not mean, of course, that the superstition of literal inspiration is prevalent, or even present at all. It is rather the question of how and in what sense the Bible can be regarded as the Word of God; of what, in view of the much discussed destructive criticism, might be the possibility, the nature and the method, of inspiration. Although the

problem is often stated in this way, it consists, I believe, fundamentally, not in the doubt or denial of the possibility of inspiration but rather in a confusion of historical and religious facts. It is, in reality, a failure to grasp the deep relation of poetry and religion, the profound value of what has been happily called "the effort to interpret and to use the materials of experience for moral ends, and to measure the value of reality by its relation to the ideal".

Then again, I suspect that many young men are tormented with the dilemma of orthodoxy and heresy, and tend to regard the propositions and categorical statements of dogma contained in the Creeds, the Articles, the Catechism, and expanded in whatever theological instruction they may have received, as absolute criteria of their thinking. Thus, when the inevitable collision occurs, they are likely to condemn their thinking or their theology, according as they are by temperament courageous or submissive. Many of them, indeed, grope towards the distinction between the truth which is the object of knowledge, and the shifting provisional representations of that knowledge which every age must formulate for itself and adjust to its own needs. But not many, as far as I have been able to observe, get much beyond the blind sense of resentment that a traditional theology should have somehow become their master instead of their helper.

Difficulties of the same order, but in certain cases of a more serious character, occur as a result of misconceptions of the Church and the Sacraments. The crude statement of the dilemma which I have come across in this connexion is, either the Church must have authority, or else it can have, as Church, no reason for existence, and if it has authority it is likely sooner or later to impose upon its members teachings to which their reason forbids them to assent. More serious, perhaps, than this rather crude misconception is the standard of conduct which is often attempted to be imposed upon young men. I venture to believe that as far as a certain sort of moral teaching goes the Church is holding up to young men an ideal that is at once unattainable and undesirable. I think of this particularly in connexion with the systems of preparation for Holy Communion that are frequently enjoined or recommended. The standard proposed is often one which it would be difficult to approach in a monastic community. The consequences of its application to the daily life of a young and vigorous man in a modern university are deplorable. I do not suggest any relaxation of moral discipline, but rather a change of emphasis, a greater insistence upon the notion of sin as an eclipse, an alienation from God rather than an act, and upon the Sacrament of the Altar as very literally a means of grace. Perhaps

my meaning will be a little clearer if I remind you of the methods of preparation for the Holy Communion proposed in some of the current devotional manuals. One in particular which is, I believe, very widely used, presents two systems of self-examination, the one by means of the Ten Commandments, and the other of the Seven Deadly Sins. These consist in a series of questions with regard to specific acts of omission and commission forming a minute analysis of various kinds of human weakness and various possibilities of sin. The penitent is invited to review his life day by day from the time of his last confession and communion, and to charge himself with the guilt of as many of the sinful acts enumerated as his conscience may suggest. The consequences of the application of such a questionnaire to a young man's daily life are obvious enough, and it is likely that a similar condition of humiliation and despair is produced by other means; for example, the somewhat emotional proceedings that result in conviction of sin and sudden conversion. I would not give the impression of condemning either of these methods out of hand; clearly it is good for a man to take account of his own life, and to stand abashed and humiliated at his own shortcomings. But surely it is not good that a young man of the sort we are discussing should be invited, week by week, to consider himself morally the basest of creatures, and warned that if he is unable to do so with conviction, he had better take no part in the corporate act which is at once the highest form of prayer and the readiest approach to God. In many cases he will be unable to take this view with conviction, and after repeated effort and relapse he will come to abandon the whole system, and much else too which he conceives to stand or fall by it, as impracticable and impossible.

Now I do not mean to say, of course, that the inferences with regard to the Bible, traditional theology, the Church and the Sacraments and the nature of sin, which many young men make from the religious teaching which they have received, are either necessary or unwarrantable. The point is that a great many young men, as I believe, do make them, and find themselves accordingly confronted with difficulties of a very serious character. They are alienated from the Christian dogma, because they cannot believe what it is not perhaps necessary or even desirable that they should believe; they are cut off from the fellowship of the Church because they imagine that to continue in that fellowship would amount to forfeiting or restricting their intellectual freedom; and finally they are denied the help and support of the Sacrament of the Altar because they cannot square their natural, decent, daily life, with an artificial and undesirable model. With

all this their true religious life is starved. The experience of the environment and the comparatively great liberty of the university often tends to increase the difficulty in which a young man finds himself, by bringing out what may well seem to him an irreconcilable contradiction between religion and ordinary secular life. It is at this moment, very likely, that he is suddenly exposed to a new set of influences, which, whether indifferent or actually hostile, play with equally destructive force, not so much upon his rudimentary religious life as upon the set of opinions and the mass of tradition which he has somehow come to identify as his religion. The effect of certain direct external stimuli of intellectual life and of certain other influences, social as well as intellectual, which are none the less important because their action is less direct, is naturally and very properly unsettling. Religious doubts arising in this fashion may be regarded as evil weeds which must be uprooted at all costs, or as tokens of an intellectual awakening and expansion in the mind of the man who entertains them, according as you are concerned with preserving in him the traditional form of Christianity, or promoting in him the personal knowledge of God, the vigorous religious life which will lead to a wise and understanding use of traditional forms and symbols. If philosophical doubt, however crude, be treated as a religious instead of a theological question, the doubter is in danger of being led to a position in which he will be forced to stake everything upon the outcome of a dialectical process. He may perhaps think himself under the necessity of abandoning the substance as well as the form of beliefs in which he has been brought up, and to which he is still attached, in order to satisfy the imperious demands of his reason. He may also find, perhaps when it is too late, that he has satisfied his reason at the expense of the wider and higher demand of his understanding. I think that among the cleverer young men in the university this danger is very real and very great. I do not mean that by reading or hearing philosophy they are moved to abandon Christianity, and that therefore they should be warned off philosophy, or at most be provided with a special form of it; the remedy, indeed, would seem to be not less but more philosophy. The danger lies in another quarter. In the first place, if the Christianity which a young man has learned is to be a real and vital thing, it must be appropriated and assimilated by some process of personal reinterpretation. Such a process would act upon the symbolism and poetry by which Christianity is imparted, giving to them a new reality based upon experience. But this process of breaking the chrysalis is a delicate and painful one, and the immediate result (not necessarily the final one) will be to a great extent

conditioned by environment. If, now, a young man just beginning this re-interpretation for himself, or perhaps even just beginning to feel the need of it, finds Christianity attacked in some of the familiar ways, he knows not how to reply or to avoid the difficulty. Certainly he will perceive that the appeal to authority will not avail him, or, if he tries it, he will soon finds its insufficiency. Then, once the exquisite mechanism of dialectic is set in motion, he is dazzled and captivated and led in many cases (not unnaturally, to be sure) implicitly to look on this method as a master rather than a servant. Other impulses contribute to produce this result:—the sheer pleasure of the thing itself, "the mad pride of intellectuality" as it has well been named; the spirit of adventure; the excitement of witnessing the application of a brilliant and destructive criticism to things which he has come to regard as in their nature superior to criticism, or at least immune from it. Finally, there is in certain cases the impulse, partly of vanity and partly of admiring imitation, which moves certain young men to abandon Christianity as a notice that they are emancipated and ranged among the intellectuals. But the man who is not prepared to take this step for any of these motives, and yet feels something of the force of all of them—what of him? He may, and in some small number of cases he does, suspend judgement and resolve to see the struggle through. With further reading, further reflection, such men will often make their readjustments for themselves, and eventually realize that what began in apparently fatal and destructive doubt has ended in providing them with a new and wonderfully efficient instrument for the interpretation of religious experience. But these cases are rare, and, so far as I have been able to observe, the young man who has reached this stage, baffled and distressed, turns to one of two courses. In many cases he will have censured himself for a lack of faith, and, without any very clear understanding of the nature of faith and its relation to reason, will endeavour to force himself to persist in as much of the old belief, held in the old way, as he can manage. Sometimes this produces indifference, sometimes emotional evangelicalism. The other course is the search for authority, or rather for certainty, for in such cases as have come under my notice there has been no impulse toward blind submission, or any crude form of intellectual suicide, but rather a hope crystallizing into a conviction that certainty ought to be, and is to be, found outside oneself. This pursuit, of course, leads some men to one wing of the Anglican Church, and others straight to the Roman fold. But, in all these cases which I have put, the outcome is sometimes, of course, a complete abandonment of what seems to be an impossible

position, and a frank acceptance of that form of agnosticism which turns from the whole question with a kind of contented relief.

I have been speaking thus far of those who come under the influence of metaphysical discussion and speculation, and experience difficulties occasioned by destructive criticism of traditional theology. But there is another class of men with minds perhaps of a more concrete turn, whose self-questionings are at first provoked by the obvious impossibility of squaring many professedly historical parts of the Bible with the conclusions of modern science. This very crude beginning leads them on along paths that are familiar, no doubt, to most of us. Difficulties arise in connexion with the nature miracles of the New Testament, the doctrines of the Virgin Birth, the Ascension, and the Resurrection of the Body. Here at the outset, at least, the dilemma seems to consist in the choice between what I understand to be an obsolete form of materialism and some kind of external certainty secured and asserted by a constituted ecclesiastical authority. Here, again, the difficulty would seem to be theological rather than religious. I gather also that materialism, or at all events such a form of materialism as is represented by Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*, is neither very prevalent nor very popular.

Well, I fear that you may accuse me of having gone a very long way around to arrive at a very simple conclusion. I believe that the efforts to resolve the doubts and difficulties of the present generation have been addressed to the wrong quarter; that the attempt has been to defend the outworks instead of strengthening and fortifying the citadel. If it be true, and I am persuaded that it is true, that the average young man with whom we have to deal has no religion in the true sense of the word, but only a great capacity for religion, surely all efforts ought to be directed toward developing and realizing that capacity. The work of maintaining and defending traditional theology against the attacks of philosophy and science, or, to put it more properly, of defining and determining the relations of the three, is important and necessary, but I cannot believe that it is the best way of meeting the doubts and difficulties which beset so many young men. I suggested at the outset that, widely varying and multiform as were the problems which arise out of these doubts, they still had a certain unity. That unity consists, I believe, in an oblivion to, or at most an imperfect realization of, personal religion, the inner life, which requires satisfaction and interpretation, but cannot content itself with theories or propositions unverified by experience. I do not mean to suggest that we should lightly abandon

traditional theology, or let go any good thing that can still be applied to an useful end ; but rather that we should employ what we have as a means, and be on our guard against even the appearance of esteeming it an end.

May I, in conclusion, venture to make one or two suggestions? If we are to be of use to young men in their difficulties and anxieties, we must make ourselves intelligible to them. I sometimes suspect that we are, by them, arranged in two general classes—those who go to church, and therefore differ only from the clergy in believing everything we hear there, although we are not professionally bound to do so; and those who never go to church, and accordingly believe nothing at all. The classification, if it really be made, is simple but not inexplicable. I suspect that many of us have a certain timidity in formulating our own views to younger men, and even in helping them to formulate theirs to us. We feel perhaps a kind of anxious sense that we may be going too fast, giving strong meat where milk would be the proper food. But surely we have nothing to gain and everything to lose by a caution so ill-timed, and we cannot better promote the cause of Him whom we serve than by helping those who doubt to know how truly light His yoke is.

THE PRAYER-BOOK IN THE WELSH CHURCH [1]

By THE DEAN OF CHICHESTER

BRETHREN, we are assembled here to-day to thank God for the great gift of the Book of Common Prayer to the people of this island; and—let us remember—through the people of this island a precious vehicle of worship has been passed on to men of many different races from the Arctic to the Southern Cross, from Vancouver to Singapore and Tokyo. The Book of Common Prayer has been translated into 147 languages.

Let us, first, thank God for his guiding hand in the creation and in the preservation of the Book of Common Prayer since its inception in 1549, through the stormy period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, till its moment of settled rest in 1662. The vicissitudes through which it passed are symbolized by the names of the Monarchs, Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, James I, Charles I, The Lord Protector, Charles II. The picture thus conjured before our eyes bears the marks of strife. Twice it seemed as though the Prayer-book was altogether lost; in the Papal triumph of Queen Mary's reign; and again, during the Puritan ascendancy of the Commonwealth. In the gracious Providence of God, the Book of Common Prayer survived the storms of political rancour and theological obloquy. In the end it became one of the most valued possessions of the British people, and "to (the Prayer Book)," wrote Professor A. F. Pollard in 1902, "the Anglican Church owes

[1] A sermon preached before the Governing Body of the Church in Wales, at the celebration of the 400th anniversary of the Prayer-book, at Llandrindod Wells on September 28, 1949.

the hold she retains on the English people . . . Amid the fierce contentions of the Churches it gave the Church of England unity, strength, and a way to the hearts of men such as no other Church could boast."

We must recognize though that the imposition of the Prayer-book in the reign of Edward VI was a high-handed act, needlessly affronting the religious sentiment of large numbers of Englishmen. But we must recognize also that from the time of Elizabeth to that of Charles II a change took place. The Prayer-book, just because it was attacked by Papist and by Puritan, gathered round it an increasing body of loyalty and indeed affection, an affection deepened by the rare capacity that it possesses for building up a strong religious outlook founded on the Faith of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

Let us consider certain vital principles that are embodied in the Prayer-book.

(1) The worship is to be corporate worship. During the later Middle Ages, there had grown up an almost complete severance between the worship of the priest at the altar and the people in the nave. The priest was saying the appointed service of the Church, but in a foreign tongue and largely inaudible, while the people were occupying themselves with private devotions, almost wholly unrelated to the liturgy.

Though the words "Common Prayer" on the title page refer specially to Mattins, Evensong and Litany, none the less they do express the ideal of the whole book. Priest and people are to join together in a common worship, a corporate act. In the Prayer-book, the people are to answer the responses, to join in the psalms, and to say the Confession, Creed and *Gloria in Excelsis* with the priest.

When the rebels from Devon and Cornwall demanded the Mass in Latin as before, Cranmer said: "When the priest desireth anything of God for you, or giveth thanks for you, how can you in your heart confirm his sayings when you know not a word of what he says."

(2) It followed that if it was to be Common Prayer, intelligible corporate worship, the liturgy must be in the vernacular, the vulgar tongue. Common Prayer must be in the common language of the people. When the Prayer-book was first made, English had already become a literary language for 150 years. It is not the least of the glories of the Prayer-book that it has done so much to stabilize an English style of great vigour, suppleness, dignity and beauty. By its constant use, it has preserved a standard familiar alike to the learned and the unlearned. In proportion as the Prayer-book fails to be familiar, the degradation of English speech, of which there are so many signs, will increase—just for lack of a well-known touchstone.

At this point it is worth noting what a remarkable change is taking place in the Roman Catholic Church. After 400 years, the wheel has come full circle; the use of the vernacular is being increasingly demanded for religious reasons.

Listen to what Mr. Donald Attwater writes in his pamphlet *In the Beginning was the Word*: "The English language is necessary for the religious welfare of the Catholics in this country . . . The requirements of prayer and praise are not met if we do not know what we are praying for, or what we are singing; the nature of instruction is wanting if we cannot understand (often cannot even hear) the word of God that is being read for our learning . . . Catholics generally do not know and cannot sing *Te Deum, Magnificat, Nunc Dimittis, Veni Sancte Spiritus*—many of them not even the *Credo*."

Another Roman Catholic writer, a convert from Anglicanism—speaks with extreme sadness of the loss of the canticles and psalms in English. "The Book of Common Prayer," he writes, "is missal and breviary in one. It expresses profoundest contrition without hysteria, adoration without cloying sentiment, intense pathos without whining, spiritual gladness without excess . . . I prophesy that its influence in the future will be even more far-reaching than in the past." Similar thoughts about the evangelistic need of worship in the vernacular could be multiplied from Roman Catholic writers in France and Germany.

(3) The Prayer-book is immersed in Scripture. At Mattins and Evensong there are the lessons and the psalms; at Holy Communion the Epistles and Gospels. Thus the people, as the Preface to the Prayer-book says, "continually profit more and more in the knowledge of God, and be the more inflamed with the love of his true religion."

But the Scriptural character of the Prayer-book goes much beyond the readings from Scripture. The language of the prayers bears a cast of thought utterly derived from the Bible. Thus the service of the sanctuary is anchored to the theology of Revelation and the supremacy of Almighty God. The importance of this safeguard of orthodoxy cannot be over-estimated to-day. Some years ago an article appeared in *The Spectator* by Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, the great American religious teacher, who belongs to the Calvinist tradition. In this article he expressed his admiration for the Prayer-book as a bulwark of true religion in an unsettled age. The Prayer-book, he said, is dominated by the conception of God's almighty Power and prevenient Grace.

I am bound in honesty to add that Dr. Niebuhr could not withhold his astonishment, when he found that the clergy who used this book, when they mounted the pulpit, spoke of nothing but human effort.

Here is a reflection on which we may well seriously meditate when we are giving thanks for God's gift of the Book of Common Prayer. It may be that in the Church of Wales things are better in this respect. One who lives in England must confess that so far as the Church of England is concerned, there is much evidence to support Dr. Niebuhr's experience.

Let us turn our thoughts again to the importance of the use of the vernacular, the mother-tongue, in the liturgy of the Church.

In the sixteenth century a new challenge confronted the Church all over Europe. Nations had sprung into self-conscious existence. With the development of the nations, the languages of the nations achieved new vigour and importance.

Everywhere the language of the people was ousting Latin as the vehicle of national thought and culture. In England, authors like Wycliffe, Reginald Pecock, Chaucer and Sir Thomas More, were moulding the English speech into a literary language. The demand that men should hear in their own tongues the wonderful works of God swept across Europe. The religious revival in Germany and France gave a special impetus to the desire for the worship of God in the mother tongue. The invention of printing opened the use of books of devotion in the vernacular to the laity.

The religious world of Europe became divided between those who put first unity of worship and those who cared more for the edification of the faithful and a form of worship common to priest and people.

In Britain, the national consciousness of an island race, aware of its new wealth and potential power, was particularly ebullient. The choice of the vernacular as the vehicle of worship was made by those in authority with firm decision. The note of liberation rings loud in the preface to the First Prayer Book of King Edward VI: "Whereas St. Paul would have such language spoken to the people in the Church as they might understand and have profit by hearing the same; the service in this Church of England these many years hath been read in Latin to the people, which they understand not; so that they have heard with their ears only, and their heart, spirit and mind have not been edified thereby."

We cannot but be thankful that this change was made, when we remember how, in course of time, worship in the vernacular established in the heart of the people of Britain a profound sense of the holiness and the love of God that gave to the English character its best elements.

But in all honesty we must recognize that the ruthlessness with which it was imposed, and the entanglement with political intrigue which accompanied the introduction of the vulgar tongue left deep wounds in the soul of the people.

The change was by no means welcomed in the West and in

the North. The mass of the people were illiterate. A book they could not read seemed a poor substitute for a religion that had depended on moving ceremonies and dramatic action for the expression of their faith.

The logic of Cranmer's answer to the rebels from the West who demanded the retention of Latin, must have seemed to him unanswerable. "The Greeks have the Mass in the Greek tongue, the Syrians in the Syry tongue, the Armenians in their tongue and the Indians in their own tongue."

But in Cornwall, where men knew no English, but spoke still their ancient Celtic language, the argument fell on deaf ears. We may be sure it was the same in Wales, where the Welsh language, extending as it did into Herefordshire and Shropshire, was the language of a wide-spreading Cymru. To them the imposition of the Saxon tongue must have been one more mark of an alien and arrogant oppressor.

Fortunately for the Welsh people, there were men of evangelical zeal who were determined to bring their countrymen the truths of the Faith and the mysteries of worship in their own language. Long before the sixteenth century, some of the noblest passages of Christian worship, the great first chapter of St. John's Gospel, the Gospel of the Annunciation, the Passion Gospels, and many others, had been translated into the Welsh tongue for private devotion. A Welsh ecclesiastical language was already in being.

All Welshmen must remember with special veneration the book known as *Yn y Llyvyr Hwn*, in which, in 1546, Sir John Price gave his people a primer in print which enabled Welshmen to know the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Seven Sacraments and the virtues and vices, in their own tongue.

William Salesbury is an even greater name in the history of modern Welsh Christianity. It was he who urged his countrymen to beseech the King's Majesty and his Council that a translation of Scripture should be made "for the sake of those among you who are neither able nor ever likely to be able, to learn English." It was the same William Salesbury who

already in 1551 produced a Welsh version of just those parts of the Bible most necessary for public worship—the Epistles and Gospels for the Sundays and Holy Days throughout the year. He dedicated his book to the Welsh dioceses, and, significantly, included the Bishop of Hereford in their number.

It was a moment of great crisis in Welsh spiritual history. Rome and Canterbury were striving for the religious allegiance of the Welsh people. (In passing we need not withhold a word of admiration for those devoted Welshmen of the Roman obedience who supplied religious instruction in the Welsh language in the way they thought best for their fellow-countrymen.)

The year that stands out with supreme significance for our commemoration to-day is the year 1567. It was in that year that the Book of Common Prayer appeared for the first time in the Welsh language. There are certain circumstances connected with it which it is worth while to recall.

(1) The impetus was given in 1563 by an Act of Parliament requiring the translation of the Bible and Prayer-book in the Welsh tongue, because "owing to their ignorance of the English tongue the more and greater number of all her Majesty's most loving and obedient subjects . . . do remain in the like or *rather more* darkness than they were in the time of Papistry." A significant statement.

May I here quote the words of a Welsh scholar from whom I personally have learnt much? "I do not think that we have really appreciated the importance and the significance of this Act of Parliament. The tendency of the aristocracy of the Tudor period was to support the English language; and it is evident that it was the result of this Act that to a great extent withstood this tendency . . . It is not too much to say that it was the Welsh Prayer-book which kept the Welsh language alive at this time." (T. E. Jenkins).

(2) The Bishops of Hereford, St. Davids, St. Asaph, Bangor and Llandaff were made responsible. Of these five, Story and Kitchin were Englishmen who knew no Welsh.

This, too, is symptomatic of an indifference to national needs, which in later times did untold harm to the Welsh Church.

(3) The immense work was ordered to be completed in three years and in a language which still had no established literary form.

(4) No financial help was given by a Parliament overwhelmingly English, which cheerfully voted 1,000 marks for the translation of the English Bible. All honour, then, to the printer, Humphrey Foy, a native of Carmarthen, who bore the entire expense himself.

(5) But our chief veneration and gratitude is due to the devoted men who, by unstinted labour, accomplished so colossal a task. It was the work of two friends, near neighbours in North Wales. Of one we have already spoken, the pioneer, William Salesbury, of Llansanan. But the principal worker was that noble and devoted man, Richard Davies, firstly Bishop of St. Asaph and subsequently Bishop of St. Davids. He gathered round him at Abergwili a group of workers which included William Salesbury and Thomas Huet, the Precentor of St. Davids.

In the end, the Welsh Prayer-book was entirely the work of Bishop Richard Davies. It is to him that our deepest gratitude and admiration go out to-day.

It may be that in some place in Wales there exists a worthy memorial of this great man. I do not know. But if there is not, would it not be a fitting climax to our commemoration that in some Welsh cathedral a statue should be erected, or a window set up, in honour of this Welshman, a devoted shepherd of the flock, who, by God's grace, endowed the Welsh Church and the Welsh people with so great a gift ?

On such a day another reflection arises naturally in the mind. I myself, alas, through separation from the land of my fathers, the land I have always loved, know too little of the history of our Welsh Church. But one thing I notice. When I read books written in modern times about Wales, the writer too often appears to have little knowledge of—and sometimes as little sympathy with—the history of the Apostolic Church of

the Principality. I am convinced that if scholars were to dig deep into that history, they would find much to stimulate faith in her mission, an affectionate admiration for her labours and sufferings, and a patriotic devotion to a rich element in the national heritage.

Is there not here a task to appeal vividly to the enthusiasm of Welsh-speaking scholars of the Welsh Church ? It is a work which, properly organized, might draw in a large number of the younger clergy. Would it not be good that some acknowledged scholar, thoroughly proficient in the Welsh tongue—this is essential—and imbued with a true understanding of and love for the Apostolic Church should be appointed by authority to map out and supervise a plan of research and to gather round him a willing band of workers?

I hope the suggestion, coming from one who belongs to another province of *Ecclesia Anglicana,* may not be regarded as impertinent.

The Welsh Church must always be bi-lingual. That is demanded by the love of souls and the pastoral needs of the Church. But the objective consideration of the history of the Welsh Church must compel one reflection. Throughout its history there has been a dangerous, and sometimes disastrous, tendency to allow the needs of those who use and love the language of the Cymru to be sacrificed to the demands of those who looked first to England and employed the English speech. There are influences at work of an economic kind which might reinforce this tendency. But there is something in the soul of the Welsh people greater than economics, something that longs to maintain the language which is so closely interwoven with their soul. One who comes among you as an outsider, but not, I hope, a stranger, cannot but be struck by the vigour and vivacity of this passion to preserve the Cymric speech. If we are to fulfil our task as stewards of a great inheritance, and the watchmen and messengers of the Lord, must we not employ every possible means to see that the doctrines of the Faith and the mysteries of worship find their fittest expression in each of

the languages of the Welsh people ? It is the love of souls and the mission we have received from our Lord Jesus Christ that lays this task upon us.

We have a great treasure in the Book of Common Prayer, a mighty gift of God. Let us show our thankfulness by an even more loving, more reverent, and more enthusiastic use of it, whether it be in the Welsh or in the English tongue.

BELIEF IN BEINGS SUPERHUMAN AND INHUMAN[1]

By H. A. BLAIR

It is only in recent days that Christianity has become a Creed which can be regarded with indifference. It has in the past been well hated: its Founder knew that it would be. It has been used as a means for other ends by moralists, kings and politicians. It has served as a foundation for every kind of Cloud Cuckoo land, in the systems of Gnostics, mystics and philosophers. But it is now in a fair way to becoming just an ethical system: its supernatural sanctions have become secondary to the Good Life, or are ignored: its life-giving myth and ritual are regarded by the ordinary good living man as just pardonable escapism.

A very significant logion from Oxyrhyncus tells us that Christians must learn to wonder before they can reign or rest. Christ's command to become as little children is in keeping with this logion. But the rationalizing tendency of the last two centuries and more has run completely counter to this.

With the advance of scientific knowledge, the half-educated have ceased to wonder. The real scientist still wonders: but the dilettante talks of entropy and electrons and alpha-particles (and other Abracadabras of popular scientific literature), and he no longer finds the Universe surprising.

A world whose make-up yields to the formulas of the laboratory, and a Universe whose motions can be expressed within the deceptive simplicity of advanced algebra, need no

[1] An extract from a study of this belief in the Fathers, from the close of the Apostolic Age until the Council of Nicea.

principalities or powers: indeed they hardly seem to the tyro to need a God at all.

But in fact Science does not touch, it does not pretend to touch, the problem of power and its origin. Sir James Jeans has to resort to "The Finger of God" as the original force which stirred the perfect balance of the Universe.

The difference between what men know to-day and what they knew two thousand years ago is still infinitesimal, compared with the difference between what we know to-day and what there is to know. There is, in fact, no rational ground for the world's abandonment of the childlike outlook. There is no adequate reason for scrapping the beliefs and speculations of earlier days—beliefs which were fully accepted by hard-headed scientists and philosophers up to the time of the Renaissance.

In those earlier days, supernatural power was an accepted phenomenon, and it fell into two categories, good or evil—in magical terms, white or black—in religious terms, God's power or the Devil's. To-day the categories are different: power is divided into Personal or Impersonal power—Material or Spiritual. The belief that all power is ultimately personal is condemned as Animism.

Instead of standing firmly by the supernatural, the Church in our country has shifted her ground. She has been too ready to accept the extreme immanentist position. She has watered down her Gospel, until in it, too, there is little to wonder at. The Incarnation of Pan is no great subject for amazement; indeed to a greater or lesser extent it is a matter of daily occurrence: many of the miracles are miracles no longer, and the rest can well be explained away. Most power is controllable by man, and therefore (it is argued) Impersonal and Material. What has not been put under control and labelled as yet soon will be. What has been labelled needs no further discussion. The problem to-day is how to reconcile religion with life, instead of how to understand life through religion.

The Fathers of the first three centuries believed in power

exercised through superhuman and inhuman beings, working for God or against him. Their power categories were in different terms: not personal or impersonal, but in terms of black or white, good or evil, for God or against. Their objection to animists, magicians, and idolaters, was not that they worshipped or made use of beings who existed but should not be worshipped: not that their fear of the supernatural was wrong, but that if they would only accept the Gospel, it was unnecessary.

Apart from the Gospel, there might well be reason for fear: there was much of truth in the animist's belief: there might even be occult methods of control, but they were neither right, nor ultimately effective.

In the ordinary human sphere, it is our experience that God uses agents to accomplish his purposes. It is not unreasonable to suppose that that is his usual method in the supernatural world as well as in the natural world.

If therefore we find that the teaching of the early Church was unanimous in accepting the existence of principalities and powers, both of good and evil, and their interference in human affairs, we shall be justified in being quite uncompromising about their place in the Christian Gospel: we should be wrong to ignore the favourable powers: and we should be foolish to shut our eyes to the dangers of unseen enemies.

The surviving works of the Fathers of the first three centuries shew that the early Church was unanimous in accepting the existence of beings both superhuman and inhuman. It is for us to assess the value of their belief, to examine its coherence, and to enquire to what extent the belief was of the essence of the Gospel. Only by doing so can we estimate the loss which Christian doctrine has suffered.

Sir J. G. Frazer has written in *The Golden Bough*:

> For ages the army of spirits, once so near, has been receding farther and farther from us, banished by the magic wand of Science from hearth and home, from ruined cell and ivy-mantled tower, from haunted glade and lonely mere, from the riven cloud that

belches forth the lightning, and from those fairer clouds that pillow the silver moon, or fret with flakes of burning red the golden eve.

It is true enough: and had Science been the only Gospel, the world might have tolerated the leaden touch of its magic wand: the loss in terrors of the night might have compensated us for the flight of the fauns and dryads, the elves and fairies; though experience does not bear out the trust in scientific armour, as proof against supernatural fear: the coldly scientific eye can yet be made to quail at the approach of presences which refuse to conform to scientific categories. But it was not until the armour of the Christian faith had mitigated the danger from the demonic world, that Science stepped in and declared that armour unnecessary and the dark demonic powers non-existent.

It has been the claim of every religion that to some men at least is granted an insight into reality quite independent of the ordinary five senses. Christianity is no exception. It is of the essence of our belief that whilst many prophets and seers have been granted a relative insight into reality, in Jesus Christ alone was there an insight which was absolute, combined with a gift for interpretation into human terms of that insight limited only by the boundaries of human reason and perception.

By word and action, Jesus Christ left behind him a double revelation of reality divine and human. The revelation of Godhead was complete in the sense that it included the fullness of God in relation to man. The revelation of manhood was complete in every sense: man as revealed was a kind of amphibian creature, living normally in a lower and less important element, but only able to survive (like the whale) by means of life-giving draughts of an element more rarefied. Man does not live by bread alone.

His visits to this higher atmosphere, whilst necessary to survival, are dangerous: for he is there exposed to attack from enemies. But enemies or no enemies, there is no avoiding those dangerous visits; and there are friends as well as enemies to be found in that upper air. It is well that men should

know the one from the other. And it was surely one of the most important objects of the revelation of Jesus Christ to give men the wisdom which should enable them to distinguish friend from enemy.

In the matter of the world around him, man was fitted in due course to find out all that he needed to know. Jesus was not primarily concerned with that. An astronomer only concerns himself with terrestrial geography and geology in so far as they affect his theme: but when he speaks of the stars and space, he is to be taken seriously. What Christ has told us about the world beyond us cannot, I believe, be lightly set aside as teaching diluted to suit the understanding of his hearers.

Either the Christian myth is true or false. There can be no halfway-house. If it is true, it is all true. And if it is all true, it includes a world of super-human and inhuman personalities around us all the time—of angels and devils—for our Lord's teaching about them was specific and uncompromising. He spoke of them as continually interested in us and our doings, the angels constructively, and the devils destructively.

(References are Mark i, 13 and Matt: iv, 11 (after the temptations—an account which can have emanated from no one but our Lord himself): Matt: xiii, 36-42, 47-49 (the parables of the tares and the drag-net): Matt: xviii, 10 (Guardian angels over children): Mark xiii, 32 (the limitation of angelic knowledge about the Last Day): Mark viii, 38, and Luke xii, 8-9 (angels as witnesses of judgement): Matt: xxiv, 31 (angels as actual agents of judgement): Matt: xxvi, 53 (angels as prepared to intervene if called upon): Mark, xii, 25 (modes of existence amongst the angels in heaven): Luke xvi, 22 (angels as tending the souls of the dead): Luke xv, 10 (joy amongst angels over a repentant sinner): Matt: xxv, 41 ("aeonian fire" prepared for the devil and his angels): Matt: xiii, 38 ("sons of the evil one," used in interpretation of the tares, in a context which demands either a predestinarian significance, or a significance which can only refer to devils, unchangeably evil and interested in ruining the "sons of the kingdom"): Mark v, 2-20 (the man with the "legion"): Matt: xii, 43, and Luke xi, 24 (teaching about the ways of demons exorcised without faith in God, and therefore liable to return with companions): Mark iii, 22, and parallels (teaching about the unity of the powers of evil, and Satan's undivided kingdom): Matt: iv, 1-11, and Luke iv, 1-13 (the tempta-

tions): Matt: xvi, 23 (the rebuke of Satan in Peter): various passages in John (vi, 70; viii, 44, 49 in particular, which speak of the Devil as very much a person; and xii, 31; xiv, 30; xvi, 11, which use the term "the prince of this world.")

It is not the purpose of this article to prolong discussion about the teaching of Jesus about angels and devils: but it is necessary by way of an introduction to shew that what the early fathers of the first three centuries accepted and assumed as part of the Gospel, was neither a lapse from the teaching of their Master, nor a pleasant but childish folly permitted by him, which we have now outgrown. It needs a conscientious reading, one after another, of the pertinent passages, especially those quoted above, to see the full cumulative force of the teaching presented by the evangelists as that of our Lord about these strange assistants and interrupters of human life.

There are four possible explanations of that teaching. One is that the evangelists misrepresented our Lord. If so, there seems to have been a curious unanimity in their misrepresentation: for even the limited references quoted above come from Mark, "Q," the special Matthaean source, probably two special Lukan sources, and the Fourth Gospel.

A second explanation is that our Lord knew that angels and devils did not exist as personal agents; but that he accepted the conventional language of his day, and personalized good and evil tendencies; that in this way he achieved a vividness in his teaching which it would otherwise have lacked; that he "talked down" to his hearers, just as a grown-up tells fairy tales to a child. But even an averagely good parent qualifies his fairy tales with an atmosphere of make-believe, if he does not believe in fairies. It seems quite incredible that on a subject of such importance our Lord should have allowed his hearers to believe something which he knew was not objectively true. It seems even more incredible that he should have added the weight of his own teaching to fables. Nor is it easy to see what could have been gained by doing so. If a child asks questions about ghosts, there are few grown-ups who do not wish they could positively and conscientiously say, "There

are no such things," (there are some, indeed, in the happy position of being able to say so with a good conscience). But our Lord was apparently not able to do so, and even adumbrated the importance and the danger of such presences. A Christ who could use non-existent angels as an encouragement, and non-existent devils as bogies to frighten men into virtue, would not be the Christ whom we acknowledge as the revelation of a God of Love.

A third explanation is that he talked in the language of his times, not knowing that these beings did not really exist. That is to assume that his insight into reality, as that of the prophets, was limited. Whilst it can easily be believed that a lack of scientific and astronomical and even of historical knowledge was compatible with God-become-Man, and was a part of the kenosis; it is not so easy to see how he can have been mistaken about spiritual things. And if so, how far is his insight to be trusted in greater matters? Is the Comforter, after all, not to be regarded as a Person? Is perhaps, even the Father himself merely power immanent and impersonal ? Where is the line to be drawn? That way (for believing Christians) madness lies.

The fourth explanation is that Jesus Christ was right. Angels and demons do exist. They are spectators, and far from disinterested spectators, of the doings of men: in fact they often take a hand themselves: and half the folly and indifference of men is due to their failure to take the Gospel warnings seriously.

We shall in fact see that Christians of the first three centuries unanimously believed in superhuman beings of light, and inhuman beings of darkness: and that their views were not vague and shadowy, but authoritative and dogmatic. These men included Greek philosophers of the calibre of those men who jeered at St. Paul for his belief in the Resurrection: they included hard-headed lawyers, travellers, scholars, courtiers, and business men. What they preached at their level of culture, there is no reason that we should not believe and preach at ours.

But we must go further than this. There is positive reason

why we should believe and preach such a gospel. Many accusations were levelled at religion in our Lord's day, but I cannot recollect that anyone ever accused it of dullness, though the hollow ceremonial of the Sadducees and the formal ceremonial of official Caesar worship might have deserved the accusation. Certainly Christianity could never have been called dull or cold, until the Medusa head of State recognition began the slow process of turning it to stone.

The glamour and terror of the Holy was as much a part of the Christian gospel as of any of the mystery religions. The fear and attraction of the unearthly gripped even Christ's own disciples in many of their contacts with him. The wrong sort of fear was only mastered through the security of the gospel: the right sort of glamour remained.

Outside the Church there is every reason for the wrong sort of fear to-day: but it is no longer realized, for the Devil has become simply an "evil imagination"—a subject for well-bred self-control, but not an object of fear. So men have lost their sense of need, and without it "Salvation" is a meaningless term. Heaven has descended: the City of God has come down to earth: above its golden gates (now slightly tarnished, for like ourselves it has left the gold standard) is written the word *security*: and the word now means everything except freedom from ghostly fear. It promises solid comfort, but all the glamour has left it.

The search for God was once a treasure hunt—a search for the greatest quarry which man has ever hunted, and in mixed company too. Until we, as a Church, have recaptured this atmosphere we can never recapture that elusive creature —the ordinary man. Might it not be that our night horrors are all too well justified and that our visions of angels are not just mental processes? If so it is surely of first importance to bring back a lost world and shew that its foundations are deep in the earliest records of the Church.

CONTEMPORARY BACKGROUND.

(*a*) *The Atheists.*

Together with the cynics, the sceptics, and some of the Epicureans, Christians of the pre-Nicene days were labelled Atheoi. It has sometimes been a matter for wonder that Christians were so well hated during these centuries. Pliny suggests and all the Apologists claim that their behaviour, except in the matter of ceremonial observance, was unexceptionable: their loyalty to the State did not apparently suffer: their love for each other—a real thing in those early times—was not accompanied by vindictive feelings towards non-Christians.

They had, however, committed three unpardonable sins, each of which aroused the hatred of a different section of the community. They were a secret society with flesh and blood devouring ceremonies, which annoyed the Government. They mixed up God and Man, which no philosopher could tolerate. They had abolished the companionable Daemon-Gods, who had evolved from the Keres (and who were now so good for trade): and (more frightful doctrine than any of the sceptical philosophers had dared to proclaim) they not only abolished them as Gods, but reversed the genial course of their divine evolution, and turned them back into Keres of the most horrible and Hecatean type.

The first of their sins has no bearing upon our subject, except as perhaps a comment in passing upon early Christian acceptance of the Eucharistic elements as something more than mere symbols.

(*b*) *The Link Between God and Man.*

The repugnance of philosophers and educated men to any mingling of human and divine is clear from several passages of Plutarch and Apuleius. "*Ceux qui ne croient pas aux démons, ou bien suppriment tout commerce et tout contact entre les dieux et les hommes, en supprimant cette race d'interprètes et de serviteurs de la divinité, ou bien nous forcent de tout mélanger et de tout bouleverser en faisant descendre les dieux jusqu'à nos*

passions et à nos affaires." (B. Latzarus: *Les idées religieuses de Plutarque;* quoting J. A. Hild, *Etude sur les démons dans le littérature et la religion des Grecs*). Or as Apuleius says, (*de Deo Socratis*), "*Nullus deus miscetur hominibus: sed hoc praecipuum eorum sublimitatis specimen est, quod nulla attrectatione nostra contaminantur.*" For the Gods of Plato "*ab humana contagione procul discretos, plurimi, sed non rite, venerantur: omnes, sed inscie, metuunt; pauci, sed impie, diffitentur . . . quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque auctor est, solutum ab omnibus nexibus patiendi aliquid gerendive, nulla vice ad alicujus rei mutua obstrictum, cur ego nunc dicere exordiar.*"

At all costs Greek philosophy, in its main stream, was determined to maintain the divine Transcendence. It was at the same time intolerable to them, as to the Jews, that there should be no link between human and divine. In the centuries around the beginning of the Christian era, there had taken place what Gilbert Murray has called "The Failure of Nerve." "It is," he says, "a rise of asceticism, of mysticism, in a sense, of pessimism; a loss of self-confidence, of hope in this life and of faith in normal human effort; a despair of patient inquiry, a cry for infallible revelation; an indifference to the welfare of the State, a conversion of the soul to God. It is an atmosphere in which the aim of the good man is not so much to live justly . . . but rather, by means of a burning faith, by contempt of the world and its standards, by ecstacy, suffering, and martyrdom, to be granted pardon for his unspeakable unworthiness, his immeasurable sins."[2] A purely ethical humanism, supported only by abstract philosophical conceptions of the divine, was no more permanently endurable in Hellenistic times than it was in the eighteenth century in England, or than it is to-day. It was no more capable of dealing with the *vitium originis* of humankind than was the lofty idealism which inspired men like Dr. Gilbert Murray himself between 1918 and 1939. What he would and did call a failure of nerve, we

[2] *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, ch. iv., p. 155.

as Christians might justly call the restoration of a sense of balance; the resurgence of the sense of need of God.

A transcendent God is a satisfactory philosophical principle but deplorably unsatisfactory for religious needs, unless there is some kind of link between him and mankind. The religious soul asks, with Apuleius, "*Nullus, inquis, Deus humanis rebus intervenit. Cui igitur preces allegabo? Cui vota nuncupabo? Cui victimam caedam?*" And the usual answer of that age was, "To the Gods, through the Daemons their ambassadors." As Latzarus said, "*Par l'introduction de cet élément dans l'échelle des êtres, la perfection et la sérénité divines sont donc sauvegardées.*"

The Jewish answer had been a different one. It did not safeguard the divine inactivity and impassibility, to the Greek mind. Nor did it link God with men satisfactorily enough to be popular with the ordinary religious rank and file. For whilst the orthodox Jew maintained his own view of divine Transcendence, Yahweh remained a God who had chosen, a God who was about to send a Messiah, a God who had already become in a limited sense Incarnate in the Torah.

That this view was found philosophically unsatisfactory is indicated by the conception of Wisdom, which in its highest development was held to be an actual divine hypostasis. "She is the agent of Creation, the artificer of all things. It is she who brings man into contact with God . . ." (*Hebrew Religion*. Oesterley & Robinson. p.372.) And it was this conception that Philo took and harmonized with the Logos of Greek philosophy, though it is not quite clear how far Philo's Logos was really personal. The conception was philosophically sound: ". . . it is in Philo that we have the confluence of the two great streams of thought, Hellenic[3] and Jewish; and in a very real sense both find, not only their union, but also their highest point in him." (*ibid*: p.373.)

[3] I have corrected an obvious misprint, and have read "Hellenic" for "Hebrew."

But though this hypostatization of the divine Word, the divine Reason (Nous, in Greek philosophy), or the divine Wisdom, might satisfy the philosophers, it still fell short as a true religious link between man and God for the ordinary worshipper. Philo himself felt this, and in his commentary on Genesis vi, 1-4, he protests against the story being regarded as a myth: he demands the acceptance of intermediate beings whom "Moses calls angels," who are in fact no other than souls, as of men but never embodied. They are "about the business of the Creator," they are "worthy ambassadors from men to God and from God to men, sacred and inviolate by reason of the blameless and perfect beauty of their service."[4] That the Jews themselves felt the need of some further link is shewn by their angelology and demonology, which increased in inverse ratio to their sense of God's nearness. The more transcendent Yahweh became, the more popular became books such as the first book of Enoch. One might say that at the time of our Lord, the pendulum was about vertical between Deistic philosophy and superstition in the Greek world, and between extreme Transcendentalism and Theosophical speculation in the Jewish world.

Greek philosophers for the most part had made no serious attempt to get rid of the conception of daemons as intermediaries between God and men. Daemons were the inheritance of the "People of the Land": and when the Olympians conquered, the daemons of the day were the Chthonians—"Blameless" to their own folk, but feared and propitiated perhaps more than the very Olympians themselves by their conquerors. Some remained amongst the Chthonians, but others under a decent veil of convention usurped the garb, the figures, and the very names of Olympians, reserving as marks of identification their own peculiar epithets, and something of the apotropaic in their ritual and worship. Those who became and remained Chthonian became also accepted as evil, perhaps because their rites could only be celebrated (in the early days

[4] Philo. Commentary *ad loc.* (I 206).

of the Achaean conquest) in secret and at night. But whether they sank from being daemons to the level of demons, or rose again in Olympian disguise to the level of Gods, they were of ancient stock and not lightly to be tampered with; for they represented the essential underlying truth of myth, a truth not merely subjective but conforming in some measure to the pattern of things, the truth of a dream which displays before the dreamer things carefully concealed in waking life.

As such the philosophers for the most part accepted them: and following their master Plato, they admitted that the links between a personal and transcendental Intelligence, and lesser personal intelligences, must in themselves be personal. Time after time, it seemed that one or other of the philosophic systems was on the verge of a rejection of any divinity less than the supreme God himself: time after time they seemed ready to accept what was the message of the Classical Age, that God was God, and man was man whose highest ideal must be Sophrosyne: time after time they seemed ready to proclaim that direct or indirect contact between them was no more than the faint fugitive dream of medicine-men and mystery-mongers: time after time men like Posidonius amongst the Stoics turned back from the paths of Sophrosyne to the paths of mysticism. It might be splendid and magnificent for man to climb proudly if wearily towards a transcendent God in Pelagian self-sufficiency; but it was and always has been impossible. Man leans on the divine; and if the divine be so high and unattainable that he can give no support, he must at least have messengers: for men found it a melancholy but indisputable fact, that there were darker powers which, without divine support, he must fear.

(*c*) *Plato.*

It was indeed Plato (who traditionally derived this and many other things from Pythagoras) who was the father of philosophic belief in daemons. In the Symposium (202E) he makes Eros the interpreter and ferryman between Gods and Men:

"What then is Love?" I asked, "Is he mortal?"

"No" (answered Diotima).

"What then?"

"As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two."

"What is he then, Diotima?"

"He is a great spirit (daemon), and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal."

"And what," I said, "is his power?"

"He interprets," she replied, "between Gods and men, conveying to the Gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the Gods; he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and in him all is bound together." (Jowett's translation).

Again, in the well-known passage in the Apology (40A), the inner voice which prompted Socrates was accepted as something more objective than the voice of conscience. Even without accepting the doubtful words "ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου", the gloss, if it is a gloss, in itself testifies to the way in which the words were read and understood in very early times: indeed, both Plutarch and Apuleius testify to the acceptance of Socrates' "oracle" as the voice of his own particular daemon or (in Christian terms) guardian angel.

Such a conception is compatible with the end of the vision of Er, in which he sees the souls who are about to re-enter life choosing their lots. They are finally sent before Lachesis, "who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of their choice" (Rep: X, 620E, Jowett). This conception is worked out in the greatest detail in the Timaeus: "We should consider that God gave the sovereign part of the human soul to be the divinity of each one, being that part which dwells at the extremity of the body, and inasmuch as we are a plant not of an earthly but of a heavenly growth, raises us from earth to our kindred which is in heaven" (Tim: 90A, Jowett). Earlier in the Timaeus, he makes it clear that this kindred spirit of each human being is his star, a living being of fire which the mind at its best could reach. These daemon-stars have their own heavenly activities, the

planets having the function of marking out time, whilst the fixed stars ("*ζῶα θεῖα ὄντα καί ἀίδια*") though always turning unchangeably upon themselves, are yet living, self-conscious, and self-controlled beings. Inferior powers are to be accepted, though to account for their origin is beyond us, except by quoting the myths(*περὶ δέ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν καὶ γνῶναι τὴν γένεσιν μεῖζον ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς*).

The Creator then addresses his creatures, and explains to them that their immortality is conditional upon his will, though it is not his purpose that they shall die. To those who are entering life, he assigns each one his own star: and he gives the duty of fashioning their mortal bodies to the "younger gods," who are to care for them, and avert from them all evils except such as are self-inflicted.

(*d*) *Plutarch.*

There is a subtle difference between the guardian daemon as conceived by Plato, and as later reproduced by Plutarch (de Genio Socratis, 22). Plato places the daemon within man, itself an extension of its heavenly counterpart and endeavouring to maintain contact with it. Plutarch places the daemon outside man, whilst man carries within him the mirror in which the image of the divine counterpart is reflected. But for Plato and Plutarch alike, the daemon was the link between man and God; and all achievement that was worthwhile was achieved through the mediating daemons.

Plutarch refused with emphasis to accept later rationalizings of the daemons and Gods, of which the most famous were "the impostures of Euhemerus the Messenian"; who suggested that the traditional Gods were no more than "old world rulers and benefactors of mankind, who had by their own insistence or the gratitude of their subjects, been transferred to the ranks of heaven" (Gilbert Murray, *op.cit.* p.194). "It is better," says Plutarch ("on Isis and Osiris," 360 D,E), "to be as those who consider the tales of Typhon and Osiris and Isis to be records of the experiences neither of Gods nor men, but of great daemons, which was the view of

Plato, Pythagoras, Xenocrates, and Chrysippus. For they followed the ancient thinkers and said that they (daemons) were more powerful than men and far surpassing us in natural force, yet not unmixedly divine nor uncontaminated with matter: they contained in fact an affinity to men in the nature of their soul and in bodily sensation, and they felt both pleasure and weariness and as many other things as . . . . disturb us."

In the *De defectu oraculorum,* Plutarch runs through various explanations of daemonic activities, shewing how they become involved in humankind, incarnate in men and animals, and materialized in trees. He quotes Hesiod's division of beings into *primum Deos, mox Daemonas multos et bonos, deinde Heroas: postremo homines, unde mutationem ducere videtur, aurei quidem generis in Daemonas multos bonosque, semideis in Heroum partem secretis"* (Adrianus Turnebus transl: Paris 1556: p.10a, 1.29—p.10b, 1.4). Transitions may be from men to heroes, from heroes to daemons, and even (for those *virtutis ope, longa temporis diuturnitate prorsus expurgati*) from daemons to Gods. Similarly, through incontinence and baseness, there may be a return to mortality for daemons and demi-gods. He quotes, apparently with approval, Hesiod's theory of cycles of time, which daemons fulfil enclosed in forms of men, animals or trees (*ibid*: 415C). He mentions nymphs coeval with trees, quoting from Pindar: and from Hesiod again nymphs embodied in water and mist. The daemons are good and bad, joyful and sad, triumphant and darkly avenging: for their natures differ as the natures of human beings. But wherever there is contact between God and men, it is through daemons, that is the good ones. They are the channel between God and men, and must be tended with sacrifices, with prayers and petitions. The others, if in any sense messengers of God, are only used to vindicate wrong done. They may be avengers dispatched by God, but they may also be malignant on their own account; they are therefore tended with apotropaic rites and ceremonies of aversion: and in his essay on Isis and Osiris, he quotes

Xenocrates "who," he says, "thinks that those days which are Unspeakable, and festivals whose celebrations include beating or mourning or words of ill omen or abuse, do not belong to the celebrations of the Gods or Good Daemons; but that there are in the atmosphere Beings great and strong, but dangerous and sullen, who delight in such things, and when they come across them are diverted by them from anything worse."

He quotes Empedocles as saying that daemons are subject to punishment for their errors and offences "until such time as, chastised and purged, they return to their own order and place." Indeed, it would sometimes seem that their position amongst the world of human beings is in some way part of their punishment, and indicates a certain disorder and lack of balance in their make-up: for in the *De defectu Oraculorum* he approves of the analogy of the triangles to describe the status of Gods, daemons, and men—the Gods being the equilateral triangle, daemons the isosceles, and men the wholly irregular triangle, completely at odds with itself.

Plutarch may be said to represent enlightened Greek religion and philosophy of the beginning of the second century. His defence of the Gods, the mythology, and the oracles of his country was no die-hard Conservatism, but a genuine attempt to reconcile real religion, wherever he saw it, with the religion in which he had been brought up, and which he believed to be the best expression of the religious impulse in man. His school of philosophy in Rome was extremely popular, and could not have been (to judge from his writings) in any sense rigidly exclusive of foreign religious influence. Miss Harrison comments on his acceptance of the famine-driving ceremony at Chaeronea as religious (Epil: to Gk. religion, p.5): he regarded it as a sacrifice, and not as a purely magical ceremony. She remarks also on his friendship with Clea, the priestess of Isis. We are safe in saying, therefore, that what Plutarch taught was what religious men of his time believed, and what orthodox philosophy of his time was willing to accept.

His daemonology may be summed up under four categories:

(1) The daemons are indispensable to his system of thought (a) as mediators, through whom men can gain contact with the divine, and by whom man can eventually become God; (b) as a barrier, establishing God's transcendence, and preventing the "bouleversement" involved in supposing God to be active and passible; (c) as messengers and oracles of God to man (v. *de Pythiae Oraculis, passim*).

(2) On the whole daemons are not important for their adverse activities: but if they have sunk to the level of Keres (evil influences), it is well for men to take precautionary apotropaic action.

(3) Daemons are superhuman, but they are fallible, and are of all grades of goodness between man and God: their malice is used by God vindictively, to fulfil the laws of divine justice, and is turned to good in that way. Keres are in a different category and are subhuman influences.

(4) His beliefs are based on Plato's philosophy, and modified by a wide knowledge of Egyptian and other cults.

(*e*) *Apuleius.*

Plato had also explained, that as men could be uplifted by their daemons, so their daemons could be earth-bound by the bodily indulgence of the men they guided: they were interpenetrated with corporeal desires and habits: they had lost the knack of thinking in terms of the spiritual: all discipline was gone. "The soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always; and is in love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form . . . do you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed?"

"'That is impossible,' he replied.

"She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual

association and constant care of the body have wrought into her nature."

"'Very true.'"

"And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty and earthy, and is that element of sight by which such a soul is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below—prowling about tombs and sepulchres . . . the souls not of the good, but of the evil, who are compelled to wander about such places in payment of the penalty of their former way of life . . ."

So daemons became demons, until finally they were imprisoned in lower bodies. But meanwhile the door was opened to a philosophy of demonology, to a study of the occult. On the authority of the Father of nearly all the various schools of philosophy, it could be claimed that daemons were not only superhuman but subhuman: and men of culture and intelligence, such as Apuleius, followers of Plato and his successors, spoke with pride of their adventures into magic, black as well as white (*vide* his Apology, *passim*).

From the theological point of view the inquiry into the affairs of the daemon-world was a matter of importance in Apuleius' day: for the Gods were out of fashion, and it had to be shewn that they were not only poetically attractive, but also philosophically sound. Plato had accepted them as daemons, and had left a loophole through which they might become earthbound: on their way to mortality they lost caste and became demons. But before they had sunk as low as that, they were our link with God. They had bodies of a sort, too heavy for Heaven, but not heavy enough for the regions of Darkness: "*Habeant igitur haec Daemonum corpora et modicum ponderis, ne ad superna incedant; et aliquid levitatis, ne ad inferna praecipitentur,*" (*De Deo Socratis,* 8.): "*Fila corporum possident rara, et splendida, et tenuia . . . hinc est illa Minerva Homerica . . .*" (*ibid*: 10). They mingled freely with human concerns; they loved and hated; they helped and

persecuted; they pitied, grew indignant, were hurt, were joyful: they rose and fell with human beings on the waves of this troublesome world (*"Ex hoc ferme Daemonum numero poetae solent, haudquaquam procul a veritate, osores et amatores quorundam hominum Deos fingere, hos evehere et secundare, illos adversari et affligere: igitur et misereri, et indignari, et angi, et laetari, omnemque humani animi faciem pati, ac simili motu cordis ac salo mentis per omnes cogitationum aestus fluctuare."*).

Beings of this kind required reverence and tendance. Lesser beings of the daemon order were on their way to an incarnation, or even a materialization in natural objects, in trees, in streams. On their way there, they might be used: once incarnate or imprisoned in matter they might be controlled by those who knew their formulae of release: hence spells, incantations, and the invocation of strange mathematical names. In the practice of such art there was nothing derogatory: if it were practised efficiently and for a good purpose, it was no more than the use of evil powers, enemies of men, to help men: there was something creditable in the control which a man, learned in the occult, could exercise over them. Apuleius' defence of himself is less a defence than an opportunity: and so far from disclaiming the powers of which he was accused, his defence is a general discussion of black and white magic, a lecture on the use of herbs, the invocation of the names of deities, an exposition of the medical arts of his time. Daemons as such are not introduced at all. Had he tampered with them he might have been on ground less sure. But his speech is an indication of what he felt sure cultured Romans believed and would accept. In it, as in the *Golden Ass,* spells, unctions, witchcraft, charms, and metamorphoses take the leading parts.

There must have been many men with views such as those held by Apuleius, men who, whilst paying homage to the traditional philosophic schools, yet took a backward step into the world of magic and the occult. Apuleius was an educated Roman African, and, like educated Christian Africans of to-

day, saw no reason for banishing magic because he had found religion. His views may be summarized in the same four categories as those of Plutarch:

(1) Daemons had (a) a theoretical importance as mediators between God and man, (b) a more significant practical importance as "*Energeiai*" to be magically used by the initiated.

(2) Their adverse activities were many, and could only be averted by magic.

(3) Superhuman beings of various grades existed and inhabited the air: but the beings most important to man were inhuman, and scarcely personal.

(4) As a philosopher he followed Plato: religiously, he drew from all available superstitions.

Apuleius was a sign not so much of his time, as of a stage on the journey from philosophy which has taken the wrong turning. The right destination was religion of a high and thoughtful type, a type which we shall see in the followers of Hermes Trismegistos. But much Hellenistic belief and practice had made magic the inevitable destination for those who preferred astrology to astronomy, rigmaroles to formulae, mascots to mathematics. From Babylon and the East came the cult of the Seven Planets, which with their spheres and their Gods who guide them (as even Aristotle admitted—Diels, 450—quoted by Murray, *op.cit.* p.173) became identified with the elements of the Kosmos, the Stoicheia. "It is significant that in Hellenistic theology the word Stoicheion, element, gets to mean a daemon—as Megethos, greatness, means an angel. But behold a mystery! The word Stoicheia, *elementa,* had long been used for the Greek A B C, and in particular for the seven vowels $\alpha\ \varepsilon\ \eta\ \iota\ o\ \upsilon\ \omega$. That is no chance, no mere coincidence. The vowels are the mystic signs of the Planets; they have control over the Planets. Hence strange prayers and magic formulae innumerable." (Gilbert Murray, *op.cit.* p.175).

For upon the planets much may hang: indeed, it was quite clear from the ancient and reputable lore of the Chaldaeans that everything hung upon them: this lore was avail-

able to interested Greeks in the translation of the "Eye of Bel" by Berossos the Chaldaean: the planets were the interpreters of the divine *Ennoia*: prophecies were made from their risings and settings and colours. Above them were the Twelve Masters, signs of the Zodiac; or the Thirty-Six Decani: below them were the Thirty Gods of Counsel (days of the month). The planets were the Kosmokrators, the Administrators of Heimarmene "beneath the Moon": Heimarmene, Destiny, becomes fixed—and the stars smile maliciously at the helpless efforts of men.

So the stars, the pure and divine beings of Plato, became evil powers, especially Saturn their chief. Man's greatest hope became the knowledge and supernatural foresight by which he might outwit destiny: by charms, rigmaroles, and formulae not of science but of magic, the votary seeks to pass through the planetary spheres to God—not by the help of the star-daemons, but in spite of them. Meanwhile in all his earthly life, man must be set upon foiling the *Energeiai* put forth by the Kosmokrators, the evil influence of the material world, who are no more or less than Keres : and this, again, is to be achieved by Apuleian machinery of the Occult.

(*f*) *The People of the Land.*

From this point, back to the old-fashioned religion of the people of the land is no far cry. For those people still had their effect on the atmosphere of contemporary thought. But to them the Chthonians, the Keres, the little people, were not what they were to the upper classes and the educated: they were indeed spirits to be fed and satisfied, but not at all necessarily hostile spirits. They were rather in the category of the hero-gods of Classical Greece: they were beings who took the side of the conquered against the conquerors: they were spirits who might blight the farms of the invaders, but to their own people they were, in part at least, fertility givers. The Ker was a microbe, a carrier of disease, to newcomers; but amongst her own folk, semi-immune through long use, her diseases were less dreaded and less severe.

In the festivals characteristic of "People of the Land," in most parts of the world, the spirits are invoked, fed, and then dismissed: but it is a mistake to suppose that the only object of the festival is the dismissal. To strangers on the land, the object may be *Do ut abeas,* for local Keres could hardly be expected to give to strangers: but to their own folk, the first object of the sacrifice is to gather the spirits together to help; for spirits during the dark dead winter season wander into strange places, from which they must be gathered, must be tempted to share the feast of the worshippers, and then despatched about their business which is to maintain fertility in the land instead of spreading disease among their people: *do ut des* is the object of the people of the land.

Most conquering religions shared in these fertility feasts, as did the conquering Hebrews in Canaan, in spite of the opposition of the prophets. The ruling tribes of West Africa to-day still contribute towards, and share in the sacrifices to the local shrines as a matter of course. The spirits are feared but tended, and there is therefore no undue reason for hostility. But a religion which forbade the tendance of the earth spirits (closely identified with tribal ancestors, for dust they were and unto dust they returned, Chthonian in the most important sense), was a religion which must be opposed by every thinking farmer: conscientious scruples were well enough until they interfered with cattle, crops, and family. Christians were sure of unpopularity with the people of the land.

(*g*) *The Cultured Westerns.*

Cultured men of the West disliked Christianity for more practical reasons. *Religio* (the recognition of supernatural forces) might be to them, as it was to Lucretius, the author of much evil; but it was not wholly bad. Men like Cicero followed Simonides in regarding the nature of God as a matter for Agnostic and scholarly discussion, a matter for quiet and inconclusive reflection, but no matter for vulgar squabbles. The deplorable enthusiasm displayed by the exponents of the various Eastern religions which were

gradually filtering into Rome could not decently be shared by Romans with their boasted *gravitas*. None the less religion was tolerable on two scores: first it was good for the masses, and the apotheosis of the *imperium* in the form of Caesar-worship was to be encouraged: and second, because it is fashionable for the cultured, in a sentimentalized and poetic form, to accept an expurgated and romanticized version of the old myths and legends; Lucretius and his followers of the Epicurean schools, the earnest adherents of the cynics and the sceptics too, might contemptuously disclaim such faery fables, but Roman society enjoyed the innocuous eerieness of fauns and dryads, nymphs and piping Pans. Christians were thus in the worst of taste: they were unpatriotic in refusing to recognize the genius of Rome: and they were crude and vulgar in their whole-hearted belief in these shadowy companions of the Olympians, no less than for their uncompromising description of them as "unclean spirits." For Christians of the West, unlike their more cool-headed brothers of Alexandria and the East, and their own wiser successors of the days of Gregory the Great and after, were certainly uncompromising and crude in their treatment of local beliefs and superstitions: supernatural beings of every kind were labelled demons, and the only angels much mentioned were the fallen ones: indeed, angels as a whole were in some disrepute in the West, and the possibility of God having exercised a pre-Christian dispensation through them in the more enlightened forms of pagan belief does not seem to have been considered.

(*h*) *The Hermetists.*

In the West, therefore, Christianity was a disrupting force. It was disliked because it came from the East, and was enthusiastic and uncompromising. But in the East, and especially in Alexandria, the ground had been prepared for new religions. The Greek schools of philosophy had begun to fuse: since the time of Posidonius, the Stoics had begun to Platonize, and the Platonists to Stoicize: Philo had reconciled Greek philosophy with Judaism: Mithraists from the East

had found a welcome in a country whose traditional religion had been based upon Sun-worship,[5] and whose system of astronomy was quite compatible with their own system. In the teaching of the Hermetists all these elements are found, together with some of the later developments of Zoroastrianism, combined and built up on a Platonic-cum-Stoic foundation: and the date of their written teaching, in the *libelli* which have survived, we may accept as being between 100 A.D. and 300 A.D. (This is the dating of Scott—vide his *Hermetica,* vol. I, pp. 8-9: *vide* also vols. II and III, and the introductions to the individual *libelli.*)

Their doctrines and daemonology are more difficult to classify. They were mystical philosophers, and there was in their teaching a small Egyptian ingredient (for they must themselves have been for the most part Egyptian). Scott remarks (*Hermetica,* vol. I, p. 11): "Egyptian influence may have worked more strongly in another way; it may have affected the spirit or temper of the writers. These men were, some of them certainly, and probably almost all, Egyptians by race, though Greek by education; and there is in some of their writings a fervour and intensity of religious emotion, culminating in a sense of complete union with God, or absorption into God, such as is hardly to be found in Greek philosophic writings, until we come down to Plotinus, who was himself an Egyptian by birth and bringing up." In the Hermetic teachings the transcendence of God was safeguarded in another way than by the use of daemons as ambassadors. God, it was clear, could have no traffic with men as they were: but the mind of man can attain to God and serve him, for mind is the Demiurge, that is God in active form: in man, however, mind (which is normally robed in fire) has to have other robes to protect it from contact with matter: Mind (Nous) is therefore robed in Soul (Psyche), and Psyche is robed in the Vital

[5] Some modern archaeologists deny this, and give reasons to believe that the worship of Ra was worship of the "Little Sun" of the night. By this period, however, whatever its origin, it had declined into a religion with which Mithraism could easily fuse; and Ra was accepted as a Sun-god.

Spirit (Pneuma), which controls the body. After death, Psyche "when it has run the race of piety—and this means, when it has come to know God, and has wronged no man—becomes mind throughout; and it is ordained that after its departure from the body, when it becomes a daemon, it shall receive a body of fire, so that it may work in God's service. But the impious soul retains its own substance unchanged; it suffers self-inflicted punishment, and seeks an earthy body into which it may enter." (W. Scott, *Hermetica,* vol. 1, pp. 198-201. This passage is para: 19a, *Libellus* x, of the *Corpus Hermeticum.*)

Throughout the whole variety of the Hermetic teachings, one or two doctrines remain constant: and one is that man through development of mind can attain to union with God, without the mediation of daemons. Neither daemons nor "other gods" are in themselves "Good," nor men, but God only (*Corpus Hermeticum,* Lib. II, 14-16). There are daemons who bear authority in the material sphere, for instance the Seven Archons (sun, moon, and five known planets) who govern Heimarmene, (*Corpus Hermeticum,* Lib. 1. 9): these are surrounded by armies of daemons (Lib. XVI, 10b-11—an insertion by a transcriber, but none the less reflecting a belief relevant to our period) who govern the irrational part of man: the rational part of man is free[6] from this administration and so free from Heimarmene and the daemons, who are also known as Ousiarchs (Ascl. Lat. III, 19b: vol. 1, p.323). There are, however, some daemons who are Theioi (of the divine nature): it is into such daemons that the good are transmuted after death, and join in the choral dance of the gods (*Corp.Herm.* Lib.X,7). The man who attains to the true Gnosis can pass through all ranks of daemons, after death, and reach God himself (*Corp.Herm.* Lib. I,25: Lib. IV, 8b). Man attains to God through re-birth (*Corp.Herm.* Lib. XIII, *passim*), and the relation is direct and unmediated (*ibid.* Lib. XIV *passim*): evil is unreal, and is resolved by change

6 *Vide* also Ascl. Lat. III, 29b, vol. 1, p. 370, where piety gives this freedom.

(*ibid.*). Some daemons are actually adverse to God, and work against him by implanting evil thoughts (*Corp. Herm.* Lib. IX, 3, 5)—but these are used by God as punishers of impiety (the Avenging Daemon of Lib.I, 23). One, even, of the writers rejects the belief that true personality belongs to daemons (though this was taught by some of the Hermetists, e.g. the author of *Corp. Herm.* Lib.XVI), and calls them *Energeiai* put forth by the *Decani* (the thirty-six star-gods ruling in turn over ten day periods of the year): this amounts in fact merely to a reduction in the number of daemons, for the *Decani* are themselves *Theioi Daemones* (Stob. Exc. VI., 10). It is these *Theioi Daemones* who are referred to, in Excerpt XXIV of Stobaeus (vol. 1, pp. 496-499, sec. 5, 6) as escorting the souls of kings to earth; kings differ in temperament in accordance with the differences in temperament of their escorting daemons. There are orders of daemons who exercise the duty not only of punishing during life, but also of purgation and salvation after death (*vide* Lydus, de mens. 4, 32: probably a summary of a missing passage between Ascl. Lat. 29a and 33b).

To sum up, the Hermetic teaching (1) is not interested in the daemons as mediators, except for the imperfect; they have, however, real importance as administrators in the order of Nature. (2) Only one author (*Corp. Herm.* IX) dwells on demonic activities: as a whole the Hermetists regard "bad" daemons as beings under authority, performing unpleasant duties with a good purpose. (3) In this life daemons are superhuman; potentially the human soul is higher than all but the highest daemons. (4) There are several possible sources of the Hermetic daemonology: the Hellenistic and mystical Platonism-cum-Stoicism of Posidonius and his disciples: a touch of Buddhist influence, for Buddhist missionaries are said to have visited Egypt in the 3rd century B.C., and the Therapeutae (described by Philo) may have sprung from Alexandrian Judaism mixed with Buddhism (Mansel, *The Gnostic Heresies*, p.31f): Chaldaean systems, originating perhaps in Arabia, must have contributed the

doctrine of the Seven Planets as administrators, with their cohorts of daemons.

The contemporary background of thought and belief was certainly not favourable to a religion which maintained that the supreme God had both acted and suffered in history, which tolerated no other worship, and which asserted that the humblest and most unlearned could enter into communion with the Absolute (who was also the Creator and his own only Mediator). Christianity was uncompromising and had made a clean cut with earlier thought: Christian thinkers were not afraid of being unpopular. It would therefore have been delightfully simple for Christians to have adopted a completely Euhemeristic attitude, and to have said, "Your gods and demi-gods are legendary heroes—nothing more." But whereas some Christian writers followed Euhemerus as far as the word "heroes," few added the uncompromising last two words.

Daemons were, in fact, as much a part of the Christian system as of other religions and cults: only they were not mediators under the New Covenant, whatever they may have been under the Old. The Prince of this world, fallen angels, principalities and powers, rulers of the world-darkness, spirits of wickedness in high places—all existed. Indeed, if it were not they whom Christ conquered, then whom? It was not their existence but their claims that Christianity denied. Their death sentence had been passed and their powers over Christians had been taken away. It was the Twilight of the Gods, and the stars were fading: but it was a twilight which promised not darkness but a new dawn. Meanwhile the daemon world was more dangerous than ever to unbelievers and half-believers: the Devil was come down having great wrath, because he knoweth that he hath but a short time.

REVIEWS

EXISTENCE AND ANALOGY. By E. L. MASCALL. (Longmans.) 12s. 6d.

SIX years ago, in *He Who Is,* Mr. Mascall gave us an admirable restatement in modern English of the general structure of Thomistic natural theology. Now he presents us with his later ruminations on the two most pervasive and elusive notions concerned in it. This is undoubtedly the right order in which to publish. If the contents of this book had been incorporated in *He Who Is,* it might have been difficult to see the wood for the trees. As it is, the foundations having already been truly laid, the new volume serves for an increase of clearness and the satisfaction of lingering intellectual scruple. The style of writing, which is quiet and eschews superficial brilliance, has merits which might on this account be overlooked; in reality it attains the greatest lucidity and precision while avoiding pedantry, and nothing better could be said of a philosophical style.

In his reflections on existence Mr. Mascall follows closely the interpretation of St. Thomas first emphasized by M. Gilson in *God and Philosophy* (1941), and later elaborated in the new edition of *Le Thomisme* and, since the time of Mr. Mascall's writing his book, in *L'Etre et l'Essence*. With this the present reviewer is in the heartiest possible agreement. The point is that St. Thomas's most typical thought is at the farthest possible remove from any "essentialist" system, in which existence appears only as the translation into fact of a somehow presupposed essence or nature. Rather what a thing is appears as its mode of that fundamental activity which is existence. Hence it is not only impossible to argue directly, as St. Anselm did, from God's essence to his existence, but, even with the addition of other premisses, an argument from essence to existence does not represent the genuine process of thought. The precise opposite is the case. When we ask why things exist, we are really asking why existence takes this form or that, and we apprehend God when we see that the source of the being of the things of experience must be a being about which no such question can arise, because it is existence itself and, since it is existence itself, must be a fullness or infinity of being. This reflection, while it is analysed by the metaphysician, is not alien from the ordinary man's more implicit and concrete way of thinking; all that it

requires is that we should not dully take the world for granted but should experience a due wonder at the existence of ourselves and of the persons and things about us. Materialists, atheists and agnostics must be convicted of a crass failure to realize what an extraordinary and exciting thing it is that we and other finite things exist.

For Mr. Mascall's exposition of these matters we have nothing but applause; our only doubt concerns whether this should be described as St. Thomas's "existentialism". The term would be appropriate enough if it had not acquired a contemporary application to a type of thinker who, while stressing the uniqueness of existence, treats it in an altogether different way from St. Thomas. The contemporary existentialist, whether theist or atheist, regards existence as a mysterious or even absurd factor which defeats thinking; St. Thomas, on the contrary, found in existence itself the final ground of the intelligibility of the universe. Two so different doctrines hardly merit the same name.

Mr. Mascall on analogy is full of interest but less satisfying than he is on existence. He fully recognizes the difficulties inherent in the traditional descriptions of the analogies of attribution and of proportionality. If we think only of an analogy of attribution between God and creatures, we can say that created perfections are caused by God but not that uncreated perfection is in any way like them. When we try to remedy the position by the analogy of proportionality, the proportion of the divine essence to the divine existence seems to be a relation between two unknowns. How, anyway, can we speak of a relation if the divine essence is really identical with the divine existence? And how is this relation, if we can speak significantly of it, to be compared with the relation of created essence to created existence? We seem to be compelled to introduce another analogy here, and so on *ad infinitum*. Mr. Mascall holds that the notion of existence comes to our rescue again, and that, when we think, for example, of goodness existing self-existently, this indicates to us genuinely although inadequately both the likeness and the difference of created and uncreated goodness. This is acceptable but needs more elaboration, and it may be suggested that an advance in the understanding of analogy demands more than can be wholly expressed in the traditional terminology of attribution and proportionality.

One other point may be singled out for remark. Mr. Mascall follows a contemporary fashion in hesitating to describe our apprehension of God as an inference. It was Dr. Farrer,

perhaps, who set the fashion in *Finite and Infinite* (1943), saying that, since God is not an instance of a class or a case of a rule, there cannot be a formal logical demonstration of his existence, and that an analogical syllogism involves *quaternio terminorum.* Recently Mr. Langmead Casserley, in *The Christian in Philosophy,* has said very much the same. Meanwhile, Dom Mark Pontifex, in his book on *The Existence of God,* had stated that we know God by an analysis of what the existence of a finite thing means, and Dom Illtyd Trethowan, in *Certainty,* said that the apprehension of God was a making explicit of what was at first only implicit in the total datum of experience. All these writers, however, including Mr. Mascall, hold that we know God through creatures and as entailed by the existence of finite things, and the simple-minded may be excused for retorting that this is precisely what we mean when we say that we know something inferentially. Nevertheless it would be excessively simple-minded not to try to discover what these writers are driving at.

It is not clear what sort of argument Dr. Farrer had in mind when he made the accusation of *quaternio terminorum.* It must have been a categorical syllogism in which the middle term was used ambiguously because analogically, but an alleged demonstration of the existence of God in this form would not be easy to find. The genuine process of thought may be represented in abbreviated fashion thus: if finite being exists, infinite being exists; but finite being exists; therefore infinite being exists. Neither the obviousness of the existence of finite being, nor the truth that the recognition of the entailment depends not upon logical acumen but upon an understanding of what finite and infinite being mean, seems to make this process any less inferential. Nor does the fact that there can be only one instance of God make the entailment any less an entailment. Nothing is more infuriating than to be charitably interpreted by someone whom you judge to take an insufficiently subtle view, but we must accept the risk of offending and suggest that these writers have put forward theories which are really inferential but have been deterred from calling them so by an unduly restricted conception of what inference means. It is evidently true, however, and perhaps this is the point which has caused the difficulty, that our quarrel with atheists and agnostics is not about the formal validity of a logical process; it is about the material truth of the entailment of infinite by finite being.

Some apology may be due to Mr. Mascall for having insisted on a question which is given a relatively minor place in his book, and our amends must be to repeat that his discussion is full of

interest throughout. It should be commended wholeheartedly both to Thomists who wish to deepen their understanding of the foundations of metaphysics and to others who have so far shared the common contemporary doubt whether metaphysical thinking can carry them very far or very reliably on the road to God.

D. J. B. HAWKINS.

THE GLORY OF GOD AND THE TRANSFIGURATION OF CHRIST. By A. M. RAMSEY. (Longmans.) 9s. 6d.

"THE business of the world is carried on by words," Hoskyns quoted at the beginning of his commentary on the Fourth Gospel, and he then specified the truth more exactly that "the business of the world depends upon the Word of God both for its creation and for its salvation." Words are the common currency of everyday life and communication, and yet the tragic situation of our day lies in the fact that the words in which the Word of God is spoken to us have lost their meaning for the great majority of men and women; they are entombed in dictionaries and have lost their living power. There is one major task which stands before the Church to-day: to recover the theological meaning of biblical words, and make this meaning plain to men as the interpretation of their existence. Again, Hoskyns asked in one of his sermons: "Can we rescue a word, and discover a universe? Can we study a language, and awake to the truth? Can we bury ourselves in a lexicon, and arise in the presence of God?" It is to this task that Professor Ramsey, one of Hoskyns's most distinguished pupils, has addressed himself in this book.

The first part is concerned with the study of the particular biblical word *glory*, and then to show that "the word *doxa* both reflects and expresses the pattern of the apostolic faith. This faith has as its groundwork the glory of God in creation, in nature and in the history of Israel; it has as its centre the glory of God in the birth, life, death and exaltation of Jesus, and as its goal the participation of mankind and of all creation in the eschatological glory of the Messiah. Creation, redemption, eschatology form a single pattern; and to separate them is to render each of them unintelligible and to distort the theology of the apostolic age" (p. 28). The first two chapters are a fascinating study in linguistic history which leads us right to the heart of this rich pattern of theological meaning. The Hebrew word *Kabod*, which is translated as *glory*, derives from a root meaning *weight* or *heaviness*, and comes to include the ideas of illumina-

tion, radiance, power and righteous character. The makers of the Septuagint bring about a revolution in language by adopting *doxa* as a translation of *Kabod*: they reject the sense of *distinction;* and at the same time they use it to translate other Hebrew words such as majesty, beauty and excellency. " As a result of this wide use the *doxa* of God is more prominent in the Septuagint than is the *kabod* of God in the Hebrew bible, and the doctrine of the divine glory is presented with a greater unity and impressiveness. . . . The Greek word proved itself to be in a striking way both servant and master. Submitting itself to the service of a Hebrew theology, it presses a variety of Hebrew words and ideas into the unity of its own new and massive conception " (p. 24).

This linguistic background is used to expound the New Testament doctrine of glory in the following chapters. " The eschatological use of *doxa* is primary both in the tradition of our Lord's teaching and in the language of the apostolic faith. Yet this language hints that the glory has already been anticipated in the events of the Gospel and in the experience of the Church " (p. 36). Two chapters are devoted to an illuminating discussion of the glory in the resurrection and the parousia, and in the life and the passion, and these are followed by an exposition of the teaching of Paul and John where the primacy of the eschatological note is again emphasized: " The thought of the apostles does not begin with the present and pass on to the eschatology as a kind of further stage. It begins with the eschatology, intent upon the coming Parousia; and then it perceives that the eschatology is being anticipated in the here and now, and that the glory of the Parousia seems to throw its light backwards upon the present life of the Church " (p. 51). The first part of the book concludes with a study of glory in the Christian faith, showing how it unifies the doctrines of God and the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Church and the Last Things, and how this is expressed in Christian worship, " the praise of his glory."

The second part of the book is concerned with the particular event of the Transfiguration, the significance of which is perhaps expressed more clearly by the German title, *die Verklarung*, the Glorification; " for though Saint Luke's narrative alone contains the word 'glory' the word summarizes the dominant idea of all the narratives." The event itself is a kind of " watershed " in the gospel narratives which looks back to the ministry in Galilee and forward to the Passion (p. 101). Professor Ramsey provides a brief survey of different views about the character of

this event which have been held by recent expositors, and then makes a more detailed study of the Markan narrative, and subsequently notes further significant points which appear in other New Testament writings. The book concludes with a chapter on the Transfiguration in the Church, which notes the significance attached to it in her festivals and the relative emphasis given to it in eastern and western Christendom.

Such a summary, however, does much less than justice to the richness of Professor Ramsey's work. He writes with great economy and precision, so that his book has a peculiarly seed-like quality: there is much material in it for meditation, as well as being a sustained essay in biblical theology of a kind which is much needed to-day. He is a master of the relevant literature of the subject, and while his many references are quoted with extreme brevity in most cases, the reader is nevertheless given a sense of complete confidence that the author knows these works thoroughly, has assimilated them and has presented their essential features exactly. Perhaps one's chief regret is that he has not made it a larger work: it points to the situation in the last chapter on the Gospel of the Transfiguration where biblical theology raises philosophical issues, particularly in the brief reference to Toynbee about the transfiguration of human existence in a time of cultural crisis, and to the ultimate mystery of man's destiny in the vision of God. But, of course, one is always inclined to ask too much of esteemed teachers, and the recognition of this is a measure of one's gratitude to them.

R. H. DAUBNEY.

THE CRISIS OF THE HUMAN PERSON. By J. B. COATES. Pp. 248. (Longmans.) 12s. 6d.

THIS book is at first sight rather an odd compilation. It bears the sub-title "Some Personalist Interpretations" and consists in the main of interpretations of the work of ten leading thinkers of our time. I would agree with Mr. Coates's selection; all these writers—I would make an exception of Laski—really have something of importance to say on the spiritual crisis of our time and place, and should be pondered by anyone who wishes to find his way through. Mr. Coates's presentation is clear and fair, apart from certain blind spots which I shall mention presently. Of the ten thinkers, it is evident that he only really approves of the first three—Berdyaev, Buber and Mumford; but it is only in the case of two—Burnham and Heard—that his basic unexamined assumptions seriously obstruct him in the interpre-

tation of his chosen subject. (For example, his account of Heard's alleged wholly unpractical attitude seems seriously at variance with the emphasis in "The Eternal Gospel" on the "intermediate" stage of social evolution—the need not to expect most men to behave according to the Law of Love, but to expend our efforts in making effective the Law of Equity and Chivalry; nor has he really understood Burnham's account of the necessity and legitimacy of myths in their proper place.) Still, the book is well worth reading as an adequate introduction to some important "prophets" of our time.

This, however, is not altogether what Mr. Coates intended it to be. In addition to the above, it contains two chapters on Reich and C. S. Lewis—I for one enjoyed the trenchant criticism of Mr. C. S. Lewis; an Introduction on Personalism, and a concluding essay on Theism and Humanism. This latter is the only part of the book that is quite superficial. It would, of course, be extremely difficult to give a fair account of the case for and against the existence of God in fourteen pages. But for me, at least, this chapter has two glaring defects. First, it starts from the dilemma that the universe is either fortuitous or has a purpose—ignoring the sensible evolutionist's position that there are manifold signs of purpose *in* the universe which we do well to reflect on, but that the universe *as a whole* has no purpose. This position is excellently delineated by Hume in his Dialogues and is basic to Eastern religion. Secondly, it assumes that the notion of God is quite simple, whereas it is extremely ambiguous. He objects to Mr. Stapledon's "agnostic-mystics"; but in one sense of the word these exist and are important—compare J. B. Pratt's Buddhist who was asked by the missionary whom he was praying to for what, and replied: "I am not praying to anyone for anything, just praying".

The real aim of the book is evidently to give a clear account of what the Personalist Movement believes and recommends. To me, an outsider—I have no knowledge of the work of M. Mounier or of the English Group—it seems to fail in this. The keynote of the introduction is that Personalism is to "add a rider to Marxism". I doubt whether Berdyaev, Buber or Maritain would put it in this way, and the common points said to be acceptable to the Personalists are not peculiar to Marxism. It seems rather an attempt to find a new basis for English "Lib.-Lab." democracy in the existentialist philosophy, since the old Christian basis does not make a wide enough appeal.

On the political plane, can an alliance of Church with near-Marxists, inspired only by a common dislike of totalitarianism, be

effective? As the introduction shows, rifts on this issue are already emerging, Continental personalists favouring U.S.S.R. while English personalists favour U.S.A. On the philosophical plane, can our age find a common ideological background in a doctrine which deliberately skates over the issues of Theism, Pantheism and Atheism, absolute and relative morality, the "I" the Self and the community, and merely affirms: "The person—not the individual—is very important, but we can't say why, or what the difference between these conceptions is"?

Mr. Coates's great unquestioned assumption is that existential philosophy—reflection on the nature of personal decision and personal contact—supports Western social-democracy. As a matter of historical fact, this philosophy grew up hand in hand with the inter-war revival of the aristocratic idea, commonly labelled "Fascism". Among the progenitors of this philosophy, Nietzsche and Heidegger are at least as important as those whom Mr. Coates mentions. In his recent illuminating little book *Problems of Socialist England*, Bertrand de Jouvenel attributes the general failure of England in the post-war world to the failure of her intellectuals to take Hitlerism seriously—to understand what problems Hitler was trying to solve and how far he succeeded—because they were bemused by their own war-propaganda; he points out that the Jewish refugees, like Karl Mannheim, knew better and tried to enlighten English opinion, but their efforts had only limited success. Now a recent book adduces as an argument in favour of democracy that it "everywhere replaces persons by institutions". (Hitler's state both in theory and practice was based on the opposite principle.) The depersonalizing influence of mass-organizations is surely a chief source of our troubles.

On the social-political plane, the most important thing seems to be to understand the distinction between Personalism and Individualism—if there is a distinction, as Mr. Coates claims. To demand that I shall be free from all irksome restrictions is surely Individualism rather than Personalism; "there can be no freedom from want except in death", as Burnham so well says. Community life requires the active, creative integration of divergent interests and solving of tensions. This can only really be accomplished by the free person, responsible (as used to be said) "to God alone". The test of genuine belief in Personalism should be willingness to submit one's interests, on matters involving others, to the free judgement of persons. We should train up free and responsible business enterprisers; but the same argument requires that they should, where conflict of interest occurs, willingly submit to the free judgement of local and regional

administrators. Some rules there must be to curb unworthy men, but irresponsible and heartless bureaucracy comes partly from tying the discretion of persons with too many written rules. The one-party system of government, that is, rule by a hierarchy of selected and trained persons with a certain minimum of common ideology, may well be an advance in the direction of Personalism. Justice is something only found through the effort of persons. The present need, in my judgement, is for a strong, really independent State able to control both the great capitalist organizations *and* the great trade unions. But this is not at all what Mr. Coates wants.

I think Mr. Coates throughout the book is misled by the ambiguity of the word " freedom ". There is, indeed, some connexion between spiritual freedom and political freedom, but it is but a slight one. I think that, as its physical basis, spiritual freedom does require some leisure from the mere provision of bodily needs and not too great uncertainty of life. But no one can be made spiritually free any more than he can be made happy by outward conditions. Among other things, spiritual freedom means a freeing of oneself from the conventional orthodoxies of the time; this can only be the result of a personal struggle. Like all mass orthodoxies, these will always include a great deal of error and superstition. I do not think that the Marxist orthodoxy is any greater hindrance to spiritual freedom than others. A good community, in which individuals will willingly make sacrifices of their private interests to one another, requires a certain minimum of common values, which government should quite openly and candidly seek to maintain. Provided government realizes its limitations, there will always be a large field in which the free spirit will blow where it lists. If it fails to realize its limits, persecutions and ideological wars will in the end sicken people of the common ideology.

The counterpart of the crisis in politics is the crisis in the individual. There are always people suffering from oppression, and it should be the business of politics to try to liberate them. But there seem to me to be at least as many to-day obviously suffering from their own discordant wants, fears, hates and ignorance. In my judgement, the business of religion is to be " psychiatric ", not political. If the Churches would really pool their traditional resources in this field, and take a serious interest in the experience of the Eastern religions also, we could see a great advance. Those thinkers who emphasize this task, stressing the need for concentration or for social " oases " (Koestler), and whom Mr. Coates therefore labels " defeatist ", are not really so useless to their fellows, as the East has long realized. For the

free and integrated person is one who *relies on a trained intuition about relative values,* respecting, but not intimidated by, conventional rules. This is a common theme of atheistic and religious existentialists. The free person takes decisions which are often tragic with a sense that he is fulfilling his destiny, or "from faith in God". There is little doubt that the power of creative imagination—of finding the right solution that nobody thought of before—is stronger in those who live in simpler types of society, that in very complicated impersonal societies it gets submerged, and that it can be positively cultivated. Personalism should involve the search for and respect for "wisdom".

C. SUTTON.

THE DIVINE AND THE HUMAN. By NICOLAS BERDYAEV. Translated by R. M. FRENCH. (The Centenary Press.) 18s.

THE death of Nicolas Berdyaev has silenced one of the great prophetic voices of our time. Along the shelf we can count seventeen volumes of his writings which have been translated into English. It is curious, however, that *The Meaning of Creativeness,* one of his major early works to which he has constantly referred, has not yet been translated. It also appears that there are two more substantial books still to come: *Truth and Revelation* and *Creativity and Objectivization,* as well as an *Autobiography.* We shall then have the Berdyaev *corpus* more or less complete. For the majority of English readers he has been the sole way of approach to the richness of Eastern orthodox thought; and one is inclined to wonder at times if this has not been a danger and a limitation. There is a massive and volcanic quality about Berdyaev which tends to inhibit criticism. He is an unsystematic thinker who does not present an argument which the reader can follow to the point where it breaks down and then show where the false conclusion has been drawn. He is given to ponderous utterances, some of which are profoundly illuminating just as others are equally infuriating; and in this situation all one can do, it seems, is to express gratitude for the insights one has received, and to say that there are statements one cannot accept, and contradict them. The western reader cannot fail to be aware that there is a richness and depth in eastern orthodox thought which we have not fully penetrated; and at the same time it is compounded with an element of arrogance which prevents us from sharing in this heritage more fully. It is a pity, therefore, that there are so few other sources from which we can correct Berdyaev or with which we can compare him.

The problem of man has been the central theme in all Berdyaev's writings. He has insisted that the crisis in the modern world demands a religious and philosophical doctrine of man, and that the crisis within Christianity itself has shown that the patristic and scholastic anthropology have proved inadequate to the burden laid upon them. They do "not now correspond to the state of contemporary man, who has undergone a complex development. . . . On the one hand man is being deepened; on the other hand he is being thrown up on the surface." (p. 56-7). In particular, they have been unable to understand the problem of human freedom and creativeness because they are oppressed by the sense of sin (p. 110); and they fail to perceive that the problem of man is not that of man alone but of God-Manhood, the dialectic of the divine and the human. "In order to be completely like man it is necessary to be like God. It is necessary to have the divine image in order to have the human image." (*ibid.*) Yet this conviction immediately leads Berdyaev to overt pantheism: "Man is necessary for the divine life, for its fullness, and on that account only does the divine and human drama exist." (p. 111). In the same way he regards the world and man as necessary to God since they are "an enrichment of the divine life" (p. 7); and this in turn demands "a transvaluation of the doctrine of providence" because the traditional doctrine "has led to an attitude of servile reverence before power and authority" (p. 8).

These pantheistic implications of Berdyaev's thought are difficult to accept; and he himself points out that when pantheism is present, as in certain types of mysticism, it is not only frequently misunderstood owing to a lack of comprehension of the language of the mystics, but it is also not so much a heresy about God as about man, "a diminution of the significance of man, a diminishing of the rôle of human freedom and human creativeness" (p. 25). We are on similarly dangerous ground when Berdyaev cuts through the identification of God and being: "God is the non-being which is supra-being. God is the Existent but not being. God is Spirit but not being" (p. 4). There seems to be a fundamental unintelligibility in this kind of assertion, just as there is in the view he frequently expresses about the primacy of freedom over being. It is, of course, rooted in his protest against all forms of objectivization, which he believes is the inevitable fate of the Christian revelation in the social process. "Objectivization is a distortion of spirituality and at the same time objectivization is a necessity for the realization of the destinies of mankind and of the world for movement towards the Kingdom of the Spirit." (p. 14). He finds the same process

at work in the intellectual interpretation of revelation which is an adjustment to the level of thought.

The indications given here concerning the fuller treatment of revelation in the book which still waits to be translated suggest some cause for apprehension. It is true that the interaction of the divine and the human in the work of revelation has probably not been fully appreciated (largely owing to Barthian influence). But Berdyaev's prophecy of a third stage of revelation in the age of the Holy Spirit (which seems to be due to the influence of Joachim of Floris) appears to beg the question of the finality of the specific revelation in the Person of Christ, and again introduces an unintelligible element into Berdyaev's insistence on messianism, upon which his whole interpretation of history rests.

These are merely one or two examples of the kind of thing which makes one profoundly uncomfortable about Berdyaev; and yet they are very difficult to deal with apart from saying that they are not true, or at least they are not the whole truth. Berdyaev tells us in the preface that *The Divine and the Human* was written during an exceptionally difficult period in his life, both internally and externally; and yet it probably gives one of the best introductions to his thought that is available. The chapters are a peculiar combination of meditation and philosophy. They appear at first sight to be detached from one another, and yet it is possible to detect an underlying pattern. The reader might well be advised to begin with chapter eight, entitled "Manhood." It is immediately preceded by four chapters which are concerned with characteristic elements of man's existential situation: Fear, Suffering, Evil and War. It is followed by three chapters concerned with aspects of man's redemption and destiny: Spirituality, Beauty and Immortality. The book opens with an "undevout meditation" on the crisis of Christianity and the necessity for a critique of revelation; and it concludes with a "devout meditation" on the religion of the spirit and the prophecy of the new aeon.

The reader will find many familiar themes in Berdyaev's work commented on here: the mystery of time and the mystery of sexuality, the rôle of the messianic element in history, comments on Nietzsche, and an analysis of the dialectic of the divine and the human in German thought. For the flashes of insight scattered through the pages he can be profoundly grateful, even if he cannot accept Berdyaev's general position.

R. H. Daubney.

RICHARD HOOKER AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL IDEAS. By F. J. SHIRLEY. (S.P.C.K. for the Church Historical Society, 1949). Pp. vi + 274. 14s. 6d.

THIS book covers a vast field. It contains an exposition not only of Hooker's own political ideas, but of those of his contemporaries, Catholic and Protestant also. There is a particularly interesting chapter on the Jesuits. The book ends with an application of Hooker to present questions.

Its crux seems, however, to be ecclesiastical, rather than in a secular way political. While there is a good deal else, the debatable part of Dr. Shirley's argument rests upon his rejection of the seventh book of the *Ecclesiastical Polity* as in its present form a reliable guide to Hooker's mind. These doubts, by no means unprecedented, are suggested of course by the uncertain history of the manuscript (elucidated in recent times by Professor Sisson), by passages in a style unlike that of the unquestionably authentic parts of the *Polity*, and by a teaching about the episcopate in Book VII, which seems to Dr. Shirley impossible to square with that in the earlier books. In an interesting argument, Dr. Shirley provides a villain of the piece, in Bishop Gauden, editor of the first complete *Polity*, as the unscrupulous redactor of Hooker's original material.

Dr. Shirley puts it that in the seventh book as published by Gauden, episcopacy is of the *esse* of the Church, but in the certainly genuine books, of the *bene esse* only. Here perhaps our learned author overstates the difference. For in the Preface and in Book V, hardly less than in Book VII, the threefold ministry is represented as continuing from the Apostles' time until now. Anything else is clearly regarded as a most disputable novelty. On the other hand, Book VII asserts strongly the divine institution of episcopacy, but at the same time goes to remarkable lengths in making it in certain conditions dispensable, particularly in VII, v, 8. In consequence the odd phenomenon is to be observed that Dr. Shirley finds, as a new recruit to the higher latitudinarians, that Book VII is too "Anglo-Catholic", while Professor Sisson thinks it no book for high Churchmen. Perhaps, too, it is worth while to comment on Dr. Shirley's treatment of Timothy and Titus. He says that they appear in Book VII as "monarchical bishops with power to ordain", but in Book V as "simple missionary presbyters". But does he not here again make too much of the difference? Are not Timothy and Titus in Book V accounted Evangelists, apostolic delegates with power to ordain, with more of the episcopal about them than the phrase "simple missionary presbyters" suggests?

Hooker is, indeed, not altogether easy to interpret, so that it behoves a commentator—still more a reviewer of a commentator—to avoid injudicious dogmatism. Hooker, with all his comprehensiveness of mind (in some ways, how like William Temple) writes at times with a remarkable reserve. Thus in Book III, xi, 20, he distinguishes in a most interesting fashion the constants from the variables of Church polity, in a way that is quite naturally consistent with the highest views of episcopacy contained in Book VII, but does not with absolute necessity involve them. The list of variables makes no allusion to bishops. Difficulty lies, too, for those who would apply the arguments of the sixteenth century to the twentieth in a point at which Dr. Shirley glances (p. 126, n), but does not develop, namely that the distinction was not made by these writers as clearly as it now is between the episcopal functions in the sacramental sphere of holy *order* (not of course absent from their thought), and episcopal activities as rulers in the Church. Similarly, *esse* and *bene esse* are not such terms as Hooker himself would have used, in the way now fashionable, which is prejudicial, and calculated to reduce the bishop to an " optional appendage ". What is implied in the language of such as Bishop Blomfield, who was no tractarian, is quite different. He, claiming to follow Hooker, maintained, in his once celebrated sermons of 1842, that the episcopate is " absolutely necessary to the Church's perfection and efficiency, as a dispenser of truth and grace ".

There are one or two other details to be noticed. It is astonishing to read (p. 1) that Marsilio of Padua was making a case, in 1324, on behalf of the *national* state. It is not true that in " the comfortable days of eighteenth-century English Christianity ", no question was ever raised of the bondage of the Church of England, for it was a main theme of Charles Leslie. To say that Hooker was " well aware of the unrepresentative character of Tudor parliaments " is to read back into the sixteenth century modern conceptions which hardly belong there, but Dr. Shirley, learned man as he is (*clerus Anglicanus stupor mundi*), will by now have read Professor J. E. Neale on the Elizabethan Commons.

One may be doubtful, too, of the applications of Hooker which are made in this book to our present problems. Even with the aid of such a " comprehension " as Dr. Shirley seems now to desire, the primary assumption of Hooker's defence of the English Church settlement still would not be fulfilled, namely that Church and Commonwealth should be personally identical. Many will think it a pity that Dr. Shirley should bring all this

historical artillery to aid those who seek a reunion of English-speaking Protestants by means which threaten the break-up of the Church of England, following on the disruption of its daughter churches overseas. None the less, the arguments in this book deserve consideration, even though some readers will remain unconvinced that Bishop Gauden made after all so much difference to Hooker's work, and will still prefer the judgements of Keble, Church, and Paget.

R. W. GREAVES.

THE DRAMA OF ATHEIST HUMANISM. By HENRI DE LUBAC, S.J. Translated by EDITH M. RILEY. Sheed and Ward. 15s.

PERE de Lubac, a French Roman Catholic theologian whose work is becoming increasingly known and valued in this country, unfolds for us a story which we need to consider with anxious attention. Here in England, where Christian orthodoxy has long been inoculated with a healthy dose of cool rationalism, atheism has been, mostly, liberal, agnostic, polite and, above all, undramatic, averse from pushing beliefs to their logical conclusion. The border line between belief and unbelief has been hard to draw; the orthodox, like the government, have cultivated the habit of "dining with the opposition"; and although zealots may deplore compromise and demand more rigidly defined and guarded frontiers the result has been that the challenge to Christianity has never been so sharp and hostile as it has been in some continental countries.

The continental thinkers of the nineteenth century with whom this book deals were, however, radical and ruthless, anti-clerical, anti-Christian, anti-theist. Feuerbach was the link between Hegel and Marx, the spiritual father of Marxism. But Marx clothed with flesh and blood the abstract figure of divinized man and preached the practical means of expressing humanism in political and economic terms. For both thinkers religion is a serious matter. Neither dismisses it with the shallow contempt of an eighteenth-century sceptic as simply the fabrication of priests. Religion is the opium of the people, but only because religion is in reality man's own consciousness and feeling which has not yet found itself; and a false organization of society has produced a misdirection of this consciousness. Existing society is a false world, and within it religion (in the conventional sense, presumably) is the substitute for a true heart and mind. Radical reorganization of this society will restore the true divinity of man.

Nietzsche was more violent in his hostility. Religion is a

process by which man is debased, and in Christianity this process of self-despoilment and self-debasement is carried to extremes. God is a lie, living only in the human mind; once show how the idea came into the mind, and God is dead. This age celebrates the death of God. "Don't you hear the bell?" had asked Heine. "Down on your knees! The Sacrament is being carried to a dying God." In Comte atheism receives an organized form and becomes a Catholic Church of unbelief.

This atheism was dynamic, and seemed to open the road to human progress. It could inspire men of thought with the desire for action. "So far the philosophers have done nothing but explain the world; now we have got to transform it." Yet the practical result of it has been that man has come to be regarded as a tool or as so much material for the planner; the human person is annihilated, and atheist humanism ends in bankruptcy.

This is the theme of the first two parts of the book: an antitheism which is increasingly positive, organic, constructive, and which "at its maximum point of concentration is the great crisis of modern times, that same crisis in which we are involved to-day and which takes its outward course in disorder, begets tyrannies and collective crimes, and finds its expression in blood, fire and ruin."

In a few discriminating pages (all too few) on Kierkegaard, and in a long third part on Dostoevsky, the Christian answer at its deepest level is discussed. The former recalled men to the true meaning of faith, and "in a century carried away by immanentism, he was the herald of transcendance"; the latter plumbed human nature to its murky depths, and still believed in God and in Christ. "My hosanna has come forth from the crucible of doubt." No man went so far towards the strange frontiers of the spirit: no one came nearer to a solution of the spirit's problems.

The book is a commentary and not a history. It uses quotation extensively to illustrate the thought of these men, and for this reason alone it would be valuable. But it is more than an orthodox critique of heresy. It opens up a grim and frightening chapter in European thought in which it is matter for doubt whether the challenge to Christianity is more radical and disturbing to our peace of mind than the answer. The author writes from the security of the Roman Catholic Church and from within a tradition which has preserved in union both faith and reason. Yet he writes with deep understanding, with an awareness of the imperfection of Christian witness in the past, with a vivid sense of our present troubles and a high conception of the nature and destiny of man.

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